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INTRODUCTION

It can be argued that the Indian right to aboriginal land is
fundamental because land is the basis of all things Indian.
The relationship of a tribe to its land defines the tribe: its
identity, its culture, its way of life, and its methods of adaptation. Since tribal existence is central to personal Indian
selfhood, the very existence of an Indian people is largely
dependent on the recognition and protection of Indian
property rights.1

You are not hostages in our house. We don't hold
you here. But we do recognize the fact that you are in our
house. We have people who are working on settling the
2
dispute as to how you should live in our house.

1. Nell Jessup Newton, FederalPower over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REiv. 195, 252 (1984).
2. Irving Powless, Jr., The Sovereignty and Land Rights of the Houdenosaunee, in
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S the United States looks forward to the twenty-first century,
any localities still face Native American land claims. Some of
these claims are over 200 years old. The United States Supreme
Court's 1991 holding in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak3 -that
the states enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits by Indian tribes 4-may further hinder settlement of these disputes because it alters the balance of power between the states and Native
claimants.
Federal common law, statutes and treaties recognize and protect Native American rights to occupy and use tribal lands.5 These
are among the most important interests that Native Americans hold
and still form the basis for much of today's Indian policy. Unfortunately, the sorry history of Indian relations in this country has too
often been, and continues to be, marred by government and pri6
vate exploitation of Native American property rights.
Native Americans have a unique status in the United States that
is unlike other ethnic and racial minorities. They are neither assimilated nor independent sovereigns. Instead, Indian tribes are considered "dependent domestic nations." 7 As such, their ability to
155, 160-61 (Christopher Vecsey & William A. Stama eds.,
1988) (The author is a chief of the Houdenosaunee [Iroquois Confederacy]
Grand Council).
3. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
4. Id. at 782-88.
5. See, e.g., Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988) [hereinafter Nonintercourse Act] (barring alienation of Native American lands without
federal government's consent); Treaty at Canandaigua, Nov. 11, 1794, U.S.-Six Nations, art. II, III, 7 Stat. 44 (acknowledging lands reserved to Oneida, Onondaga,
Cayuga and Seneca Nations in New York State); Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Oct. 22,
1784, U.S.-Six Nations, art. II, III, 7 Stat. 15 (securing Iroquois Confederacy Nations' possession of their lands within what is now New York State); County of
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 233-40 (1985) [hereinafter Oneida
II] (recognizing cause of action under federal common law); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1974) [hereinafter Oneida 1] (finding federal question jurisdiction).
6. Modem' day examples include usurping reservation water rights, depositing hazardous wastes on tribal lands and taking tribal land by eminent domain for
public works projects.
7. Chief Justice John Marshall described Indian tribes as follows:
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable,
and heretofore unquestioned, right to the lands they occupy, until that
right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; yet
it may well be doubted, whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be
denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to
which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in
point of possession, when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile,
IROQUOIS LAND CLAIMS
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protect their rights has often been limited.8 Until relatively recently, tribal access to the federal judicial system was restricted or
nonexistent. Indian tribes were often forced to rely on the federal
government to assert their rights under the Indian/government
trust doctrine or resort to self-help.
In 1966, Congress enacted the Indian jurisdiction statute. 9

This statute gave the federal district courts original jurisdiction over
civil claims by recognized Indian tribes arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, without regard to the
amount in controversy.1 0 In the 1970s, tribes began filing actions in

federal court asserting possessory rights to millions of acres of ancestral land long since acquired by the states and currently occupied by private citizens, businesses, municipalities, counties and the
states.1

In a series of decisions culminating with County of Oneida v.

Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida I1),12 the United States Supreme

Court eliminated most of the procedural hurdles that had plagued
Indian land claims. It soon became apparent that many of these
suits asserted valid claims and that the tribal plaintiffs had a good
chance of prevailing on the merits. State and local defendants began settlement negotiations. As a result, a number of significant
land claims have settled.
Although their terms vary, negotiated settlements have generally allocated public money and/or land to the Native claimants in
they are in a state of pupilage; their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
8. For a discussion of the restrictions placed on Indian tribes, see infra notes
37-125 and accompanying text.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988).
10. Id.
11. In 1970, the descendants of the original Oneida Indian Nation filed a test
case against two New York counties in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York. They sought the fair rental value over a two-year
period for approximately 100,000 acres of land in central New York State. The suit
culminated in two significant Supreme Court decisions, Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661
(1974) and Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226 (1985). For further discussion of Oneida land
Oneida II, see infra notes 89-125 and accompanying text. Suits by other tribes followed. See, e.g., Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d
612 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981); Joint Tribal Council of the
Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975); Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 649 F. Supp. 420 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 860 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 565 F.
Supp. 1297 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940
(D. Mass. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. Southern R.I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976).
12. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss3/1

4

Nelson: Resolving Native American Land Claims and the Eleventh Amendment:

1994]

CHANGING THE BALANCE OF POWER

529

exchange 'for extinguishing the claimants' possessory interests in
the disputed area not included in the allocation. Many of these
agreements have involved millions of dollars in cash, property
rights and other benefits. Although attention has focused primarily
on the federal government's role in the settlement process, the
state's participation and resources have also been crucial to successful negotiations. By law, the federal government must ratify any
agreement involving alienation of tribal property rights' 3 but will
not do so without the state's consent to the settlement terms. Moreover, the federal government will generally not contribute to a settlement until the state and local parties have agreed to provide
14
their "fair share."
One of the questions that the Supreme Court left open in
Oneida IIwas whether the individual states have sovereign immunity
from suits by Indian tribes.' 5 In 1991, the Supreme Court held that
the Eleventh Amendment bars Indian tribes from suing states in
federal court without the states' consent. 16 As a result, tribes must
now sue local municipalities, counties and private landowners to
recover land and damages. However, these defendants generally
lack adequate resources to either satisfy court judgments or offer
reasonable settlements. Although the states still have an interest in
resolving tribal land claims within their borders, countervailing
political and financial pressures may hinder effective state
involvement.
This Article examines the possible effects of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity on resolving Indian land claims. Parts
II and III summarize the origins of modern Native land claims and
the history of tribal access to the federal courts. Part IV focuses on
Indian land claim settlements. It discusses the benefits of negotiating settlements to these claims and examines three examples: the
Narragansett, Puyallup and Seneca-Salamanca agreements. Part IV
concludes by examining the important role that the states play in
13. Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C § 177 (1988).
14. For a discussion of the federal government's treatment of Native land
claims as a local matter and the state's important role in settlement negotiations,
see infra notes 404-11 and accompanying text.
15. Oneida If,470 U.S. at 252 (leaving undecided whether Congress abrogated
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from tribal suits by enacting
Nonintercourse Act).
16. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991). The states
also have sovereign immunity from suit in their own courts without their consent.
See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989) ("It is an 'established principle of jurisprudence' that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own
courts without its consent." (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529
(1857))).
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the settlement process. Part V summarizes current Eleventh
Amendment law including the states' sovereign immunity from suit
by Indian tribes and Congress' power to abrogate that immunity if
it so chooses. Finally, Part VI evaluates how the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity may affect settlement negotiations in tribal
land claims. 17 The Article concludes that negotiations are likely to
be more difficult and protracted in the future and agreements
harder to reach.
II.

INDIAN TITLE AND THE NONINTERCOURSE ACT

Understanding the basis for modern Indian land claims requires an understanding of how Native American tribes hold property in this country. 18 Indian tribes generally do not own fee simple
title to tribal lands. Instead, they have a possessory interest in their
land that is known as Indian title.1 9
Indian title is based on a legal fiction called the Doctrine of
Discovery. The United States Supreme Court recognized this doctrine in the early 1800s to describe the rights of the discovering
European nations to land in the New World in relation to other
"discovering" nations and the native inhabitants. 20 Under the Doc17. The states' Eleventh Amendment immunity also impacts many other areas
of Indian litigation. This Article focuses on land claims because the consequences
of barring suits against the states are potentially more severe. In some other areas,
such as enforcement of hunting and fishing rights, Native Americans may still be

able to secure prospective injunctive relief against state officials under Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 788 (leaving open question
of whether Indian tribes can obtain injunctive relief).
18. For a discussion of the historical and doctrinal development of federal
restraint on alienating Indian title, see FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 486-93, 508-28 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN HANDBOOK]; Robert N. Clinton & Margaret Tobey Hotopp, JudicialEnforcement
of the FederalRestraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins of the Eastern Land
Claims, 31 ME. L. REv. 17, 17-49 (1979).

19. Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974) (discussing Native American right to
occupancy); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 580 (1832) ("[Indians']
right of occupancy has never been questioned, but the fee in the soil has been
considered in the government.").
Of course, individual Native Americans can own fee simple tide to private
lands. Tribes may also acquire fee tide to non-treaty land where the government
has extinguished Indian tide or where tribes purchase private land in fee. See generally Mashantucket Pequot Indian Settlement Act of 1983, 25 U.S.C. § 1754(b) (8)
(1988) (stating that lands purchased outside of settlement lands will be held in fee
and subject to alienation); Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,
362 U.S. 99 (1960) (holding that land purchased and owned in fee simple by Tuscarora Indian Nation could be taken to construct reservoir).
Federal restraints on alienating tribal land still apply to land that the tribe has
purchased unless the government provides otherwise. COHEN HANDBOOK, supra
note 18, at 484 (discussing federal protection of tribal land acquired by purchase).
20. See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 543-44 (explaining origin and pur-
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trine of Discovery, the discovering or conquering nation had legal
title to the land that it discovered. This title was good against all
other nations and gave the discovering nation the sole right to acquire possession of the land from the native inhabitants.2 1 Native
Americans had the right to inhabit and use the land subject only to
the sovereign or discovering nation's right to extinguish the Native
Americans' right of occupancy. 22 The sovereign could extinguish
Indian title by either purchase or "just conquest."23 Accordingly,
when Great Britain "discovered" North America, it became the
sovereign with the sole right to extinguish Indian title. 24 The
power of sovereignty then passed to the original thirteen states
when they declared-or won-their independence from Great
Britain. 25 Under the Constitution, sovereignty passed to the federal
26
government.
The Doctrine of Discovery is, in effect, codified in the United
pose of the Doctrine of Discovery); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,
572-74 (1823) (explaining Doctrine of Discovery and diminishment of native inhabitants' rights in land discovered by European nations); see also ROBERT A. WILLIAMs, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF
CONQUEST 312-17 (discussing Chief Justice Marshall's acceptance of Doctrine of

Discovery as means for rationalizing process of Native land acquisition in America
based on Euro-centric, feudally-derived doctrines of conquest).
21. Oneida II, 470 U.S. 231, 234 & n.3 (1985) (explaining Doctrine of Discovery); Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572-74 (stating that discovery gave exclusive
title to discovering nation with "sole right of acquiring soil from the natives, and
establishing settlements upon it").
22. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 234 & n.3; Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572-74; see
also Newton, supra note 1, at 207-09 (explaining Doctrine of Discovery and Indian
title).
23. Johnson,21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587-91; see also Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Oct.
22, 1784, U.S.-Six Nations, 7 Stat. 15, 15-16 (taking cessions of land from the hostile Iroquois Nations following War for Independence with Great Britain). What
constitutes 'just" as opposed to "unjust" conquest is unclear. History suggests that
"just"conquest is whatever the sovereign determines it to be. See United States ex
rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941) (quotingJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 586 (1823)) ("The exclusive right of the
United States to extinguish Indian title has never been doubted. And whether it
be done by treaty, by the sword, by purchase, by the exercise of complete dominion adverse to the right of occupancy, or otherwise, its justness is not open to
inquiry .... ").
24. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573-74, 576-80. Of course, the same right
of sovereignty also passed to the other "discovering" nations of what is now the
United States, including Spain, France and Russia.
25. Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974) (discussing historical development of
authority over Native American lands). During the confederal period, the right to
extinguish Indian title to land outside of the original states' boundaries, but within
the national domain, vested in the central government. Id.; Johnson, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) at 584-88.
26. Oneida , 414 U.S. at 667 ("Once the United States was organized and the
Constitution adopted ... tribal rights to Indian lands became the exclusive province of federal law."). Similarly, when the United States acquired territory from
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States Constitution2 7 and the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act
(the "Nonintercourse Act").28 The Indian Commerce Clause of the
Constitution reserves to the federal government the right to regulate commerce with Indian tribes.2 9 The grant of power is plenary.
The Nonintercourse Act, first promulgated in 1790 under the Indian Commerce Clause,3 0 prohibits alienating Indian land without
the federal government's consent.3 ' The government's consent
other nations, such as the Alaskan territory from Russia, it also acquired the right
to extinguish native title as an incident of sovereignty.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
28. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988); Oneida 1,414 U.S. at 678 ("[T]he Nonintercourse
Acts... put into statutory form what was ... the accepted rule-that the extinguishment of!Indian title required the consent of the United States.").
29. The Indian Commerce Clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power
.[t]o regulate Commerce with ... the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
30. Nonintercourse Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 177 (1988)). The Nonintercourse Act was designed to preserve peace on the
frontier, reinforce the Indian Commerce Clause against the states and discourage
Indian reprisals against White settlements by assuring the Indians that their possession of tribal lands was secure. These goals would facilitate the orderly advancement of the frontier. SeeJack Campisi, From Stanwix to Canandaigua:NationalPolicy,
States'Rightsand Indian Land, in IROQUOIS LAND CLAIMS 49, 61 (Christopher Vecsey
& William A. Starna eds., 1988) (explaining that Congress enacted Nonintercourse
Act out of fear that state and private cessions of Indian land would cause a general
Indian war); Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 18, at 36-37; Daniel M. Crane, CongressionalIntent or Good Intentions: The Inference of PrivateRights of Action under the Indian
Trade and Intercourse Act, 63 B.U. L. REv. 853, 896-904 (1983) (discussing policy
behind Nonintercourse Act).
31. The current version of the Nonintercourse Act provides:
No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or
claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any
validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention
entered into pursuant to the Constitution. Every person who, not being
employed under the authority of the United States, attempts to negotiate
such treaty or convention, directly or indirectly, or to treat with any such
nation or tribe of Indians for the title or purchase of any lands by them
held or claimed, is liable to a penalty of $1,000. The agent of any State
who may be present at any treaty held with Indians under the authority of
the United States, in the presence and with the approbation of the commissioner of the United States appointed to hold the same, may, however,
propose to, and adjust with, the Indians the compensation to be made for
their claim to lands within such State, which shall be extinguished by
treaty.
25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988).
Since 1871, when the United States stopped making treaties with Indian
Tribes, Congress generally has authorized transfers of tribal property interests by
statute. See generally Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1705
(1988) (ratifying all prior transfers of Narragansett Tribe's land and extinguishing
Tribe's aboriginal tile). However, Congress may also expressly delegate its authority to the Executive branch. See COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 515-17 (dis-.
cussing restraints on alienation of tribal lands).
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must be "plain and unambiguous."3 2 Conveyances of Native Ameri33
can land made in violation of the Nonintercourse Act are void.
Native American possessory rights to tribal lands may be based
on aboriginal title or recognized title.3 4 As discussed, aboriginal title arises out of the Doctrine of Discovery and the Nonintercourse
Act. However, the federal government has often formally recognized various tribes' rights to specific tracts of land through treaties,
statutes and executive orders. In addition to the federal government,3 5 the states, political subdivisions of the states and private
parties have also acquired millions of acres of Native American land
over the years. Any conveyance of Indian land, made subsequent to
the Nonintercourse Act, that the federal government has not ratified, was made illegally and is potentially the basis for a tribal land
36
claim.
III.

THE HISTORY OF TRIBAL ACCESS TO THE FEDERAL COURTS

A.

37

Before Oneida I and II

One of the primary purposes of the federal courts is to provide
32. Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1985) (quoting United States ex rel. v.
Santa Fe Pac. R.R, 314 U.S. 339, 346 (1941)). Instruments of conveyance, such as
treaties and purchase contracts, between Indians and other entities are interpreted
in the light most favorable to the Indians. Id. at 247.
33. Id. at 245-46.
34. "Aboriginal title" is also called "ancestral title," and "recognized title" is
also referred to as "formal title."
35. The federal government has acquired most of the Native Americans' land.
See Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958, 972 n.5 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The
138 million acres held exclusively by Indians in 1887 when the General Allotment
Act was passed had been reduced to 52 million acres by 1934 ....[In 1934) John
Collier testified before Congress that nearly half of the lands remaining in Indian
hands were desert or semi-desert, and that 100,000 Indians were 'totally landless as
a result of allotment.' "(citations omitted)); William T. Hagan, "To Correct Certain
Evils:" The Indian Land Claims, in IRoQuoIs LAND CLAIMS 17 (Christopher Vecsey &
William A. Starna eds., 1988) (estimating that United States has acquired 90% of
Native Americans' land by treaty or agreement).
36. See Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 18, at 42-44 (discussing early state cessions of Indian land). Authorities estimate that New York State alone has entered
into almost 200 treaties alienating Indian land in violation of the Nonintercourse
Act. Id. at 43.
37. See generally COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 562-74 (discussing tribal
access to Court of Claims and Indian Claims Commission); Clinton & Hotopp,
supra note 18, at 45-51 (discussing tribal access to federal courts during 18th, 19th
and 20th centuries); Hagan, supra note 35, at 17-30 (discussing tribal access to
federal judicial system); Newton, supra note 1, at 199-236 (providing historical
overview of Congress' authority.to regulate Indian affairs and judicial deference to
that authority); Glen A.Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Claims Before the Court of Claims, 55
GEO. L.J. 511, 511-28 (1966) (examining history of tribal litigation against federal
government in Court of Claims); John Edward Barry, Comment, Oneida Indian
Nation v. County of Oneida: Tribal Rights of Action and the Indian Trade and
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a federal forum for vindicating federal rightsA 8 Yet before 1968, 39
Native Americans' access to the federal court system to assert federally protected tribal rights was often barred or restricted. In large
part, this was due to the Indians' special status as wards of the federal government, prejudice and national policy to open the frontier
for White settlement through the orderly acquisition of Native
40
land.
During the confederacy, 4 1 the United States had no national
courts because the Articles of Confederation failed to provide for a
national judicial system. 42 The state courts heard both state and
national claims. However, Indian tribes were expected to petition
the President to redress an infringement of their formal treaty
rights.

43

Even after the national courts were created under the ConstituIntercourse Act, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1852, 1858-62 (1984) (discussing historical
limitations on Native Americans' access to federal and state courts in connection
with Oneida test case).
38. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 960-61 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafterHART & WECHSLER]. For
an interesting discussion of the essential and nonessential functions of the federal
courts, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal
Courts, 1 B.Y.U. L. REv. 67, 77-95 (1990).
39. SeePoafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 368-69 (1968) (holding that
government/Indian trust relationship does not preclude tribes from suing on their
own behalf to protect their property interests).
40. See generally Nancy Carol Carter, Race and Power Politics as Aspects of Federal
Guardianship over American Indians: Land-Related Cases, 1887-1924, 4 Am. INDIAN L.
REv. 197, 226-29 (1976) (discussing federal guardianship power over Native Americans and influence of racial and cultural prejudice); Newton, supra note 1, at 21422, 236 (discussing historical basis and exercise of federal plenary power over Native Americans).
41. The colonies declared their independence from Great Britain in 1776.
The Articles of Confederation were submitted to the United States in Congress
Assembled in 1777, but were not ratified until 1781. See WiLIAMS, supra note 20, at
289-96 (discussing dispute between "landed" and "landless" states delaying ratification of Articles of Confederation). The United States Constitution became effective in June, 1788, after ratification by 9 states. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE

§ 1.1, at

33-34 (2d ed. 1992).
42. The Articles of Confederation did make the United States in Congress
Assembled the "last resort on appeal" in disputes between states "concerning
boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever" and specified a procedure for
selecting a seven-judge panel. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX. The Articles
also gave the Confederal Congress power to create certain admiralty courts. Id. In
1780, Congress created "The Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture" as the first
national court. The court existed until May 16, 1787. HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 38, at 4-5 n.17-18.

43. See Treaty at Canandaigua, Nov. 11, 1794, U.S.-Six Nations, art. VII, 7 Stat.
44, 46 (stating that nations of Iroquois Confederacy could complain to United
States President or his appointed superintendent to redress wrongs against them
until legislature enacted other means for asserting their rights).
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tion 44 and the First Judiciary Act, Native Americans did not have
access to them. Congress did not delegate federal question jurisdiction over civil cases to the lower federal courts in the First Judiciary
Act.4 5 Accordingly, Indians could not assert any claims arising
under the United States Constitution, laws or treaties in the federal
courts. 46

They could not invoke the courts' diversity jurisdiction

because Congress did not confer citizenship on Indians until
1924. 47 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court held in

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia4 8 that Indian tribes were not independent
sovereign nations but rather "domestic dependent nations." 49 As
such, they were not foreign states that could invoke the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction or the lower courts' foreign diversity
jurisdiction. 50
Congress finally granted the lower federal courts federal question jurisdiction in 1875.51 However, the courts were still uncertain
as to whether Indians could sue to protect tribal rights without a
specific statute authorizing them to sue.52 Native Americans were
44. Article III of the Constitution provides for the Supreme Court and defines
the Court's original and appellatejurisdiction. It also empowers Congress to establish lower federal courts and to confer judicial power on them within the scope of
Article III. U.S. CONST. art. III.
45. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 38,
at 30-34 (summarizing provisions of First Judiciary Act). However, Congress did
give the lower federal courts jurisdiction over federal criminal law prosecutions.
Judiciary Act § 9, at 76-77. The Supreme Court was given appellate jurisdiction
over some federal questions from the states' highest courts. Id. § 25, at 85-87; see
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 38, at 30-34 (summarizing provisions of First Judiciary Act).
46. See Crane, supra note 30, at 901-02 (discussing Executive's primary enforcement role under Nonintercourse Act). A tribe could invoke the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction to review a state court judgment on a federal claim.
Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 255 n.1 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); Clinton &
Hotopp, supra note 18, at 46-47 n.141. However, state courts were not generally
open to Indians, especially to claims against the state. See The Supreme Court, 1984
Term-Leading Cases, 99 HARv. L. REv. 120, 261 (1985) (discussing state court hostility toward tribal plaintiffs). For further discussion of the difficulties Native
Americans faced in state courts, see infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
47. Act ofJune 2, 1924, ch. 233,43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b) (1988)).
48. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
49. Id. at 17 (discussing relationship between Indian nations and federal
government).
50. Id. at 19-20; see also Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 255 n.1 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part) (noting that before 1875, Indian tribes could not invoke federal
courts' original jurisdiction to assert federal land claims; they could only obtain
Supreme Court appellate review from state court judgments).
51. Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988)).
52. See, e.g., Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 444-46 (stating that
where Executive had right to sue for Indians, Indians had no say in litigation and
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considered "wards" of the United States government. Under the
trust doctrine, the government had the duty to protect tribal interests. Accordingly, the federal courts generally concluded that Indian tribes did not have the capacity to sue on their own behalf;
they still had to rely on the federal government to assert their
rights.
Too often, however, the government was not inclined to assert
Indian rights for any number of reasons.5 3 When the federal government did choose to protect Native rights, the courts were often
hostile.5 4 Even enforcing favorable court decrees could be problematic in the Nation's early years because of governmental hostility
implying that they had no right to sue on their own behalf), rev'd sub nom. Mullen
v. United States, 224 U.S. 448 (1912);Jaeger v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 278, 288
(1892) (finding that Indians did not have "common-law rights of suitors" and,
therefore, were "not defendants . . . distinct from the United States" who were
entitled to notice); id. at 285 (stating also that, "[w]henever... [Indian nations,
tribes or Indians] have asserted a legal capacity in the maintenance of their rights,
it has been in pursuance of some statute of the United States specially conferring
upon them the civil rights of suitors."); see Newton, supra note 1, at 205, 228-29
(discussing historical development of Indians' standing); see also United States v.
Forness, 125 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1942) (United States suing for Seneca Nation to
determine if Senecas could cancel defaulted leases), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 694
(1942). But see Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co. 390 U.S. 365, 370-71 (1968) (construing Heckman as implying Indian standing to sue). In Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., the
Supreme Court finally rejected the argument that the government's trusteeship
restricted Native Americans' right to sue on their own behalf to protect property
rights. Poafpybitty, 390 U.S. at 370-71. Six years later the Supreme Court recognized that the federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over tribal land
claims. Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661 (1974). For further discussion of Oneida I, see infra
notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
53. Indian policy in the United States has shifted dramatically a number of
times. For example, rapid settlement of the West in the late 1800s required acquisition of large areas of Indian land. Between 1871 and 1928, Congress adopted a
policy of forced allotment of Indian lands and assimilation. The government divided tribal land and gave parcels to individual Indians. Surplus land was sold to
whites. COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 127-43; Newton, supra note 1, at 21922. Between 1943 and 1961, the government adopted a policy of terminating federal responsibility over Indian tribes and affairs. COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 18,
at 152-80.
54. Professor Prucha described the early territorial courts as follows:
The courts reflected the milieu in which they existed. The courts and
juries were frontier-minded, opposed both to the Indians and to the federal army officers who were on hand to protect the red men. The Indians
were a physical hindrance to the advance of white settlement, whose
mere presence on the land was bad enough, but whose savage ways
(breaking out again and again into atrocities under the repeated sting of
injustice and hatred from the whites) seemed to justify extermination.
The army with its authoritarian ways was said to be inimical to American
democracy, which flourished in a somewhat undomesticated variety on
the frontier.
FRANCIS PAUL PRUcHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS 1790-1834 276 (1962).
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to Native property and sovereignty interests.5 5 Moreover, the tribes
could not sue the federal government for failure to protect their
rights because the government had sovereign immunity. 5 6 Even if a
tribe could find a federal forum, state sovereign immunity barred
any action against the state, local governmental entities or public
officials. 57 When Congress finally conferred citizenship on Native
Americans in 1924,58 individual Indians could assert private claims
under diversity jurisdiction. However, they generally lacked stand59
ing to assert tribal rights in federal court.
Theoretically, Native Americans could enforce their rights in
the state courts. In reality, they were usually barred from the state
courts as well. Considered "illiterate savages," they lacked the capacity to sue. 60 When they could invoke the state's jurisdiction, judicial impediments such as incapacity to serve as witnesses or jurors
made litigation virtually impossible. 61 Other social and cultural
barriers also hindered effective access to the state courts, including
racism, ignorance of the "whiteman's" system of justice and illiter55. Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 18, at 47 & n.143 (discussing Jackson administration's hostility toward Supreme Court decisions protecting Indian land
rights).
56. COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 563 (noting that doctrine of sovereign immunity barred most tribal suits against federal government prior to enactment of Indian Claims Commission Act in 1946).
57. Clinton & Hotopp, supranote 18, at 46-47. In 1977, the Supreme Court
held that political subdivisions of the state were not considered part of the state for
Eleventh Amendment purposes. Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 280 (1977). The Supreme Court also recognized a narrow exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity by allowing suits for injunctive relief against state officials to vindicate federal rights. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). For a
discussion of suits against state officials under ExparteYoung, see infra notes 441-55
and accompanying text.
58. Act ofJune 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b) (1988)).
59. See, e.g., Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 1994 WL
590827, at *9 n.1 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Individual Indians do not fall within the zone of
interests to be protected by the Nonintercourse Act."); United States v. Dann, 873
F.2d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir.) (stating that individual Indians lacked standing to contest transfers of tribal land in violation of Nonintercourse Act), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
890 (1989); James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71, 72 (1st Cir. 1983) (explaining that only
Indian tribes, as opposed to individuals, possessed standing to sue), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 129 (1984); Epps v. Andrus, 611 F.2d 915, 918 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating that
"claims on the part of individual Indians... are not cognizable"); Mashpee Tribe
v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 579 (1st Cir.) (stating that plaintiff must have
been tribe when it commenced suit to have standing)', cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866
(1979).
60. SeeJohnson v. Long Island R.R., 56 N.E. 992, 993 (N.Y. 1900) (holding
that allowing Indians to sue would be contrary to public policy).
61. See The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Leading Cases, supranote 46, at 261 (discussing problems Indians faced in state courts).
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acy. 62 Moreover, state sovereign immunity barred Native Americans
from asserting any claims against the state without the state's
63
consent.
In 1855, Congress passed the first Court of Claims Act.64 The
Act created a limited waiver of federal sovereign immunity. It allowed suits against the federal government for money damages.
However, in 1863, Congress specifically amended the Court of
65
Claims Act to exclude claims based on treaties with Indian tribes.
As a result, tribes had to petition Congress for special legislation
granting the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear individual claims.
Because each act was a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, the
Court of Claims tended to interpret the jurisdictional grants narrowly to include only the parties and claims specified. 66 Moreover,
the Court of Claims often refused to address the merits, finding
that the suit presented a nonjusticiable political issue. Congress
passed approximately 200 special acts between 1863 and 1946.67
68
Only twenty-nine resulted in awards for the Indian claimants.
The others were mostly dismissed on technical grounds, forcing
claimants to petition Congress for revised jurisdictional grants. 6 9 As
70
a result, the system was both cumbersome and ineffective.

62. See Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 18, at 46.
63. Id. at 45, 47-48 n.141.
64. Act of February 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (as amended by Act of
March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 765, 767 (1863)); see also UNITED STATES INDIAN
CLAIMS COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 2-3 (1979) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (explaining
Court of Claims' role in tribal land litigation).
65. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 765, 767.
66. See, e.g., Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 95 Ct.
Cl. 642, 681-93 (1942) (stating that proof of aboriginal title was insufficient where
jurisdiction was limited to claims arising from treaty), aff'd, 324 U.S. 335 (1945);
Klamath & Moadoc Tribes v. United States, 81 Ct. Cl. 79 (dismissing case because
original jurisdictional grant did not authorize Court of Claims to examine evidence), aff'd, 296 U.S. 244 (1935); see COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 563,
565 (noting limitations placed on jurisdictional grants); Wilkinson, supra note 37,
at 513-17 (discussing narrow interpretation of jurisdictional grants).
67. FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 3. Congress approved the first jurisdictional petition in 1881. Only 39 cases were granted jurisdiction before 1924. After
Indians gained citizenship in 1924, Congress authorized claims more readily. Id. at
2-3; Hagan, supra note 35, at 19-20.
68. FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 3. Moreover, most of the special jurisdictional acts also allowed awards for the tribe to be offset by the government's expenditures on the tribe's behalf. Wilkinson, supra note 37, at 517-18.
69. FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 3.
70. These cases took a great deal of time to litigate. First, the Indians had to
get Congress to pass a special jurisdictional act. Then they had to litigate their
claim before the Court of Claims. Assuming they won, damage judgments by the
Court of Claims were not self-executing. COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 57273. Congress still had to appropriate the necessary funds and determine the
method of distribution or use. Id. Native Americans had trouble hiring and pay-
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Congress formally granted Native Americans the right to sue in
1946. It enacted the Indian Claims Commission Act which established the Indian Claims Commission. 7 1 The Commission could
hear all claims that would be within the Court of Claims' jurisdiction if brought by a non-Indian; cases in law and equity arising
under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States or
executive orders; and certain other equitable claims, including
those based on principles of fair dealing.72 Indians could file
claims accruing before August 13, 1946, 73 and statute of limitations
74
and laches defenses were not applicable.
The Indian Claims Commission Act allowed tribes to sue the
federal government for breach of its trust duty to protect and manage tribal lands. 75 However, the tribes could only recover money
damages. The Act did little to help the tribes assert their possessory
rights to lost land. They could not sue the states or current,
nonfederal landowners, and they could not sue for possession of
the land. 76 In 1978, Congress terminated the Indian Claims Commission and transferred the cases still pending before the Commising lawyers who were willing to accept litigation that could take years. Moreover,
the General Accounting Office and Department ofJustice could not keep up with
the work load, and data requests caused a backlog of cases. See id.; Hagan, supra
note 35, at 19-20; Wilkinson, supra note 37, at 513-18 (discussing difficulties that
tribal plaintiffs faced, including set-offs against awards).
For an egregious example of the problems with the special jurisdiction grants,
see Hagan, supra note 35, at 20 (discussing the Klamath Tribe's attempts to litigate
before the Court of Claims). In 1920, Congress passed a jurisdictional act allowing
the Klamath Tribe of Oregon to sue. The Court of Claims dismissed the case fifteen years later. Congress then had to' amend the jurisdictional act to allow the
court to examine the evidence. In 1937, seventeen years after the original jurisdictional grant, the Court of Claims awarded judgment to the Indians. The government paid $108,750 for land worth $3 million. Id; see also Wilkinson, supra note 37,
at 512-13 (discussing Turtle Mountain Band's attempts to have Congress pass jurisdictional act authorizing Band to sue over 10 million acre land cession treaty).
71. Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 70-70v-3 (1988)); see also COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 160-62
(explaining origin and responsibilities of Indian Claims Commission); FINAL REPORT, supranote 64, at 4-5; Wilkinson, supra note 37, at 518-28 (discussing scope of
Indian Claims Commission Act).
72. Ch. 959, § 2, 60 Stat. 1049, 1050 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1988)). The
Court of Claims had appellate jurisdiction over the Commission's decisions. Ch.
959, § 20(b), 60 Stat. 1049, 1054 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 70s (1988)).
73. Ch. 959, § 2, 60 Stat. 1049, 1050.
74. COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 564.
75. Id. at 565-68; see, e.g., United States v. Oneida Indian Nation, 576 F.2d 870
(Ct. Cl. 1978) (involving Oneida Nation's suit against government for breach of
fiduciary duty).
76. See Ch. 959, § 2, 60 Stat. 1049, 1050 (allowing "claims against the United
States"). For a discussion of the remedies under the Indian Claims Commission
Act and their limitations, see Hagan, supra note 35, at 20-24.
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sion to the United States Court of Claims. 77
Congress gave the Court of Claims original jurisdiction over
Indian claims against the federal government accruing after August
13, 1946.78 The Court of Claims, which is now called the United
States Court of Federal Claims, hears claims arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States; claims arising under
executive orders; and claims that could otherwise be brought by
non-Indians in the United States Court of Federal Claims. 79
Although tribes can sue the federal government for breach of its
trust responsibility to protect their land, they still cannot recover
their property interests. Moreover, they cannot recover for claims
based on unrecognized aboriginal title, which the Indian Claims
Commission Act had allowed.8 0
By the 1960s, the federal courts were interpreting the district
courts' general grant of federal question jurisdiction more liberally.
However, many courts still refused to hear tribal land claims on procedural grounds. They frequently found that these claims were
nonjusticiable or untimely or that the claimants lacked standing. 8 1
Satisfying the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 was also a problem prior to 1980.82
77. Act of Oct. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-465, § 2, 90 Stat. 1990 (1976) (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 70v (1988)). The Indian Claims Commission adjudicated over 500 claims. The Indians won more than 60% of these claims. The
awards totalled more than $800 million. Sixty cases were transferred to the Court
of Claims when the Commission finally terminated. FINAL REPORT, supra note 64,
at 21; Hagan, supra note 35, at 23-24.
78. Ch. 959, § 24, 60 Stat. 1049, 1055 (repealed 1949) (codified as reenacted

at 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1988)).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1988). Section 1505 currently provides:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction of any.
claim against the United States accruing after-August 13, 1946, in favor of
any tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American Indians residing
within the territorial limits of the United States or Alaska whenever such
claim is one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States, or Executive orders of the President, or is one which otherwise
would be cognizable in the Court of Federal Claims if the claimant were
not an Indian tribe, band or group.
Id, see also COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 566-68 (discussing Court of Claims
jurisdiction over claims arising after 1946).

80. See COHEN

HANDBOOK,

supra note 18, at 566-67 (noting Court of Claims

lack of jurisdiction over claims involving "unrecognized original Indian title").
81. See The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 46, at 260-61
(discussing Indians' lack of access to federal courts).
82. See Yoder v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Indian Reservation,
339 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that suit by Indian tribes did not satisfy
amount in controversy requirement and therefore court lacked subject matter jurisdiction). 28 U.S.C. § 1331 no longer contains an amount in controversy
requirement.
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Finally, in 1966, Congress gave the federal district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States that are brought by recognized
Indian tribes.83 Unlike the general federal question jurisdiction
statute in effect before 1980,84 28 U.S.C. § 1362 has no amount in
controversy requirement and is limited to tribal claims. 85
By enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1362, Congress finally recognized the
right of Indian tribes to protect their federal rights in the federal
courts. In 1968, the Supreme Court also clarified that the federal
government's trust relationship does not impair a tribe's ability to
sue on its own behalf to protect tribal property interests. 86 Beginning in 1970, various tribes filed actions asserting possessory claims
to their ancestral lands. 87 Defendants in these actions were quick
to raise nonjusticiability, lack of standing, statute of limitations,
laches, Eleventh Amendment immunity and other defenses. 88
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988).
84. Before the 1980 amendment, § 1331 (a) provided: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actionswherein the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Act of July 25, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 1, 72 Stat. 415 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976)).
Congress eliminated the amount in controversy requiiement from general federal
question jurisdiction in'1980. Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94
Stat. 2369 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1988))..
85. Section 1362 provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions, brought by any Indian Tribe or band with a governing body duly
recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1362. Because § 1331 no longer has an amount in controversy requirement,
§§ 1331 and 1362 arguably confer essentially the same jurisdiction over tribal litigation. See Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974) (finding jurisdiction under both 28
U.S.C. §§ 1362 and 1331). However, § 1331 does not limit jurisdiction to claims of
tribes with "a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior."
Therefore, unrecognized tribes may invoke § 1331 jurisdiction. See Narragansett
Tribe v. Southern R.I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798, 805 ni.3 (D.R.I. 1976)
(noting that unrecognized tribe could assert jurisdiction under § 1331); Clinton &
Hotopp, supra note 18, at 50 (same).
86. Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365 (1968).
87. See, e.g., Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (complaint filed 1970); Mohegan
Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980) (complaint filed 1977); Joint
Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975)
(complaint filed 1975); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297
(N.D.N.Y. 1983) (complaint filed 1980); Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447
F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp.,
592 F.2d 575 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979) (complaint filed 1976);
Schaghticoke Tribe of Indians v. Kent School Corp., 423 F. Supp. 780 (D. Conn.
1976) (complaint filed 1975); Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. Southern RI. Land
Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976) (complaint filed 1975).
88. See, e.g., Oneida H, 719 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1983) (listing among other defenses statute of limitations, nonjusticiability and good-faith occupancy), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. New
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In 1970, the Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin, the Oneida
Indian Nation of New York and the Oneida of the Thames Band
Council filed a test action against Madison and Oneida Counties,
New York.90 The Oneidas sought the fair rental value, over a twoyear period, for certain land that the defendant counties owned
and used. 9 1 The land in question was part of approximately
100,000 acres that the original Oneida Nation conveyed to New
York State in 1795. The Oneidas claimed that the 1795 treaty was
void under the Nonintercourse Act because the federal government
had never ratified the conveyance. 92 The defendant counties filed
a third-party complaint for indemnification against New York
State. 93
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York originally dismissed the action. 94 The district court
found that the Oneidas' complaint asserted a possessory claim
under state law. It therefore failed to raise a federal question sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or
§ 1362. 95 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second CirYork, 691 F.2d 1070 (2d Cir. 1982) (listing among other defenses Eleventh Amendment immunity, nonjusticiability and laches); Aquilar v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 433
(D. Alaska 1976) (describing Eleventh Amendment immunity as defense); Schaghticoke Tribe of Indians, 423 F. Supp. at 785 (listing among other defenses laches,
statute of limitations, adverse possession, waiver and estoppel); NarragansettTribe of
Indians, 418 F. Supp. at 804 (listing among other defenses laches, statute of limitations, estoppel and failure to join United States as necessary party).
89. 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
90. Oneida I, 470 U.S. at 229. For a more detailed discussion of the historical
background of the Oneida test case, see Oneida I, 719 F.2d 525, 527-30 (2d Cir.
1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) and Arlinda F. Locklear,
The OneidaLand Claims "A Legal Overview, "in IROQUOIS LAND CLAIMS 141-53 (Christopher Vecsey & William A. Starna eds., 1988).
91. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 229. The complaint sought damages equalling the
fair market rental value of the disputed land from January 1, 1968 through December 31, 1969. Id. The plaintiffs deliberately limited the relief sought in the test
case so that the court would not be overwhelmed and declare this type of Native
land claim nonjusticiable. See infra notes 180-90 and accompanying text.
92. Oneida I, 470 U.S. at 229.
93. Id. at 230.
94. Oneida I, 414 U.S. at 665. The district court's decision is not published.
95. Id. The Oneidas' complaint seemed to present a classic "Mottley problem." See Louisville & Nashville R.R v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (holding that
to assert federal question jurisdiction, plaintiff cannot merely anticipate federal
defense or avoidance of defense, but must state claim in well-pleaded complaint
based on federal law). The Oneidas appeared to be asserting a right of ejectment
under state common law or perhaps an action to clear a cloud from title under
state statutory law. The counties would defend by asserting entitlement to the land
under the New York treaties. The Oneidas would then argue that the state treaties
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cuit affirmed. 96

The Supreme Court reversed. It held that the Oneidas' complaint asserted a current right of possession conferred by federal
law, which was independent of state law. 97 The Oneidas alleged
that they had owned and occupied approximately six million acres
in New York State, including the 100,000 acres in dispute, from
"time immemorial . . . to the American Revolution;" the United
States had recognized their right of possession in the 1784 Treaty of
Stanwix and two subsequent treaties; and the Nonintercourse Act
protected their possessory rights to their ancestral lands. 98 Accordingly, their claim was based on aboriginal title governed by federal
law, federal treaties and a federal statute. 9 9 After examining the
nature of Indian title, the Supreme Court concluded that the
Oneidas' federal claim was neither insubstantial nor meritless, but
involved a controversy concerning the validity, construction or effect of federal law. 100 Therefore, the complaint stated a claim arising under the laws of the United States sufficient to invoke federal
jurisdiction. 10 1
C.

Oneida

11102

On remand to the district court, Judge Port held a trifurcated
trial on the merits. He concluded that the federal government
never ratified the 1795 treaty. Accordingly, the conveyance was
void because it violated the Nonintercourse Act.10 3 On appeal, the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's findings on liability but
were invalid under federal law. Oneida , 464 F.2d 916, 918-22 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'd,

414 U.S. 661 (1974).
96. Oneida , 464 F.2d at 918 (holding that Oneidas' claim "shatters on the
rock of the 'well-pleaded complaint' rule for determining federal question jurisdiction"). The Second Circuit also rejected the Oneidas' assertion of diversity and
civil rights jurisdiction. Id. at 922-23.

97. Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661, 677 (1974).
98. Id. at 663-65, 677-78; Oneida I, 464 F.2d at 918-19.
99. Oneida , 414 U.S. at 677-78.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 667.
102. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).

Oneida II was a five-to-four decision for the

Oneidas. Id. at 228. The dissent would have dismissed the Oneidas' claim for
laches. Id. at 255-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 230. The district court awarded the Oneidas $16,694 plus interest.
Judge Port also held that New York State had to indemnify the defendant counties.
Id. The district court's opinion that found the counties liable is reported at Oneida
II, 434 F. Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd inpart, 719 F.2d 525 (2d
Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 470 U.S. 226 (1985). Judge Port's October
5, 1981 decision, awarding damages to the Oneidas, and his May 5, 1982, decision
against New York State are unreported.
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10 4
remanded for recalculation of the damages.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "whether
an Indian tribe may have a live cause of action for a violation of its
possessory rights that occurred 175 years ago."10 5 The Court first
examined whether the Oneidas' had a cause of action. The
Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether Indian tribes
have an implied right of action under the Nonintercourse Act. Instead, it held that the Oneidas had a right of action under federal
common law. 10 6 The Court based its conclusion on Native Americans' aboriginal title, first recognized under the Doctrine of Discovery, and the federal government's exclusive province in Indian
relations under the Constitution. Writing for the majority, Justice
Powell noted that the Supreme Court had recognized the Indians'
right to possess tribal land and implicit right to sue to enforce their
possessory rights in a line of cases dating from the early 1800s to the
07
present.1
The Supreme Court rejected the counties' argument that the
Nonintercourse Act preempted federal common law in the area of
Indian land claims.10 8 It found that the Nonintercourse Act did not
create a comprehensive plan for dealing with violations of the Indians' possessory rights. In particular, the Act provided no means for
restoring land to the Indians. The Court concluded that until Con-

gress provides a statutory remedy, Indian tribes may look to federal
common law to provide a remedy for violations of their property
rights.109
In Oneida II, the Supreme Court also considered whether the
Oneidas' claim was time-barred." 0 The Court noted that no federal statute of limitations governs federal common law actions to
enforce Indian property rights. Generally, courts would apply the
However, after exammost analogous state statute of limitations.'
104. Oneida II, 719 F.2d 525, 544 (2d Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
470 U.S. 226 (1985).
105. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 230.
106. Id. at 233.
107. Id. at 233-36.
108. Id. at 236.
109. Id. at 236-40. The Supreme Court also found that subsequent re-enactments of the Nonintercourse Act did not abate any cause of action for violation of
the 1793 Nonintercourse Act. They merely continued the restraint on alienation
of Indian land first recognized by common law and codified in the 1793 Act. Id. at
245-46.
110. Id. at 240-44.
111. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985) ("When Congress has
not established a time limitation for a federal rule of action, the settled practice
has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not inconsistent with
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ining congressional legislation that enforces Indian rights, the
Supreme Court concluded that Congress did not intend any statute
of limitations to apply to Native land claims. Borrowing a statute of
1 12
limitations would thus violate federal policy.
The Supreme Court did not decide whether laches could be a
defense to Native land claims. However, Justice Powell indicated in
dicta that laches probably would not bar such claims for the same
3 reasons that statutes of limitations do not apply."
The Supreme Court also found that the Oneidas' claim was
justiciable. 1 4 Relying on several earlier decisions, Justice Powell
stated that granting Congress exclusive authority over Indian affairs
in the Constitution was not a " 'textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political depart116
ment' "15 sufficient to create a nonjusticiable political question.
Similarly, the fact that Congress had delegated its remedial author
ity to the Executive in the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua did not
117
place the case within the political question doctrine.
Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed the Oneidas' claims on
the merits.1 18 The majority rejected the counties' argument that
the federal government had ratified the 1795 conveyance to New
York State in subsequent treaties.119 Justice Powell emphasized that
treaties should be construed in favor of the Indians and congressional intent to extinguish Indian title must be "plain and unambiguous."1 20 The Court found no clear congressional intent to
extinguish the Oneidas' possessory interests in the land. 12 1 Finding
no legal basis barring the Oneidas' claims, a five-to-four majority
122
upheld the counties' liability under federal common law.
While Oneida Ilwas a victory for the Indian plaintiffs, it was not
federal law or policy to do so."). See generally Katharine F. Nelson, The 1990 Federal
"Fallback"Statute of Limitations: Limitations by Default, 72 NEB. L. REv. 454, 466-94
(1993) (discussing problems with borrowing statutes of limitations for federal
causes of action).
112. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 240-44.

113. Id. at 244-45.
114. Id. at 248-50.
115. Id. at 249 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).

116. Id.
117. Id. The Supreme Court also rejected the counties' argument that there
was an unusual need to adhere to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs' 1968 decision not to bring a land claim action for the Oneidas. Id. at 249-50.
118. Id. at 253.
119. Id. at 246-48.
120. Id. at 247-48.
121. Id. at 248.
122. Id. at 253.
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a victory for the counties. The Supreme Court rejected their indemnification claim against the state. 123 It held that the Eleventh
Amendment barred the counties' indemnification claim because
New York had not waived its sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. 12 4 The Supreme Court did not address whether the
tribes could have sued the state.
Oneida I and II were significant victories for Native Americans.
They established that the federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over tribal land claims and gave tribes, seeking to protect
their property rights, a federal common law right of ejectment.
Oneida II also eliminated many of the procedural defenses, including statute of limitations, that had so effectively barred land claim
actions in the past. The Oneidas' small test case proved to be a
major vehicle for opening the federal courts to Native American
125
land claims.
IV.

NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS

A.

Land Claims

Following the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1362 and the Supreme
Court's decision in Oneida I, Indian tribes filed numerous claims for

tribal lands in the Eastern United States and elsewhere. Some of

123. Id. at 250-53.
124. The counties argued that Congress abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity when it enacted the 1793 Nonintercourse Act and that New
York waived its immunity from suit in federal court when it violated the Act. Id. at
252. The Supreme Court did not decide whether Congress could or did abrogate
the states' immunity by enacting the Nonintercourse Act. Id. Instead, the Court
found that the counties' indemnification claim arose under state law, not the
Nonintercourse Act, and New York had not waived its immunity from suit in federal court. The counties' indemnification claim was thus barred under Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Oneida II, 470 U.S. at
252-53.
125. Oneida II was remanded for recalculation of the damages. Id. at 254.

Although the Oneidas have won their suit, at the time of this writing, the district
court has not awarded any relief. For a discussion of the relief in Oneida II, see
infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
For a critical assessment of Oneida II, see Alan Van Gestel, The New York Land
Claims "The Modern Landowner as Hostage," in IROQUOiS LAND CLAIMs 123, 132-37
(Christopher Vecsey & William A. Starna eds., 1988).
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these claims have been dismissed, 126 some have settled 127 and
others are still pending. 2 8 New claims are also being filed.129
126. See, e.g., Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 649 F. Supp.
420 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 860 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871
(1989); State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210 (Vt. 1992).
Oneida Indian Nation v. New York is one of the more interesting major land
claims that has been dismissed. Unlike the Oneidas' test case and other previous
claims, the Oneidas' six million acre claim in New York State arose under the Articles of Confederation. In 1978 and 1979, the Oneida Indian Nation of New York,
the Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin, the Oneida of the Thames Band (a Canadian tribe), and the Six Nation Iroquois Confederacy intervenors sued New York
State, various New York counties, and a defendant class of private landowners. The
defendant class consisted of all landowners within the claim area except those with
up to two acres of land containing a principal residence. Oneida Indian Nation, 649
F. Supp. at 422. Claiming to be the "matrilineal descendants of the aboriginal
Oneida Indian Nation," the Oneidas and Iroquois Confederacy claimed title to
approximately six million acres of land in central New York. The claim area covered a 50 mile swatch from Canada to Pennsylvania and included the City of Binghamton, numerous towns, large businesses and prime farm country. Id. at 421-22.
New York State originally purchased the land from the Oneidas when the Articles
of Confederation were in effect. Id. at 422. The Oneidas alleged that the two
treaties in question were void because the confederal government had guaranteed
their land in the Proclamation of September 22, 1783, and the Treaty at Fort
Stanwix in 1784; the government never ratified the state treaties; and the Indian
Trade and War Clauses of the Articles of Confederation precluded the state from
preempting Indian land without the confederal government's consent. Id. at 423.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed
the Oneidas' claims. Id. at 444. Judge McCurn concluded that the Articles of Confederation did not preclude the states from preempting Indian land within their
borders. Id. at 441. He also held that the confederal government had neither the
power nor the intent in either the 1783 Proclamation or the Fort Stanwix Treaty to
prohibit New York from purchasing the Oneidas' land. Id. at 444. The Second
Circuit affirmed in 1988, and the Supreme Court denied the Tribes' petition for
certiorari. Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989).
127. See, e.g., Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 17011716 (1988); Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735
(1988); Florida Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 17411749 (1988); Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1751-1760 (1988); Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc., Indian Claims
Settlement Act of 1987, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1771-1771i (1988); Puyallup Tribe of Indians
Settlement Act of 1989, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1773-1773j (Supp. V 1993); Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1988); see also Seneca Nation Settlement Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1774-1774h (Supp. V 1993) (settling SenecaSalamanca lease dispute).
128. For example, several land claim actions are still pending in the Northern
District of New York including the Cayuga Nation's 64,000 acre claim, the Canadian St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians' 12,000 acre claim, and Oneida H on remand from the Supreme Court for recalculation of damages.
129. On August 25, 1993, the Seneca Nation filed suit to reclaim Grand Island, which is located in the Niagara River in New York State. See James Fink,
Seneca Suit May Stall Land Deals, Bus. FlRsT-BuFALo, Sept. 6, 1993, at 1-1. In November 1992, and the spring of 1993, the Golden Hill Paugussetts filed suit in state
and federal court to recover approximately 84 square miles of land in Bridgeport,
Trumbull, Orange, Seymour, Shelton, Stratford and Monroe, Connecticut.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39: p. 525

Most people, raised on old movie and television westerns, consider Indian land claims ancient history. News that Native Americans have filed suit to recover land currently occupied by nonIndians is usually met at first with disbelief and even treated as a
joke.1 3 0 As discussed in Part III, however, modern ejectment actions are a relatively recent phenomenon with serious
13 1
consequences.
Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 1994 WL 590827 at *1-2 (2d
Cir. 1994); see also Mark Pazniokas, Indians'FightTurns on History, Politics; NotJust a
Simple Legal Matter; Indian Claims Turn on History, Politics, HARTFORD COURANT, July
6, 1993, at A-al; GeorgeJudson, Land Claim By Indians Is a Tactic In Casino Bid, N.Y.
TIMES, June

21, 1993, at B1.

As of this writing, the Paugussetts' federal action has been stayed pending the
Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) determination of the claimants' tribal status.
Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe, 1994 WL 590827 at *9. In 1993, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed the Paugussett's federal suit,
holding that the Indian claimants lacked standing because they had failed to exhaust the administrative process for gaining federal recognition as a tribe. Golden
Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 839 F. Supp. 130 (D. Conn. 1993)
(holding Tribe lacked standing to sue under Nonintercourse Act and court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over claim based on Proclamation of 1763), remanded by
1994 WL 590827 (2d Cir. 1994). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit rejected the district court's standing and exhaustion analysis. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe, 1994 WL 590827 at *5-*6. Instead, the Second
Circuit concluded that the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" applied. Id. at *6-*8.
It concluded that the federal court should defer to the BIA's expertise and experience in determining tribal status and ordered the district court to stay the Paugussetts' action pending the federal agency's determination of their application for
federal recognition as a tribe. Id. at *7-*9. The parties may petition the district
court to vacate the stay and adjudicate the merits of the Paugussetts' claims if the
BIA has not issued a decision within 18 months. Id. at *9.
The Second Circuit's decision raises a number of important questions that are
beyond the scope of this Article. These include whether abstention is appropriate
in Native land claims and whether the BIA, which decides whether a tribe should
receive formal recognition for specific federal benefit programs, should decide
tribal status for Nonintercourse Act protection.
130. The New York Times reported that when the Golden Hill Paugussetts
filed suit against Bridgeport, Connecticut, some of the local residents suggested
that Bridgeport should be given to the Indians because of its financial and social
problems. SeeJudson, supra note 129. However, local amusement soon stopped
when the Paugussetts also threatened to sue the affluent towns of Fairfield,
Westport and Weston. Id.; see PAUL BRODEUR, RESTITUTION: THE LAND CLAIMS OF
THE MASHPEE, PASSAMAQUODDY, AND PENOBSCOT INDIANS OF NEW ENGLAND 71, 94,
96 (1985) (describing initial reaction to Passamaquoddy and Penobscot claims in

Maine); Chris Lavin, Responses to the Cayuga Land Claim, in IROQUOIS

LAND CLAIMS

87, 91 (Christopher Vecsey & William A. Starna eds., 1988) (describing initial reaction to Cayuga land claim).
131. Describing the potential effect of Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy
Tribe v. Morton, filed on June 2, 1972, Paul Brodeur stated, "What was at stake was
simply mind-boggling, of course, for if the case should be decided in favor of the
Passamaquoddies the central issue in suits involving billions of dollars and a staggering amount of real estate would be resolved." BRODEUR, supra note 130, at 94;
see also Van Gestel, supra note 125, at 123-39 (discussing Indian land claims from
private landowners' perspective).
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Most of the claim areas are currently inhabited by non-Natives.
They include private homeowners, businesses and farms, as well as
the local and state governments.1 32 Filing a land claim action
places a cloud on title to the land within the claim area.13 3 Title
insurance companies are reluctant to write title insurance in claim
areas, making land transfers virtually impossible.1 3 4 Potential buyers have difficulty getting mortgages, and landowners cannot sell
their land. Stagnation in the real estate market, in turn, harms
other segments of the economy within the claim area and, sometimes, throughout the state.13 5 Outside businesses are reluctant to
start new ventures in the region while existing business are reluc132. For example, the Golden Hill Paugussetts' suit against the City of
Bridgeport, Connecticut, encompasses much of the central city, including the city
hall. Constance L. Hays, With a Big Claim, a Tiny Tribe Seeks Aid, N.Y. TiMES, Nov.
28, 1992, at 21. They have also sued a number of other communities, affecting
some 200,000 people, and have threatened an ejectment action against Fairfield,
Westport and Weston, Connecticut, three of the most affluent and prestigious
communities in the state. See Pazniokas, supra note 129. The Tribe filed their
claims in both federal and state court. As of this writing, their federal action is
stayed pending the BIA's determination of the Paugussetts' tribal status. Golden
Hill Paugussett Tribe, 1994 WL 590827 at *9 (ordering district court to stay proceedings pending BIA's determination of plaintiffs' tribal status or plaintiffs' application to vacate stay if BIA fails to decide within 18 months). For further discussion
of the status of the Paugussetts' federal action, see supra note 129.
The Cayuga land claims assert the right to possess 64,015 acres in central New
York State including Ithaca, New York and Cornell University; the ejectment of
approximately 7000 property owners; and $350 million in trespass damages. See
Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); Lavin,
supra note 130, at 95. The Passamaquoddy and Penobscot claims in Maine, which
were settled, covered approximately 12.5 million acres. The area was inhabited by
an estimated 350,000 non-Indians, including timber and paper companies that
were major economic forces in the state. See BRODEUR, supra note 130, at 74, 98; see
also Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 649 F. Supp. 420, 421-22 (N.D.N.Y. 1986)
(dismissing Oneidas' claim for approximately six million acres of land in central
New York State, stretching from Canadian to Pennsylvania borders, against a defendant class of "approximately 60,000 individuals, businesses, and governmental
entities"), aff'd, 860 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989).
133. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 57, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1989) (estimating that
Puyallups' claims "cloud title to hundreds of acres of land and that the value of
these lands, including downtown office buildings, industrial port facilities, and expensive homes, is more than $750,000,000"); Hagan, supra note 35, at 25-27
(describing effects of Passamaquoddy, Penobscot, Narragansett, Pequot and
Mashpee land claims on land titles within disputed areas).
134. In New York State, only two title insurance companies were offering insurance against Indian land claims in the 1980s. See Donna Snyder, Mortgages Offered on Allegany Reservation; Cattaraugas Bank Says Program Includes Residential
Commercial Loans, BUFF. NEws, Feb. 24, 1993 (Local) (noting past difficulty of obtaining title insurance); see also Hagan, supra note 35, at 26 (noting effects of Narragansett Tribe's land claim on real estate market and construction industry in
Charlestown, Rhode Island, because of buyers' inability to obtain title insurance).
135. See Letter from Booth Gardner, Governor of Washington State, to the
Legislators, in PuYA.LUP TmiaAL SEarLEMENT 3 (1989) (public relations pamphlet)
(discussing Puyallups' claims and potential effects on state economy).
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tant to expand. Tribal land dlaims can also affect the state and local
governments' ability to raise revenue by impairing their bond ratings.1 3 6 Finally, Native residents may be harmed when land dis13 7
putes cause state and local agencies to withhold Indian services.
Tribal land suits also generate hostility and exacerbate existing
antagonism among the Native Americans, local residents and the
state.1 38 Over the years, differing life styles, sovereignty disputes,
conflicting land claims and prejudice have often generated distrust
between Indians and local residents, as well as between Indians and
the state. Generally, Native Americans have not inhabited the disputed land for years, even centuries. Whereas some of the nonNative inhabitants may have occupied the land for generations. Assuming that they or their ancestors had acquired fee title, the current inhabitants naturally believe that after so many years they have
an inherent right to the land. Suddenly, these inhabitants find
39
their homes, businesses and way of life threatened.
At the same time, Native Americans have watched their lands
disappear over the years, often through fraud, misunderstanding,
and state and federal cessions. 140 Although much of the land was
136. See LAURENCE M. HAUPTMAN, FORMULATING AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN
NEW YORK STATE, 1970-1986 26 (1988). Paul Brodeur described the effect of the
Passamaquoddy and Penobscot claims in Maine as follows:
By September, word that the Indian land suit included the claim that the
tribes had civil jurisdiction over their ancestral territories [in Maine]
reached Ropes & Gray - a Boston law firm that acts as legal adviser to
issuers of New England municipal bonds - and toward the end of the
month Ropes & Gray let it be known that it would no longer be able to
give unqualified approval to municipal bonds issued within the disputed
area. Within a few days, the sale of more than twenty-seven million dollars in bonds for cities, towns, hospitals, and school districts was either
canceled or delayed, and reports began to circulate that people living
there might soon find it impossible to transfer real estate or get
mortgages.
BRODEUR, supra note 130, at 97.
137. See HAUPTMAN, supra note 136, at 26 (describing potential effect of Indian claims on education and other services).
138. See id. at 25-26; see also.BRODEUR, supra note 130, at 39-40, 107-08 (discussing reaction to Mashpee and Maine Indian land claims); Lindsey Gruson, Its
Lease of Indian Land Expiring, A City Worries About the Futur N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
1985, at BI (discussing tensions surrounding termination of Seneca-Salamanca's
99-year leases); David Treadwell, Treaty Fuels New Settler, Indian Feud, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1992, at Al (discussing reaction to Seneca/Salamanca lease settlement).
139. See Van Gestel, supra note 125, at 130 (arguing that "[t]oday's landowner/defendants are nothing less than hostages in a power struggle between
three governments - federal, state and Indian").
140. See, e.g., Oneida Nation v. United States, 37 Ind. Cl. Comm'n. 522, 52430 (1976) (finding that New York State coerced Oneidas into selling most of their
land to State against their will in 1785 Fort Herkimer and 1788 Fort Schuyler Treaties), aff'd, 576 F.2d 870 (Ct. Cl. 1978). Despite the Indian Claims Commission's
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ceded in the 1700s and 1800s,1 4 1 substantial losses have occurred
since World War 11.142 Because of the potential consequences in
both land and money, Indian land claims naturally spark intense
emotions, making dispute resolution, both in and out of court, extremely difficult.
A tribe may base its claim to the disputed land on aboriginal
title or title that the federal government has formally recognized in
a treaty, statute or executive order. 143 In the typical suit, the claimants assert that the state and/or private parties alienated the land in
question without the federal government's formal consent. As a
result, the conveyances are void because they violated the
Nonintercourse Act and any other document guaranteeing the
tribe's possessory interests. The tribe claims that their title to the
land is superior because the current occupants' title is based on the
illegal transactions.14 The relief sought varies; however, tribal
findings, the Second Circuit subsequently refused to consider the nature of these
transactions in Oneida Indian Nation v. New Yot*, apparently applying a political
question or perhaps doctrine of state rationale. 860 F.2d 1145, 1162 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989); see also Hagan, supra note 35, at 17-19
(describing United States' tactics to gain Indian land and resulting problems).
141. See, e.g., Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132 (loss of
Native ancestral lands in Puget Sound area to United States); First Treaty of Buffalo Creek, Jan. 15, 1838, 7 Stat. 550 (loss of Seneca land to David A. Ogden's land
company); Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15 (loss of Iroquois' western land to United States); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297,
1304-05 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (discussing loss of Cayuga land to New York State in 1789,
1795 and 1807 treaties); see also Thomas N. Tureen, Afterword to PAUL BRODEUR,
Restitution: The Land Claims of the Mashpee, Passamaquoddy, and Penobscot Indians of
New England 143, 144 (1985) (stating that two-thirds of Indian land was given to
non-Indians in second half of nineteenth century).
142. See generally COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 164-75 (discussing Indian policy during termination era and loss of Native land); LAURENCE M. HAUrMAN, THE IROQUOIS STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL WORLD WAR II TO RED POWER 85-178

(1986) (discussing loss of Iroquois land for Kinzua Dam Project, Allegheny floodcontrol project, Saint Lawrence Seaway and Niagara Power project).
143. See generally COHEN HANDBOOK, supranote 18, at 472-510 (describing historical ways by which Indian tribes have acquired property interests). Many reservations were created by executive order in the latter half of the nineteenth and
first part of the twentieth centuries. Id. at 493. A tribe has formal title if Congress
has ratified the executive order establishing the reservation. Even without ratification, a reservation created by executive order is generally treated as formally recognized land. See Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251, 1261 n.10
(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that an "[eixecutive [o]rder may convey title to land to
an Indian tribe as effectively as any other conveyance from the United States"), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 496-97 (suggesting that "the distinctions between 'recognized' and 'unrecognized' title may be
of chiefly historical significance with respect to executive order reservations").
144. See, e.g., Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 229 (1985) (alleging 1795 treaty conveying Oneida land to New York violated federal treaties and Nonintercourse Act);
Puyallup Indian Tribe, 717 F.2d at 1254 (9th Cir. 1983) (claiming Port's possession
of exposed river bed violated 1857 executive order); Canadian St. Regis Band of

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994

27

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39: p. 525

claimants frequently seek possession of the land, trespass damages,
1 45
and hunting and fishing rights.
B.

Defenses in Land Claim Actions

Once a tribe has filed a formal lawsuit, the non-Native defendants may be able to raise a number of defenses. However, most of
the typical common law defenses no longer apply to Indian ejectment actions after Oneida ii.146 The reason that common law defenses are not available is based in part on the Supremacy Clause
and in part on the federal government's trust relationship with Native Americans. Indian title is protected by federal law through the
Nonintercourse Act, federal treaties and other federal statutes. Applying common law defenses that arise under state law to defeat
Indian land claims would effectively transfer title in violation of the
Nonintercourse Act and, therefore, violate the Supremacy
Clause.1 47 Moreover, state law defenses do not apply against the
federal government when it sues on the Indians' behalf. 14 8 Under
the trust doctrine, Indian tribes that sue on their own behalf are
Mohawk Indians v. New York, 573 F. Supp. 1530, 1532 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (claiming
New York's acquisitions of St. Regis land violated Treaty of Ghent and
Nonintercourse Act); Cayuga Indian Nation, 565 F. Supp. at 1301, 1303-06
(N.D.N.Y. 1983) (alleging 1795 treaty conveying Cayuga land to New York violated
federal treaties and Nonintercourse Act); see also Hagan, supra note 35, at 24-27
(describing several Eastern land claims).
145. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 649 F. Supp. 420, 423
(N.D.N.Y. 1986) (seeking declaration of ownership, possession of disputed land,
and trespass damages), aff'd, 860 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
871 (1989); CanadianSt. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians, 573 F. Supp. at 1532 (seeking declaration of ownership and right to possess land plus trespass damages);
Cayuga Indian Nation, 565 F. Supp. at 1306 (seeking declaration of current ownership, possession of disputed land, trespass damages, restitution for natural resources removed from land, and other relief); see also Lavin, supra note 130, at 95
(discussing Cayugas' claim).
146. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of common law defenses in Oneida , see supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
147. See COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 512-13 & n.20 (stating that
Supremacy Clause bars state law defenses); Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 18, at 85
(suggesting that state common law defenses are preempted by federal statutory
restraints against alienation of tribal lands); see also Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 240 n.13
("Under the Supremacy Clause, state-law time bars, e.g. adverse possession and
laches, do not apply of their own force to Indian land title claims.").
Just as the Supreme Court recognized a federal common law right of ejectment for tribal land claims, the Court could also recognize federal common law
defenses to such claims. So far, the Court has not done so presumably because
traditional defenses would be inconsistent with federal policy in this area. See id. at

240-45.
148. See Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 350-51
(1939) (stating that federal sovereign immunity bars state law defenses against federal government when it sues on Indian's behalf or otherwise).
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acting in the same capacity as the federal government, at least to
14 9
some extent, and are generally entitled to the same benefits.
Accordingly, the courts have rejected defenses based on adverse
possession, statute of limitations, laches, estoppel by sale, state
mortgage and tax foreclosure sales and state eminent domain proceedings. 150 The courts have also rejected certain federal jurisdictional defenses including nonjusticiability, political question and
15 1
the indispensability of the United States as a party.
Several defenses remain, however. For instance, the claimants
may no longer be a tribe, or they may have abandoned their tribal
status during a crucial period.152 Even though tribes must be formally recognized by the federal government in order to assert an
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1362,153 tribes that have not been formally
recognized may still assert federal question claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.154 Moreover, they do not need formal recognition to fall
149. See Oneida II, 719 F.2d 525, 538 (2d Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 470 U.S. 226 (1985). But see Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991) (rejecting similar argument concerning states' Eleventh Amendment immunity). After Blatchford, the Supreme Court may be less inclined to reject common law defenses based on a trusteeship argument. However,
Blatchford involved an Eleventh Amendment defense that is a constitutionally-based
jurisdictional bar as opposed to a state common law defense. Id.
150. See, e.g., Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 240-44 (1985); Oneida Indian Nation v.
New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1083-84 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989);
Tuscarora Nation v. Power Auth., 257 F.2d 885 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 841
(1958), and vacated as moot sub nom. McMorran v. Tuscarora Nation, 362 U.S. 608
(1960); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 771 F. Supp. 19 (N.D.N.Y. 1991); Narragansett Tribe v. Southern R.I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798, 803-06 (D.R.I.
1976); Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 18, at 84-88. In Oneida II, the Supreme Court
left open the possibility that laches could still be a defense but strongly suggested
that it would also violate federal policy. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 244-45 & n.16.
151. See, e.g., Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 248-50 (rejecting nonjusticiability defenses); Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984) (stating that United States was not indispensable party); Narragansett Tribe, 418 F. Supp. at 809-13 (dismissing motion to
join United States as indispensable party); see also Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390
U.S. 365 (1968) (holding that Indian lessors have standing to bring own action).
152. See Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978)
(dismissing suit based on jury's finding that plaintiffs were not tribe), aff'd. sub
nom. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 581-88 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
153. Section 1362 gives the federal district courts jurisdiction over suits by
"any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary
of the Interior." 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988). This provision refers to recognition of
the tribe's governing body. COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 17; see also Native
Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 1990) (interpreting
§ 1362 liberally to include congressional recognition of the tribe), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
154. Unlike § 1362, § 1331 does not limit who may invoke general federal
question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) ("The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
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within the protection of the Nonintercourse Act. 155 However,
tribes claiming land based on aboriginal or formal title must have
been a tribe from the date of the illegal transaction to the filing of
the claim.1 5 6 Tribal status under the Nonintercourse Act requires
" 'a body of Indians of the same or . . .similar race, united in a
community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a
particular, though sometimes ill-defined, territory.' "157 For example, non-Native defendants successfully asserted lack of tribal status
as a defense in the Mashpees' suit to recover 11,000 acres on Cape
Cod, Massachusetts. After a 40-day trial, a jury found that the
Mashpees had voluntarily abandoned their tribal status between
1842 and 1869 because they lacked a defined political structure.1 58
The defendants in the Paugussetts' suit in Connecticut have asof the United States."); see also OneidaI, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974) (findingjurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1362 and 1331).
155. Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d
370, 376-77 (1st Cir. 1975) (rejecting argument that tribe must be recognized by
federal government to fall within Nonintercourse Act); NarragansettTribe, 418 F.
Supp. at 808 (same); see also United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442
(1926) (quoting Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901) (defining "Indian Tribe" under Nonintercourse Act of 1834, 25 U.S.C. § 177)). But see Golden
Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 839 F. Supp. 130, 134-35 (D. Conn.
1993) (holding that Paugussetts lack standing to sue under Nonintercourse Act
because they failed to exhaust administrative process for gaining federal recognition as a tribe), remanded by 1994 WL 590827 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting district
court's determination on standing but ordering district court to stay proceedings
pending BIA's determination of Paugussetts' tribal status).
To prove a violation of the Nonintercourse Act, the plaintiff must demonstrate that:
(1) it is or represents an Indian "tribe" within the meaning of the Act;
(2) the.., land at issue [is] covered by the Act as tribal land;
(3) the United States has never consented to the alienation of the tribal
land; [and]
(4) the trust relationship between the United States and the tribe, which
is established by coverage of the Act, has never been terminated or
abandoned.
E ps v. Andrus, 611 F.2d 915, 917 (1st Cir. 1979) (emphasis omitted); Oneida II,
434 F. Supp. 527, 537-38 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 719 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1983), aff 'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
470 U.S. 226 (1985).
156. See Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 579 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
157. Joint Tribal Counci4 528 F.2d at 377 n.8 (quoting Montoya v. United
States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901)); cf.Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 667 F. Supp.
938, 943 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding federal government's recognition of plaintiff
tribes sufficient to establish tribal status under Nonintercourse Act).
158. Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978),
aff'd sub nom. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979). For a comprehensive discussion of the Mashpees'
land claims see BRODEUR, supra note 130, at 3-65; Clinton & Hotopp, supranote 18,
at 59-61.
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serted a similar defense. 15 9
Defendants may also assert that the tribe has voluntarily abandoned the land. 160 This defense is only available if the tribe's claim
is based on aboriginal title. 16 1 To have aboriginal title, a tribe must
have been in exclusive, continuous possession of the land.' 62 If the
tribe has voluntarily abandoned its aboriginal land at some point, it
cannot claim protection under the Nonintercourse Act. 163 However, voluntary abandonment is not a defense to claims based on
recognized title because only Congress can divest the tribe of for164
mally recognized title.
Congress has plenary power to extinguish Indian title or to terminate a tribe's trust status. Therefore, defendants may also defeat
a tribe's possessory claims by proving that Congress, or a previous
sovereign, has extinguished or limited the claimants' possessory
rights. For example, the Supreme Court recently held that Congress had abrogated the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe's right to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on reservation land that the
65
federal government had taken for the Oahe Dam and Reservoir.'
Similarly, in 1977, the Supreme Court determined that Congress
had intended to open nonallotted portions of the Rosebud Sioux
166
Reservation to non-Indians.
Finally, states may claim sovereign immunity from suit. The
159. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 839 F. Supp. 130,
133 (D. Conn. 1993) (dismissing Tribe's land claims), remandedby 1994 WL 590827
(2d Cir. 1994) (ordering district court to stay proceedings pending BIA's determination of Paugussetts' tribal status).
160. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 758 F. Supp. 107, 110 (N.D.N.Y.
1991) (finding no abandonment as matter of law).
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 357-58 (1941) (finding voluntary relinquishment of tribal claims to lands outside reservation); cf. Cayuga Indian Nation, 758 F. Supp. at 115 (finding no abandonment as a matter of
law because Cayugas had recognized title that only Congress could extinguish).
164. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 758 F. Supp. at 110 (citing Solem v. Bartlett,
465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984)).
165. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
166. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (finding congressional intent in statutory language and legislative history); see also Oneida Indian
Nation v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that New York State had
preempted Oneida land prior to Constitution and Nonintercourse Act), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989); State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210 (Vt. 1992) (finding sovereigns had extinguished Abenacki's aboriginal rights by time Vermont joined
Union), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1258 (1993); cf. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian
Tribe Inc., 476 U.S. 498 (1986) (finding Catawba Act of 1959 terminated federal
protection and made state law applicable to tribe, including statute of limitations),
on remand, 865 F.2d 1444 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding statute of limitations barred
Catawbas' claims).
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Eleventh Amendment bars suits in the federal courts by Indian
tribes against states without the states' consent or congressional abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment rights. 167 States also
168
enjoy common law sovereign immunity in their own courts.
C.

Negotiated Settlements

Settlements are the norm in civil litigation. Ninety percent or
more of all civil cases filed settle. 16 9 Negotiated settlements are
generally preferred to court imposed resolutions for a number of
reasons.1 70 They avoid the time, expense and inflexibility of formal
litigation.1 71 The negotiating process allows the parties to address
each other's real needs and to reach a mutually acceptable compromise. Each side gives up something to gain something. Thus, the
parties can reach a "win-win" result instead of leaving one party the
winner and the other the loser.1 72 Parties are also able to reach
more creative solutions without the rigid rules that govern court
litigation.' 73 Because both sides participate in working out the
agreement and benefit from it, each side theoretically has a greater
167. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991). For a discussion of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from tribal suits, see infra notes
504-37 and accompanying text.
168. See Will v. Michigan Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989) ("It is
an 'established principle ofjurisprudence' that the sovereign cannot be sued in its
own courts without its consent." (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527,
529 (1857))).
169. ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION 651
(3d ed. 1994) (stating that between 90% and 97% of civil cases settle).
170. But see Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984) (arguing
that negotiated settlement may not be preferable to adjudication); Carrie MenkelMeadow, Forand Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485, 505 (1985) (discussing negative aspects of settlement
process including economic waste, coercive practices and absence of authoritative
rulings in certain situations).
171. See HAYDOCK, supra note 169, at 619-20 (discussing how settlements benefit parties, judicial process and society); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering
Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REv. 637, 644-45
(1976) (discussing flexibility of negotiations allowing recognition of otherwise conflicting or "person-oriented" norms).
172. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 170, at 504 ("Settlement can be particularized to the needs of the parties, it can avoid win/lose, binary results, provide
richer remedies than the commodification or monetarization of all claims, and
achieve legitimacy through consent."); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another
View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 795801 (1984) (addressing parties' needs through "problem-solving" model of
negotiation).
173. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 172, at 804-17 (contrasting "problemsolving" negotiations with adversarial dispute resolution and illustrating greater
flexibility of "problem-solving" negotiations for fashioning resolutions that address
principal needs of parties).
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stake in their agreement than in a court-imposed remedy. Accord174
ingly, the parties are more likely to abide by the agreement.
Moreover, the negotiating process, combined with a mutually acceptable conclusion, tends to reduce hostilities, which is important
75
for the parties' future relations.'
Negotiated settlements are particularly important in Indian
land disputes. While the federal courts may be well-suited to determine the parties' legal ownership rights, they are not well-suited to
deal with the complex political and social issues that these disputes
raise or to fashion appropriate relief in cases where the tribal claimants prevail.' 76 Tribal property rights generally depend on interpreting federal statutes, treaties and common law, together with
determining the facts surrounding land transactions and tribal status. These are traditional court functions. However, Indian land
claims frequently seek large tracts of land currently inhabited by
private homeowners, businesses, local municipalities and the state.
In most cases, none of these people were alive, let alone participated in, the transactions under scrutiny. 177 This makes transferring the claimed lands back to the Indians virtually impossible as a
practical and equitable matter, even when the current owners are
parties to the suit. Forcing whole communities to abandon their
homes and businesses would create economic and social chaos.
178
Moreover, the courts have no real way to enforce their orders.
174. See Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 120
(1976) (stating that negotiated settlements are likely to be more "durable" than
court-imposed resolutions).
175. See generally id. at 120-21 (examining how process of achieving voluntary
settlement allows parties to probe underlying conflicts and restructure their relationship to avoid or minimize future conflicts).
176. See Van Gestel, supra note 125, at 132 (arguing that "[a] fundamental
and pervasive difficulty with the Indians' claims is that they ask the court to decide
issues not well suited to judicial resolution, and to grant relief not appropriate for
an appointed tribunal and incapable ofjudicial administration."). In his Aft envord,
Thomas Tureen states:
If, as all law students are taught, hard cases make bad law, these [Maine
and Mashpee land claims] were certainly candidates for some very bad
decisions. Clearly, they would press the limits of the judicial process and
tempt the judges and juries who would hear them, even in the liberal
nineteen-seventies, to rule with emotions rather than reason.
Tureen, supra note 141, at 145.
177. See Van Gestel, supranote 125, at 130 (emphasizing that "[n]ot a single
man or woman who has been sued [in the New York land claims] had any hand in
the motives or methods of the land purchases by the state of New York occurring
almost two centuries before their birth").
178. In Oneida II, the Supreme Court inserted a final footnote suggesting that
equitable concerns might limit the available relief:
The question whether equitable considerations should limit the relief
available to the present day Oneida Indians was not addressed by the

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994

33

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39: p. 525

Even determining the fair market rental value of the claim area
can be an overwhelming task. The value of the land is generally
determined by its value minus improvements if the occupant occupied the land in good faith.' 79 However, what constitutes improvement to "white society," such as roads and buildings, does not
necessarily constitute improvement to Native Americans. Moreover, it may be impossible to determine when such improvements

were made.
The Oneida test case illustrates how difficult fashioning a remedy can be.' 8 0 Because this suit was designed to be a test case, the
Oneidas carefully limited the relief that they sought. They did not
want to intimidate the federal courts and have the courts find Indian land claims nonjusticiable. Rather than suing all of the inhabitants in the 100,000 acre claim area, the Oneidas sued two
counties.' 8 ' The counties occupied a relatively small portion of the
land on which they operated-several roads, a park, a gravel pit and a
fire department radio tower.' 8 2 The Oneidas could have demanded possession of the land and the fair market rental value
from 1795 to the present. Instead, the Oneidas sought the rental
Court of Appeals or presented to this Court by petitioners. Accordingly,
we express no opinion as to whether other considerations may be relevant to the final disposition of this case should Congress not exercise its
authority to resolve these far-reaching Indian claims.
Oneida I, 470 U.S. 226, 253 n.27 (1985). In a newspaper interview, Alan Van Gestel, attorney for many of the nonstate defendants in the Eastern land claims, emphasized the courts' dilemma as follows:
No court has ever gone all the way .... The judges play political
brinkmanship with the Congress ....Suppose a judge reaches a conclusion that the Indians are correct, land was improperly sold 150 and 200
years ago. The people who lose weren't there to cause the harm. The
judge has no real power to enforce his order. He says, "OK, everybody,
off the land." His order is ignored, probably .... Is the governor going

to call out the National Guard? Unlikely. Is the president going to mobilize the troops? Unlikely.
Pazniokas, supra note 129, at A-1. Indeed, these claims raise the specter of the
federal government having to send in armed forces to enforce judicial decrees.
179. Ondida II, 719 F.2d 525, 541 (2d Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
470 U.S. 226 (1985). Whether the defendants in an Indian land claim occupied in
good faith may be an issue where the Indian claimants have a history of trying to
regain their land. See id.
at 541-42 (placing burden of proving good faith on nonIndian occupants and holding that Counties had to establish good faith occupancy
from 1800s). See generally Locklear, supra note 90, at 149-51 (1988) (discussing
Oneidas' efforts to regain their land).
180. For a discussion of the Oneida test case before remand to the district
court, see supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
181. Oneida I, 719 F.2d at 527. The Oneidas sued Madison and Oneida
Counties, New York. Id.
182. Id. at 541 (listing counties' improvements to 871.92 acres of land).
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value for just two years, 1968 and 1969.183 Judge Port, of the Northern District of New York, originally awarded the Oneidas $16,694
plus interest.1 8 4 The Second Circuit affirmed liability but reversed
the award and remanded for recalculation of the damages. 185 As
discussed, the Supreme Court affirmed in Oneida 11,186 and the case
was remanded to Judge McCurn in the Northern -District of New
87
York.1
The district court's dilemma was how to determine the fair
market rental value of the land in 1968 and 1969 When improvements had been made at unknown times and stages. Roads, in particular, presented a problem. The roads in the claim area had not
been constructed or acquired by the defendant counties at one
identifiable time. Instead, roads were constructed and-improved in
segments over several hundred years. Originally, the people who
lived along the roads were responsible for their maintenance and
improvement. Segments were later turned over to the local municipalities and eventually to the defendant counties at various times.
Judge McCurn told the parties in the Oneida test case to try to
reach agreement on how the damages should be calculated. He
ordered them to brief the issues' 8 8 and tentatively scheduled a
hearing on damages for October, 1986. In September, the parties
entered into settlement negotiations and asked the court to stay all
proceedings. 189 As of this writing, no hearing has been held on
damages, and the parties have not yet reached a settlement.
The Oneidas deliberately limited the scope of their test case
and the relief sought so that the court would not dismiss their
claims as nonjusticiable. Most land claims seek much more exten183. Id. at 529.

184. Id. at 540. In calculating the fair rental value of the land, Judge Port
valued the land as "unimproved" and then allowed the Counties a 'set-off for im-

provements. Id. at 541. He also discounted the fair market rental value of the land
containing highways by 10%, treating the Oneidas' damages claim like ajust compensation claim for a road easement. Id. at 542.
185. Id. at 541-42. The Second Circuit concluded that the district court
should not have discounted the fair market value by 10% and that the district

court needed to evaluate whether the Counties had occupied the land in good
faith since the 1800s. Id,
186. 470 U.S. 226, 253-54 (1985). The Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit on the Counties' claim for indemnification against New York State. Id.
187. Id. at 254. In the interim, Judge Port had become incapacitated and
died. Judge Neal P. McCurn took over the Oneida test case on remand to the
district court.

188. Order of Judge Neal P.' McCurn, United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York, Oneida II (July 22, 1986) (Docket No. 70-CV-35).
189. See William A. Starna, Epilgue to IRoquois LAND CLAIMS 163, 164 (Christopher Vecsey & William A. Starna eds., 1988).
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sive relief 1 90 As a result, determining the appropriate remedy in
cases where the Native claimants prevail presents even greater
problems.
In addition to the practical problems involved in awarding
land and calculating damages, the federal courts lack the power to
extinguish Indian title. Article I of the Constitution gives Congress
sole authority to "regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian
Tribes."1 9 1 . The Nonintercourse Act provides that any alienation of
Indian title must be made "by treaty or convention entered into
pursuant to the Constitution."1 9 2 Accordingly, only Congress can
extinguish Native title.1 93 However, the federal government is generally not a party in the typical land claim suit.1 9 4 Actions in eject-

ment are usually brought against the current public and private
occupants. Although the federal government is at least partially at
fault for failing to protect Indian land under various treaties, statutes or its trust relationship with the tribes, the government enjoys
sovereign immunity and cannot be sued without its consent. The
court has no power over the federal government when it is not a
party to the litigation. 195 Therefore, the court cannot order that
190. See, e.g., Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297, 1301
(N.D.N.Y. 1983) (seeking possession of approximately 64,000 acres, fair market
rental value for over 200 years and other monetary and protective relief).
191. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8,cl. 3.
192. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988). For a discussion of the Nonintercourse Act, see
supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. The federal government stopped making treaties with Indian tribes in 1871. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988) ("No Indian nation
or tribe ... shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe,
or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty ....").
193. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Oneida 1, 414 U.S. 661, 670 (1974) ("Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be extinguished only with federal consent.. ").Congress can expressly delegate its authority to extinguish Indian title

to the Executive branch.

COHEN HANDBOOK,

supra note 18, at 515-17. The

Supreme Court has also not ruled out the possibility that the President might have
been able to extinguish Indian title in the past. See Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 248
(1985) (finding "no indication that either the Senate or the President intended by
these references [in subsequent federal treaties] to ratify the 1795 conveyance [of
Oneida land to New York State]").
194. The federal government enjoys sovereign immunity from suit and may
not be sued without its consent. Therefore, neither the nonfederal defendants
nor the plaintiffs in a land claim action can join the federal government as a party.
Tribal claimants may be able to assert a claim against the government in the Court
of Federal Claims for breach of the government's trust relationship, but they can
only recover monetary damages, not land. Of course, the government may consent to suit. It may also assert an action for repossession of tribal lands against the
current inhabitants on behalf of the Indians. For example, the federal government recently intervened in the Cayugas' suit against New York State. It probably
did so because the state had raised an Eleventh Amendment defense against the
Cayugas that is not available against the federal government.
195. See Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251, 1254 (9th
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the tribe's title be extinguished if the federal government is not a
party. 19 6 For example, a federal court probably could not fashion a
remedy ordering the local defendants to pay a prevailing tribe the
fair market value of the disputed land in exchange for extinguish19 7
ing the tribe's title to the claim area.
This is not to say that the federal courts cannot fashion a viable
remedy in land claim actions or that negotiated settlements are a
panacea. The Supreme Court has held that Indian land claims are
justiciable, 19 8 although the remedy may be limited by hardship concerns. 19 9 For example, in a suit where the claimants prevail, the
court could declare the tribe's possessory interest. It could then
order the non-Indian occupants to pay trespass damages 20 0 and future rent while allowing them to maintain possession. 2 0 1 Even
though this remedy would satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III, it probably would not satisfy either side in the
dispute. Although the Indians would gain monetary relief and have
their title acknowledged, they would still lack possession of the
land. The current inhabitants would not be evicted, but they would
lose fee simple title. This, together with the monetary obligation,
202
would generate economic hardship and intense hostility.
Cir. 1983) ("United States, as the trustee holding legal title to all real property
owned by the Tribe .... will not be bound by any decree ensuing from this litigation unless it is formally joined as a party.").
196. Even if the federal government is a party to' the litigation, there may be a
problem with the court's ordering Congress to extinguish Indian title where such
action would not be in the tribe's best interest and would, thus, breach the government's trust obligations. See The Supreme Court, 1984 Term--Leading Cases, supra
note 46, at 263-64 (criticizing Supreme Court for urging Congress, in Oneida I, to
breach its trust obligations).
197. Of course, Congress could impose this remedy by incorporating it in a
statute, but the court would have no power to order Congress to do so. If the
plaintiffs' claims were based on aboriginal title, one might try to argue that a court
order extinguishing title in exchange for other compensation would constitute voluntary abandonment of the tribe's aboriginal rights. Voluntary abandonment
would derive from the tribe's initiating litigation and consenting to a court-ordered remedy. However, asserting occupancy rights through litigation, winning
on the merits and then having the court order divestment of those rights seems to
be the very antithesis of a voluntary abandonment.
198. Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 248-50, 253 (1985).
199. See id. at 253 n.27 (questioning whether equitable concerns should limit
available relief but expressing no final opinion).
200. But see supra notes 179-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
difficulties in calculating trespass damages.
201. This type of remedy would essentially create a lease arrangement similar
to the Seneca-Salamanca leases. For a discussion of the Seneca-Salamanca leases,
see infra notes 324-80 and accompanying text.
202. See Van Gestel, supra note 125, at 125 (stating that "countless personal,
business and municipal defaults" would result from such a judgment).
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Negotiated settlements can also be problematic.2 0 3 The "winwin" goal of a negotiated agreement can quickly become a "winlose" result when one party is in a substantially better negotiating
position than the other party. 20 4 In land claim disputes, the state,
counties and large commercial landowners generally have far
greater resources and political influence at both the state and federal levels than the tribes. 20 5 Because Congress must approve any
settlement, which it will not do without the state's support, and because Congress has sole power to extinguish Indian title, there is a
danger that an undesirable settlement may be forced on the claimants. 20 6 Moreover, some faction on either side of the dispute will
always be unhappy with whatever settlement is reached.20 7 Never203. See Indian Law Resource Ctr., Studies in the Application of Non-Judicial
RETHINKING INDIAN LAw 89-95
(National Lawyers Guild Comm. on Native Am. Struggles ed., 1982) (discussing
problems Native Americans face when negotiating land claim settlements); see also
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 172, at 760-61 (listing criteria for evaluating "quality"
of negotiated settlements); id. at 829-40 (discussing limits of "problem-solving"
model of negotiations).
204. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 170, at 505 (listing factors such as economic superiority, misleading statements and collusion among several parties in
order to isolate another party). But see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 172, at 833-34
(arguing that "problem-solving" negotiations may still be beneficial despite one
party being significantly more powerful than other).
205. See generally Starna, supra note 189, at 163, 169-70 (stating that small percentage of Native Americans in New York State, compared to state's non-Native
population-38,000 to 17.6 million in 1987-"furnishes persuasive evidence supporting the view historically and commonly held in government circles that Indians in the state do not constitute a political threat to those in power, and are not
regarded as an important political constituency.").
206. See Indian Law Resource Ctr., supra note 203, at 94 (noting that Penobscots only had six days to examine and approve complex Maine land claims settlement). Over time tribal claimants have become more sophisticated at litigating
and negotiating land claims. Court decisions favoring Native claimants have
helped Native Americans "even the playing field," somewhat. Moreover, tribes
may get outside assistance. For example, the Indian Law Resource Center provides
free legal representation. SeeJudson, supra note 129, at B-1. In Connecticut, large,
out-of-state gambling interests are apparently funding the Golden Hill Paugussetts'
claims. Id.
207. Each of the Native land claim settlements has had its critics. For example, a dissenting faction of the Gay Head Indians filed numerous lawsuits challenging the authority of the Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head to represent
Native interests in settling claims to the Gay Head Peninsula on Martha's Vineyard
Island in Massachusetts. See James v. United States Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 824 F.2d 1132, 1133-35 (D.C. Cir. 1987);James v. Hodel, 696 F. Supp. 699,
700 n.1 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd sub nom. James v. Lujan, 893 F.2d 1404 (D.C. Cir.
1990). A newspaper article discussing the Puyallup settlement quoted one dissenter as saying, "I think these non-Indian people got away very, very cheap and we
are the ones who are going to pay for it." George Hardeen, Tribe to Sign Land
Settlement Pact; Indian Claims: Puyallup Members Will Share $162 Millionfor Relinquishing Interest in Acreage in Tacoma Area, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1990, at A2; see also Associated Press, Washington Indian Tribe Settles Land Claim for $162M, BOSTON GLOBE,
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theless, the potentially astronomical awards, the difficulty in fashioning a judicial remedy and the possibility of establishing a better
relationship among the parties generally make negotiated settlements preferable to court ordered remedies.2 0 8
D. Examples of Negotiated Land Claim Settlements
Land claim settlements come in all shapes and sizes. They vary
depending on the participants, the political climate, the political
power of the interested parties, the historical background and the
philosophy of Indian relations at the time. In general, however,
modern negotiated settlements usually include a grant of land and/
or money to the claimants in exchange for the claimants' dropping
their claims, extinguishing Indian title to other claimed lands. and
relinquishing certain sovereignty rights.
1. Rhode Island Indian Land Claims Settlement
a.

Background

In the early 1970s, a number of the eastern tribes filed suit in
federal district court to recover their lands.2 0 9 The Narragansett
Mar. 25, 1990, at 8 (National/Foreign) (quoting protest signs stating, "Poor, Still
Poor," "Puyallup Tribe Never Gave Us Nothing" and "No Delays, Pay Today"). The
Seneca-Salamanca lease settlement generated a vocal, dissident faction of local residents who formed the Salamanca Coalition of United Taxpayers (SCOUT) to
fight the settlement. See Douglas Heuck, Reservations on Reparations: New Leases Put
Strain on Seneca Indians, Residents of N.Y. Town, PrrrSBURGH PREss, Feb. 17, 1991, at
Al, A6.
208. See HAUPrMAN, supra note 136, at 31. Discussing the Moss Lake settlement in upstate New York, Mario Cuomo, who was then Secretary of State for New
York, stated:
The Mohawk settlement has moved us toward a realization that the
way to resolve these things [Native land disputes] is not by letting them
go to court because if the Indian goes to court and wins then the court
will say that the land belongs to the Indians. If the land belongs to the
Indian, the court will not actually deliver the land to the Indians because
the legislative process will then intervene to say that's an absurd result for example, to give the whole City of Saratoga to the Indians. We must
find a different process - conflict resolution without legislation, a process
of negotiation.
Id.; see also Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement Act of 1989, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1773(a) (5) (Supp. V 1993). The Act states:
There is a recognition that any final resolution of pending disputes
through a process of litigation would take many years and entail great
expense to all parties; continue economically and socially damaging controversies; prolong uncertainty as to the access, ownership, and jurisdictional status of issues in question; and seriously impair long-term
economic planning and development for all parties.
Id.
209. See Hagan, supra note 35, at 25.
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Tribe was the first to negotiate a settlement.2 1 0 Congress subsequently ratified the parties' agreement in the Rhode Island Indian
2 11
Claims Settlement Act.
The Narragansett Tribe's ancestral lands were located in
Rhode Island. In 1880, the Tribe lost their land to the State when
Rhode Island passed legislation disbanding the Tribe.2 1 2 In 1975,
the Tribe filed two actions in federal district court to regain possession of approximately 3,200 acres in Charlestown, Rhode Island.21 3
The suits were brought against the Director of the Rhode Island
Department of Environmental Management and thirty-two private
land owners. 2 14 The Narragansetts claimed that the loss of their
land in 1880 violated the Nonintercourse Act because the federal
government had never approved the transfer.2 15
Charlestown, Rhode Island, is a small seacoast town with a substantial summer tourist trade. 216 When the Narragansetts filed suit,
the area was on the verge of a real estate boom due to the influx of
new residents and tourists from Boston, Providence and New
210. Id. at 26; Indian Law Resource Ctr., supra note 203, at 92; see alsoJoint
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Settlement of the Rhode Island Indian Land Claims (Feb. 28, 1978) [hereinafter R.I. Agreement], reprinted in S. REP.
No. 972, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 25-30 (1978).
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992) [hereinafter ANCSA], is the largest of the federal land claim settlement acts to date. See Hardeen, supra note 207, at A2. ANCSA, however, did not
enact a voluntarily negotiated, formal agreement among the Alaskan Natives, the
State and the other parties affected by the Act. ROBEIT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 737 (3d ed. 1991). Because ANCSA was
not based on a prior consensual agreement, it falls outside of the scope of this
Article. For discussion of ANCSA and its amendments, see Arthur Lazarus, Jr. &
W. Richard West, Jr., The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: A flawed Victoy, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1976, at 132; J. Tate London, The "1991 Amendments" to
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Protectionfor Native Lands?, 8 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 200 (1989); John F. Walsh, Note, Settling the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,
38 STAN. L. REv. 227 (1985). For the history of ANCSA, see also H.R. REP. No. 523,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-6 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192-96.
211. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1716 (1988); see also Narragansett Indian Land Management Cop. Act, ch. 116, § 1-12, 1979 R.I. Pub. Laws (codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 37-18-1 to 37-18-15 (1990 reenactment & Supp. 1993)) (implementing State's
part of settlement agreement).
212. Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. Southern R.I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 798, 804 (D.R.I. 1976); S. REP. No. 972, supra note 210, at 7.
213. Narragansett Tribe of Indians, 418 F. Supp. at 798, 802 (Civ. A. Nos.
750005, 750006); S. REP. No. 972, supra note 210, at 7.
214. See S. REP. No. 972, supra note 210, at 7; Indian Law Resource Ctr., supra
note 203, at 92.
215. Narragansett Tribe of Indians, 418 F. Supp. at 802; S. REP. No. 972, supra
note 210, at 7.
216. See Hagan, supra note 35, at 26 (stating that in 1975, Charlestown's normal population of less than 4,000 persons grew to approximately 20,000 during the
tourist season).
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York.2 1 7 The Narragansetts' claim clouded property titles in the
area, including land not subject to the suits. 21 8 As a result, develop2 19

ment essentially stopped.
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island consolidated the Narragansetts' two actions. In 1976, the
court issued an opinion finding subject matter jurisdiction and
striking the defendants' other defenses. 220 Following this decision,
the Tribe, State and other parties to the lawsuits began settlement
negotiations.2 2 1 They finally reached an agreement in February
1978.222 Congress subsequently ratified the settlement agreement
with minor changes in the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement
Act, which became effective on September 30, 1978.223
b.

Settlement Terms

Under the settlement, the Tribe acquired approximately 1,800
acres of land in exchange for relinquishing its land claims and ab217. See Michael Knight, Winds of Change Ruffle Charlestown, RI., N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 1978, at A18 (noting that land prices were relatively low because Charlestown missed previous real estate booms and remained underdeveloped).
218. 25 U.S.C. § 1701(b) (1988).
219. See Hagan, supra note 35, at 26 ("Construction in Charlestown ground to
a halt, real estate agents could not function because no buyer could get title insurance, and the local school district had to borrow money at short-term bank rates
because it could not find purchasers for long-term bonds.").
220. Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. Southern R.I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 798, 801 (D.R.I. 1976).
221. Indian Law Resource Ctr., supra note 203, at 92.
222. R.I. Agreement, supra note 210, at 25-30. The Governor of Rhode Island, the attorneys for the Narragansett Tribe and the other parties to the two
lawsuits signed a joint memorandum of understanding on February 28, 1978. Id.
at 27. The settlement agreement was reached after three years of "legal skirmishing" and difficult negotiations. Hagan, supra note 35, at 26. A local real estate
broker-developer and president of the Charlestown Action Committee
spearheaded the opposition to the Narragansetts' land claims. Knight, supra note
217, at A18. He spent $20,000 in legal fees but ultimately agreed to sell 160 acres
of his land to the tribal corporation as part of the settlement agreement. See Hagan, supra note 35, at 26; Knight, supra note 217, at A18.
223. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1716 (1988). The parties' negotiated agreement
called for the federal government to reimburse the private defendants' costs and
attorneys' fees incurred in the lawsuits. R.I. Agreement, supra note 210, at 26,
para. 10. Speaking for the Administration, the Department of the Interior objected, fearing that this provision would establish a precedent for other land claim
actions. S. REP. No. 972, supra note 210, at 17. Accordingly, federal reimbursement to the defendants was omitted from the Settlement Act. Id. at 10. The negotiated agreement also provided that the settlement lands would be subject to
federal restrictions on alienation. Id. at 8; R.I. Agreement, supra note 210, at 26,
para. 7. The Act, however, states that the lands will be given federal trust status
only if the Secretary of the Interior formally recognizes the Narragansetts as a
tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 1707(c). The Act contains a number of other minor changes.
See S. REP. No. 972, supra note 210, at 9-11.
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original title in Rhode Island. 224 The settlement provided for creation of a state-chartered corporation (State Corporation) to hold
the land conveyed under the settlement in trust for the Tribe. 225
The Narragansett Tribe, incorporated as a Rhode Island nonbusiness corporation (Indian Corporation), would select the majority of
the directors and thereby control the State Corporation.2 26 Rhode
Island agreed to convey approximately 900 acres of public land to
the State Corporation for the Tribe. 22 7 The State Corporation also
received 900 acres of private land.2 28 The federal government established a $3.5 million fund to purchase the private settlement
land. 22 9 Under the agreement, no private landowner would be
forced to sell his or her land; private land would be purchased at
fair market value through purchase option agreements. 23 0
The settlement agreement further provided that all of the public land and seventy-five percent of the private land would be used
for conservation purposes.2 3 1 This left approximately 225 acres for
development. The Tribe was given authority to regulate hunting
and fishing on settlement land as long as the Tribe maintained
232
minimum standards for protecting wildlife, fish stock and safety.
The Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act also exempted
the settlement land from federal, state and local taxes.2 33 However,
income-producing activities on the land were taxable. 23 4 The Act
224. S. REP. No. 972, supra note 210, at 5; R.I. Agreement, supra note 210, at
25-26, paras. 2-3.
225. 25 U.S.C. § 1706(a); R.I. Agreement, supra note 210, at 25 paras. 1, 8, 26.

ANCSA also used a corporate format. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1988 & Supp. IV
1992). Subsequent settlements, however, have dropped the corporate model. See,
e.g., Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993); Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1751-1760 (1988); Seminole Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1987, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1772- 17 72g (1988); Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement Act of 1989, 25

U.S.C. §§ 1773-1773j (Supp. V 1993).
226. 25 U.S.C. § 1706(a) (2); R.I. Agreement, supra note 210, at 25, para. 1.

227. 25 U.S.C. § 1706(b); R.I. Agreement, supra note 210, at 25, para. 2.
228. R.I. Agreement, supra note 210, at 25-26, para. 3.
229. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1703, 1707(a), 1710 (1988); see also R.I. Agreement, supra
note 210, at 25-26, para. 5.
230. R.I. Agreement, supra note 210, at 25-26, para. 3. The agreement provided that private land would be purchased at fair market value through purchase

option agreements and no one would be forced to sell his or her land. Id.; see also
25 U.S.C. § 1704 (1988).
231. R.I. Agreement, supra note 210, at 26-27, paras. 12, 14.

232. 25 U.S.C. § 1706(a)(3) (1988); R.I. Agreement, supra note 210, at 26,
para. 11.

233. 25 U.S.C. § 1715(a) (1988).
234. Id. § 1715(b). The Tribe also agreed to reimburse Charlestown for future services provided to the settlement lands. Id. § 1715(c); R.I. Agreement, supra

note 210, at 27, para. 16.
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extinguished the Narragansetts' aboriginal title in Rhode Island
and validated all prior land transfers.2 3 5 It also gave the State civil
and criminal jurisdiction over the settlement land. 236 The State

Corporation could grant public and private easements over the
land pursuant to Rhode Island law. 23 7 However, this provision apparently also subjected the State Corporation to involuntary eminent domain proceedings to secure public easements.2 38 Finally,
the Act absolved the federal government of any further responsibility for the settlement land, the Narragansetts, the State Corporation
or the Indian Corporation after the government conveyed the private settlement land to the State Corporation and extinguished Indian title. 239 Nevertheless, the Act provided that if the Secretary of
the Interior formally recognized the Narragansett Tribe, the settlement land would gain federal trust status and could not be alien240
ated without the Secretary's approval.
235. 25 U.S.C. § 1705 (1988); see also R.I. Agreement, supra note 210, at 26,
para. 6. The Act also extinguished any other tribe's tite and claims in Rhode
Island unless the tribe or other claimant commenced an action within 180 days of
the Act's enactment. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1705, 1712 (1988). Claims to land in Charlestown brought by Indian claimants other than the Narragansetts had to be brought
against the State Corporation. 25 U.S.C. § 1705(b).
236. 25 U.S.C. § 1708 (1988); see also R.I. Agreement, supra note 210, at 26,
para. 13 (noting that state and local building, fire and safety codes applied to settlement lands). The State also retained a public fishing area on settlement land at
Deep Pond and the state benefits provided under the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act of Sept. 2, 1937, 16 U.S.C. §§ 669-669i (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and
the Federal Aid in Fish Restoration Act of Aug. 9, 1950, 16 U.S.C. §§ 777-7771
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). See 25 U.S.C. § 1709 (1988); R.I. Agreement, supra note
210, at 27, para. 17.
237. 25 U.S.C. § 1707(c) (1988); see alsoR.I. Agreement, supra note 210, at 26,
para. 7.
238. 25 U.S.C. § 1707(c). The Act provides:
That nothing in this [Act] shall affect or otherwise impair the ability of
the State Corporation to grant or otherwise convey (including any involuntary conveyance by means of eminent domain or condemnation proceedings) any easement for public or private purposes pursuant to the
laws of the State of Rhode Island.
Id.; see also R.I. Agreement, supra note 210, at 26, para. 7 (indicating that settlement lands would have federal restraint on alienation, "provided that nothing in
the federal restriction or in any other aspect of this memorandum shall affect the
ability of the State Corporation to grant or otherwise convey (whether voluntary or
involuntary, including any eminent domain or condemnation proceedings) easements for public or private purposes.").
239. 25 U.S.C. § 1707(c).
240. Id. Presumably, without the Secretary's recognition, the land was otherwise alienable. See S. REP. No. 972, supra note 210, at 7 ("[S]ettlement lands will be
subject to a special federal restraint on alienation only if the Secretary [of the
Interior] subsequently acknowledges the Tribe's existence under the Department
of the Interior's regulations governing recognition of Indian tribes.").
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Evaluation

Viewed in hindsight from the Tribe's perspective, the Rhode
Island Indian land claims settlement has its flaws.2 4 1 The Narragansetts gave up substantial sovereignty rights in addition to claims for
many acres of land. More recent settlements tend to be more lucrative, depending on the size of the claim, with less loss of tribal sovereignty rights. 242 Some have included large monetary funds for
social and economic development, in addition to land grants or
2 43
funds to purchase land.

Nevertheless, the Narragansetts' settlement was the first and
should be considered in light of the times in which it was negotiated. 2 "4 In 1978, no court had yet decided on the merits a similar

possessory action in favor of the Native claimants. The Narragansetts' claims had accrued nearly 100 years before the Tribe filed suit
and were based on aboriginal title. 245 It would be another seven
years before the Supreme Court would decide Oneida I1.246 Under

the circumstances, the parties could have reasonably anticipated
that the'First Circuit or the Supreme Court would simply dismiss
the Narragansetts' claims as untimely, nonjusticiable or otherwise
barred. The Narragansetts gained a substantial land base through
the settlement. 2 47 In the face of rapid real estate development, they
were also able to preserve a large tract of land and gain the right to
regulate hunting and fishing on their land without state interference.2 4 8 Today, the Tribe might have been able to negotiate a better deal, but without the legal precedents and experience of
negotiating subsequent settlements, the Tribe and their attorneys
fared reasonably well. They also established an important precedent for future settlements.
241. See Indian Law Resource Ctr., supra note 203, at 93 (discussing problems
of settlement agreement).
242. See, e.g., Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement Act of 1989, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1773-1773j (Supp. V 1993); Seneca Nation Settlement Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1774-1774h (Supp. V 1993). But see Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25
U.S.C. § 1725 (1988) (giving state considerable regulatory jurisdiction).
243. See Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement Act of 1989, 25 U.S.C. §§ 17731773j; Seneca Nation Settlement Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1774-1774h.
244. See, e.g., Hagan, supra note 35, at 26; see also supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
245. Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. Southern R.I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 798, 802 (D.R.I. 1976); S. REP. No. 972, supra note 210, at 5, 7.
246. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
247. For a discussion of the terms of the Narragansett settlement, see supra
notes 224-40 and accompanying text.
248. For a discussion of the settlement lands and the terms governing them,
see supra notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
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In 1983, the federal government formally recognized the Narragansetts as a tribe. 249 Formal recognition gave the Tribe's land
federal trust status 250 and made the Tribe eligible for federal grants
in education, housing and health care. 251 As of this writing, the
Narragansetts are planning to build a casino.2 52 In March, 1994,
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected
Rhode Island's argument that state law prohibiting casino gambling
applied to the Tribe pursuant to the Settlement Act. 255 The First
Circuit ruled, instead, that the federal Indian 'Gaming Regulatory
Act 2 54 governed and thus required the State to negotiate with the
Narragansett Tribe over establishing casino gambling on tribal
land.

255

In reaching its conclusion, the First Circuit somewhat clarified
the extent of the State's jurisdiction over the Tribe's land under the
Settlement Act. The court rejected the State's argument that the
Act granted Rhode Island exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement
land. 256 Instead, the First Circuit held that the Tribe still "retained

that portion of jurisdiction they possess by virtue of their sovereign
existence as a people"25 7 and concluded that Rhode Island and the
Narragansett Tribe have concurrent jurisdiction over the settlement land.

258

249. 48 Fed. Reg. 6177-78 (1983).
250. 25 U.S.C. § 1707(c) (1988).
251. See generally 25 C.F.R. § 83.12 (1994) (noting that recognized tribe is eligible for federal services and benefits). The State Corporation subsequently transferred title to the settlement lands to the Tribe. In 1988, the Tribe deeded the
lands to the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs to be held in trust. Rhode Island v.
Narragansett Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 689 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 298 (1994).
The validity of these transfers is doubtful because Congress has not formally ratified them. See id. at 689 n.2 (noting issue but declining to consider it because issue
was unnecessary to questions before court and because parties had not raised it).
252. NarragansettTribe, 19 F.3d at 690; see also Associated Press, Indians, Governors Disagree on Tribe Casinos, PH-ILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 4, 1993, at A3; Gerald M. Carbone & Tatiana Pina, Casino Expected to Draw 15,000 Daily, Tribe Says, PROVIDENCE
JouRNAL-BULLETIN, July 17, 1992, at Al.
253. NarragansettTribe, 19 F.3d 685.
254. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) [hereinafter IGRA]. IGRA provides for negotiation of a "Tribal-State compact" before "class III" gaming can be offered on Indian lands. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
255. NarragansettTribe, 19 F.3d at 706.
256. Id. at 702.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 701. The First Circuit declined to specify the scope of the State's
concurrent jurisdiction, except as limited by IGRA and the facts of the case. Id.
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Puyallup Land Claims Settlement

The Puyallup settlement is the largest and most comprehensive
of the voluntarily negotiated settlements to date. It resolved claims
to approximately 20,000 acres of land around Tacoma, Washington, including vital portions of the Port of Tacoma and the Tacoma
259
industrial area.

a.

Background

The Puyallup Tribe's ancestral lands were located on the eastern side of Puget Sound.2 60 At the Treaty of Medicine Creek in
1854, the Puyallups and other area tribes ceded approximately 2.24
million acres of land to the federal government. 26 1 In return, they
received $32,000, guaranteed fishing rights, and the promise of
smaller parcels of land for reservations.2 6 2 Presidential executive
orders in 1857 and 1873 established the Tribe's reservation
lands. 263 These grants included land along the mouth of the Puyallup River at Commencement Bay and sections of what are now the
cities of Tacoma, Fife and Puyallup. The Tribe subsequently lost
most of its land under the allotment acts. 26 4 In addition, the State
of Washington acquired the land under all of the navigable water259. Associated Press, supra note 207, at 8 (National/Foreign).
260. H.R. REP. No. 57, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1989).
261. Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132; H.R. REP. No. 57,
supra note 260 (providing historical background for Puyallup settlement); Roberta
Ulrich, Puyallup Deal Sparks Hopes, Fears, ORECONAN, June 25, 1989, at BI (discussing Treaty of Medicine Creek). Isaac I. Stevens, the Governor and Superintendent
for Indian Affairs in the Washington Territory, negotiated the Treaty. Ulrich,
supra,at BI. He was also the surveyor of a transcontinental railroad route. Id. The
purpose of the treaty was to obtain the land for white settlement and to induce the
Indians to move onto reservations voluntarily and without violence. United States
v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 682-83 (9th Cir. 1975).
262. Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); Ulrich, supra note 261, at BI.
263. See, e.g., Puyallup Indian Tribe, 717 F.2d at 1253-54, 1260 (discussing Executive Order of January 20, 1857); H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 6-7. Contrary to what they had been promised, the Puyallups were settled on land with poor
access to Commencement Bay and without access to the Puyallup River and its
fisheries on which the Tribe depended. The Tribe's protests erupted into hostilities with the United States and non-Indian settlers which lasted until August 1856.
The Executive Orders ofJanuary 20, 1857, and September 6, 1873, expanded the
Tribe's reservation lands to include the mouth of the Puyallup River and important tidelands. Puyallup Indian Tribe, 717 F.2d at 1253-54, 1259-60; H.R. REP. No.
57, supra note 260, at 6-7.
264. H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 7-8. The Puyallups' reservation at
one time covered approximately 23,000 acres. Ulrich, supra note 261, at BI. By
1978, the Puyallups retained only 65 acres. The Tribe held 39.51 acres and individual members held 25.58 acres. H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 8.
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ways within the State's borders when it gained statehood in 1889.265
The Port of Tacoma and other private parties later acquired ownership of the tidelands in Commencement Bay and certain riverbed
2 66
property within the Tribe's original reservation.
The Puyallups began asserting their land claims and other
treaty rights as early as the late 1800s. 267 In the 1960s and 1970s,

disputes over tribal fishing rights became a serious problem. Litigation began in 1963 and culminated with a series of Supreme Court
decisions that examined the State's right to control Native fishing. 268 This litigation, together with the militant protests in the
1960s and 1970s, known as the "fishing wars," bred mistrust and
269
hostility between Natives and non-Natives.
Against this background, the Puyallups claimed title to some
20,000 acres of land throughout the Tacoma area that had been
part of their original reservation.2 70 In 1974, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized the validity of
the Tribe's original reservation boundaries.2 7 1 In 1983, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the Puyallups' title to twelve acres of former
riverbed along the Puyallup River.2 72 The following year, the Tribe
filed suit against the Union Pacific Railroad and the Port of Tacoma
to regain 120 acres of tideland along Commencement Bay and ad265. See United States v. Ashton, 170 F. 509, 512-13, 517-20 (C.C.W.D. Wash.
1909) (stating that Washington State succeeded to sovereign jurisdiction over waterways previously held by federal government upon admission to Union), appeal
dismissed sub non. Bird v. Ashton, 220 U.S. 604 (1911).
266. H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 7-8; see also Puyallup Indian Tribe, 717
F.2d at 1254 (discussing Port of Tacoma's acquisition of exposed riverbed and
other land abutting Puyallup River).
267. See, e.g., Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984); United States v. Ashton, 170 F. 509
(C.C.W.D. Wash. 1909), appeal dismissed sub nom. Bird V. Ashton, 220 U.S. 604
(1911).
268. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165
(1977); Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Puyallup Tribe v.
Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
269. Ulrich, supra note 261, at BI. In one incident, militant tribe members
occupied a former Indian hospital in a week-long standoff against the police and
United States marshals. Id.
270. Associated Press, supra note 207, at 8 (National/Foreign).
271. United States v. Washington, 496 F.2d 620 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1032 (1974).
272. Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251, 1253-54, 126367 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). Between 1948 and 1950, the
Army Corps of Engineers rechanneled portions of the Puyallup River, leaving the
riverbed exposed. The Puyallups' suit involved 12 acres of former riverbed that
were located within the Tribe's reservation land after the Executive Order of 1857.
Id. at 1254.
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ditional riverbed along the Puyallup River. 273 These claims clouded
title to much of the Tacoma area, including prime industrial and
Port of Tacoma land. 274 Several important state highways also
crossed the claim area.2 75 The House Report accompanying the
Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement Act estimated that the value
of the land, including office buildings, homes, and port facilities,
2 76
was more than $750 million.
Settlement negotiations began shortly after the Ninth Circuit's
1983 decision for the Tribe in Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma.2 77 On August 27, 1988, the Puyallup Tribe, the State of Washington, the federal government, the local governments of Pierce
County and various private property owners reached an agreement.2 78 The federal government ratified the agreement in the

Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement Act of
b.

1989.279

Settlement Terms

The settlement package was worth approximately $162 million
in land, money, economic and social development, fisheries en28 0
hancement and construction of the Blair Navigation Project.
The state, local governments and private parties provided fifty-two
percent of the settlement assets. The federal government contrib273. Complaint, Puyallup Tribe v. Union Pac. R.R., No. C84-359TC (W.D.
Wash. June 1984). The State of Washington intervened as a party defendant. Order of Judge John C. Coughenour, Puyallup Tribe v. Union Pac. R.R., Mar. 24,
1990.
274. H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 9.
275. Letter from Booth Gardner, Governor of Washington, supra note 135, at
3.
276. H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 9.
277. 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983) (declaring Puyallup Tribe's title to 12
acres of former riverbed).
278. Agreement between the Puyallup Tribe of Indians, Local Governments
in Pierce County, the United States of America, and Certain Private Property Owners, Aug. 27, 1988 [hereinafter Puyallup Agreement], reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 57,
supra note 260, at 23-165. The parties had actually reached an agreement earlier;
however, the Tribe's members voted to reject it in February 1986. Negotiations
resumed in 1987 and were completed in August 1988. See Ulrich, supra note 261.
The signatories to the settlement agreement were the United States Government;
the State of Washington; the Port of Tacoma; Pierce County; the Cities of Tacoma,
Fife, and Puyallup; the Union Pacific Railioad Co.; Burlington Northern, Inc.; the
Riverbed Owners Committee; the Commencement Bay Tideland Owners Committee; and the Puyallup Indian Tribe. Puyallup Agreement at 1, reprinted in H.R. REP.
No. 57, supra note 260, at 27.
279. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1773-1773j (Supp. V 1993).
280. For a discussion of the Puyallup settlement, see Grover, Stetson & Williams, P.C., Tribal-State Resolution: Recent Attempts, 36 S.D. L. REv. 277, 293-96
(1991).
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uted the remaining forty-eight percent.2 81
The Puyallup Tribe received 900 acres of land. 28 2 The land
included property for a marine terminal, industrial development,
fisheries enhancement and recreation.28 3 The United States currently holds title to the land in trust for the Tribe, and most of the
land has "on-reservation" status. 28 4 The agreement also provided
for environmental audits and decontaminating land in the port
28 5
area.
In addition, the settlement established several multi-million
dollar funds to benefit the Tribe and its members. The federal government created a $22 million permanent trust fund. 286 The principal may not be invaded, but the Tribe may use the trust income to
provide social, health and welfare services for its members. 287 The
permanent trust fund should generate approximately $88 million
for the Tribe over the next fifty years.28 8 The Washington State Department of Social and Health Services agreed to provide the Tribe
with additional funds for an elder care facility; a youth substance
abuse facility; a child day care center; computers for the tribal
mental health center; and training in alcoholism counselling, day
281. The State estimated the parties'
$ 77.250 million
48%
$ 21.000 million
13%
32%
$ 52.134 million
7%
$ 11.460 million
$161.844 million 100%
P YALLuP TRIBAL SETrLmENT

contributions as follows:
Federal contribution
State contribution
Local contribution
Private contribution
All contributions

4 (1989) (state public relations pamphlet). Settle-

ment assets are not subject to tax, liens or forfeiture. 25 U.S.C. § 1773h(a);(d).
282. 25 U.S.C. § 1773b; Puyallup Agreement § I, supra note 278, at 2-6, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 28-32. Five hundred thousand dollars was set aside for purchasing 600 acres of open space, forest and cultural land.
25 U.S.C. § 1773b(c) (9); Puyallup Agreement § I(A), supranote 278, at 3, reprinted
in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 29.
283. The market value of the land was approximately $37.5 milliom Puyallup
Agreement § I(A), supra note 278, at 2, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note
260, at 28.
284. 25 U.S.C. § 1773b(a),(d); Puyallup Agreement § I(A), supra note 278, at
3, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 29.
285. 25 U.S.C. § 1773b(b); Puyallup Agreement § I(A) supra note 278, at 3,
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 29.
286. 25 U.S.C. § 1773d(b); Puyallup Agreement § III, supra note 278, at 7-8 &
doc. 3, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 33-34, 93-95.
287. The purpose of the trust fund is "to provide the Tribe with a permanent
resource that enhances the ability of the Tribe to provide services to its members."
Puyallup Agreement, supranote 278, at 1. The income may be used only for "housing, elderly needs, burial and cemetery maintenance, education and cultural preservation, supplemental health care, day care and other social services." Id; 25
U.S.C. § 1773d(b) (3) (A); Puyallup Agreement, supra note 278, at 1.
288. Pu'ALLuP TRIBAL SETrLEMENT, supra note 281, at 6.
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care, child welfare and mental health.2 89 The settlement also established a $9.5 million economic development and land acquisition
fundY90 The Tribe received an additional two million dollars for
developing and expanding small business enterprises owned by
Tribe members.291 Finally, each member of the Tribe, as of the
ratification date, received a one-time, $20,000 payment from a $24
2 92
million annuity fund.
293
The settlement did not affect the Tribe's fishing rights.
However, it did establish a $10 million fund for fisheries enhancement 2 9 4 Under the agreement, the Tribe, State and local governments will work together to increase fish production, protect fish
habitat, control pollution and prevent flood damage.2 95 The settlement also included a navigation agreement to reduce conflicts be2 96
tween tribal fishing and commercial shipping.
Another important part of the settlement provided for construction of the Blair Navigation Project. 297 The project was
designed to promote domestic and foreign trade by improving shipping access and "unlocking" valuable waterfront land for development, including Puyallup property. 298 The settlement allocated
$51 million for widening and deepening the Blair Waterway Channel and for building a connecting bridge over the channel or a by289. Puyallup Agreement § V(C), supra note 278, at 16 & doc. 5, reprinted in
H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 42, 150-52.
290. 25 U.S.C. § 1773f(a) (1); Puyallup Agreement § VI(A), supra note 278, at
16, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 42.
291. Puyallup Agreement § VI(B), supra note 278, at 16, reprinted in H.R. REP.
No. 57, supra note 260, at 42; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1773f(a) (2) (authorizing federal
government's contribution). The agreement also promised job training for 265
Puyallups and 115 local jobs for Tribe members. Puyallup Agreement § V(A),
supra note 278, at 15 & doc. 5, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 41,
142-50.
292. 25 U.S.C. § 1773d(a); Puyallup Agreement § III, supra note 278, at 7 &
doc. 2, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 33, 91-92. Members of the
Tribe who were not 21 years old, receive their payment when they turn 21. 25
U.S.C. § 1773d(a) (2); Puyallup Agreement § III, supra note 278, at doc. 2(B), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 91.
293. 25 U.S.C. § 1773g; Puyallup Agreement § VIII(A) (2) (b), supra note 278,
at 20, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 46.
294. Puyallup Agreement § IV, supra note 278, at 8-9 & doc. 4, reprinted in
H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 34-35, 96-98.
295. Puyallup Agreement, supra note 278, at doc. 4, reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
57, supra note 260, at 96-141.
296. Id., at doc. 4, at 16-23, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at
111-18. The federal government agreed to provide $100,000 for navigation equipment for Commencement Bay. 25 U.S.C. § 1773e.
297. Puyallup Agreement § VII, supra note 278, at 17 & doc. 6, reprinted in
H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 43, 153-58.
298. Id. § VII, at 17, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 43.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss3/1

50

Nelson: Resolving Native American Land Claims and the Eleventh Amendment:

1994]

CHANGING THE BALANCE OF POWER

pass road around the waterway.2 99 The federal government gave
the Tribe permission to engage in foreign trade so the Puyallups
could further benefit from the Project.3 0 0 Under the agreement,
the Tribe also receives an annual incentive payment for participating in the Project. These payments will total $2.5 million over a
30 1
twenty-year period.
In return, the Puyallups relinquished claims to approximately
20,000 acres of land and certain sovereignty rights. The Settlement
Act extinguished the Tribe's title to all land in Washington State
that was not exempted under the settlement.3 0 2 In addition, the
Tribe agreed not to contest several local projects that would be constructed with minimal impact on the fisheries. 303 The Tribe was
given jurisdiction over its trust land, including land conveyed under
the agreement.3 0 4 However, the Tribe agreed not to assert jurisdiction over non-trust land and non-Indians within the reservation, except as authorized under the Indian, Child Welfare Act. 30 3 The
agreement gave each government the exclusive right to enforce its
environmental laws on its own land. 30 6 Finally, the parties consented to suit in the United States District Court for the Western
30 7
District of Washington to enforce the settlement.
c.

An Example of Mutually Beneficial Negotiations

Although the negotiations were protracted and difficult,30 the
Puyallup settlement illustrates how the flexibility of negotiating an
agreement can allow the parties to address what is important to
each party, lead to a "win-win" result and create better relations for
299. Id., at doc. 6, at 2-3, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 15455; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1773f(c) (appropriating $25,500,000 for costs associated

with Blair Project).
300. 25 U.S.C. § 1773f(b).
301. Puyallup Agreement § VII, supra note 278, at 17 & doc. 4, reprinted in
H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 43, 156.
302. 25 U.S.C. § 1773a; Puyallup Agreement § IX, supra note 278, at 28-30,
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 54-56.
303. Puyallup Agreement § IV, supra note 278, at 9-11, reprinted in H.R. REP.
No. 57, supra note 260, at 35-37.
304. 25 U.S.C. § 17 73g; Puyallup Agreement § IV, supra note 278, at 18-19,
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 44-45.

305. 25 U.S.C. § 17 7 3g; Puyallup Agreement §§ VIII(A)(1)(b),(e), supra note
278, at 19, reprinted in H.R. REp. No. 57, supra note 260, at 45.
306. 25 U.S.C. § 1773g; Puyallup Agreement § VIII(A) (3), supra note 278, at
20, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 46.
307. Puyallup Agreement § XI (B), supra note 278, at 33, reprinted in H.R. REP.
No. 57, supra note 260, at 59.
308. See H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 9 (citing four years of difficult
and extensive negotiations eventually resulting in current settlement).
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future interaction. Had the State and local parties litigated the
Puyallups' claims, development in one of the State's most important deep-water ports and industrial areas would have essentially
stopped because of the cloud on property titles in the area.3 0 9 Economic growth throughout Washington State would have been hurt.
The State estimated that prolonged litigation would have cost millions of dollars in state funds and the State's economy could have
lost billions of dollars.3 1 0 The Tribe, in turn, would have faced
years of litigation, uncertainty and the hostility such litigation typically generates.
Through the negotiations process, the parties were able to address their major concerns. The agreement substantially increased
the Tribe's land, provided for increased fish production 31 1 and established substantial financial resources for the Puyallups' social
and economic development and stability. For the State and the
other public and private parties, the settlement quieted property
titles and allowed for development and economic growth. Washington State was also very concerned that if the Puyallups prevailed,
private landowners would sue the State for, originally passing bad
title.3 12 The settlement removed this threat, as well as the threat of
any future land claims by the Tribe. Moreover, the agreement allowed the State and local governments to resolve jurisdictional is3 13
sues which were particularly important to them.
Washington State, the Tribe and the other local parties reaped
another important benefit. The agreement called for millions of
federal dollars to be spent in the area; including millions for improving the port.3 1 4 The influx of capital and improvements will
benefit all of the parties, not just the Tribe. The State and local
309. See PUYALup TiAL SETrLEMENT, supra note 281, at 4; Ulrich, supra note
261, at BI.
310. Letter from Booth, Gardner, Governor of Washington, to Washington
State Legislators, supra note 135, at 3; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1773 (a) (5) ("[A]ny final
resolution of pending disputes through a process of litigation would take many
years and entail great expense to all parties; continue economically and socially
damaging controversies; prolong uncertainty as to the access, ownership, andjurisdictional status of issues in question; and seriously impair long-term economic
planning and development for all parties.").
311. See Grover, Stetson, & Williams, P.C., supra note 280, at 294 (noting that
"key concern" of tribe was preserving and increasing fisheries).
312. PtuALuP TRIBAL SETtEMENT, supra note 281, at 3, 4, 9, 15. Generally,

the states have sovereign immunity from suit, but they may waive their immunity.
313. See Grover, Stetson & Williams, P.C., supra note 280, at 295-96 (emphasizing that agreement "resolved major issues regarding tribal-state jurisdiction and
police powers" and describing allocation of jurisdiction under settlement).
314. The federal government's contribution to the settlement was approximately $77.25 million. H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 9.
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parties contributed $84.394 million to the settlement.3

15

The

agreement should generate many times that amount in economic
316
growth and tax revenues.
Relations among the parties prior to the settlement were
marked by distrust, animosity and occasional violence.3 17 During
the course of the negotiations, the parties were able to identify certain areas of common interest and establish cooperative programs
for their mutual benefit.3 18 For example, one shared goal was enhancing the fisheries.3 19 In particular, the parties wanted to increase the number of salmon and steelhead released into the
Puyallup River and Commencement Bay Basin and to protect the
fish environment.3 20 Accordingly, the agreement provides for a cooperative fisheries enhancement program, pollution control and
decontaminating polluted areas.3 2 ' The agreement. also requires
consultation and a cooperative approach to resolving future conflicts. 32 2 Both the negotiations process and the final agreement
thus provided a means for easing tensions among the parties, solv3 23
ing specific problems and improving future relations.
315. See id. (included state, local and private contributions). The State's public relations pamphlet on the settlement lists the state, local and private contributions as $84.594 million. PUYALLuP TRiBAL SETTLEMENT, supra note 281, at 4.
316. The State estimated that "over the next 10 years the agreement will create $320 million annually in economic expansion of the State's second largest urban concentration that will provide a return several times over to State coffers in
the form of additional tax revenues." PuYALLuP TRIwAL SETTLEMENT, supra note
281, at 11; see also id. at 4 ("Estimates of the growth potential for the Port area
alone could mean as much as $38 million in sales tax revenue. In addition, up to
$9 million annually may be realized from other tax sources. Expansion of the Port
will bring enhanced export opportunities for the agricultural industry in, Eastern
Washington, the timber industry and manufacturing in all parts of the state.").
317. See Grover, Stetson & Williams, P.C., supra note 280, at 293 (describing
Puyallup settlement agreement as "major triumph of negotiation and perseverance" and "comprehensive resolution of long and bitter disputes between the various governments and communities").
318. Numerous state and local agencies were brought in to assess the Tribe's
needs and develop effective programs. The mutual knowledge and working relationships that developed may prove to be one of the most important long-term
benefits from negotiating the settlement.
319. Puyallup Agreement, supra note 278, at doc. 4, reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
57, supranote 260, at 96 (noting "common goal to protect and enhance the fisheries resource ... while allowing construction and development to occur").
320. Id., reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supa note 260, at 96.
321. Id., at doc. 4, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260,,at 96-141.
322. Id., at doc. 7, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 57, supra note 260, at 158-65.
323. Of course, it remains to be seen how well the settlement will work over
time. As of May 1993, $2.2 million had been distributed for various programs.
Associated Press, PuyaUup Accord Three Years Later: The Good and Bad, SFEATTrE
TIMEs, May 9, 1993, at B-2. A "showcase" marina had been built on the Hylebos
Waterway which was expected to generate $650,000 per year. Id. The Tribe had
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Seneca-Salamanca Lease Settlement

As of this writing, the most recently negotiated settlement act
involves the lease controversy between the City of Salamanca, New
York, and the Seneca Nation. Salamanca is located almost entirely
within the Allegany Reservation in southwestern New York State,
about 60 miles south of Rochester. The population is approximately 6,600, most of whom are non-Indians.3 24 Unlike the previously discussed settlements, the Seneca Nation Settlement Act of
1990325 did not settle title to the land in question. Instead, it established new leasing terms between the residents of Salamanca and
the Seneca Nation to land in Salamanca, New York,3 2 6 that belongs
to the Seneca Nation.
a.

3 27

Background

The Seneca Nation is a member of the Six Nation Iroquois
Confederacy, also known as the Houdenosaunee. 3 28 During the
American Revolution, the Senecas sided with the British.3 2 9 At the
Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1784,330 which ended the war between the
purchased 69 acres for a new school. Id. Negotiations were also under way with a
Korean company to build a newsprint recycling and de-inking plant adjacent to
the Blair Waterway. Id. However, the private sector job placement program was
not working well. Id. The agreement called for employers in the Tideflats industrial area to provide 115 jobs to Tribe members. Id. Out of the 100 people who
took jobs, only 20 to 30 were still working. Id. Moreover, environmental assessment and cleanup were taking longer than anticipated and delaying the transfer of
some settlement land. Id.
324. See HAUPTMAN, supra note 136, at 25 (stating that Salamanca "iscomposed of thousands of non-Indians who live and work on land leased from the
Senecas"); Treadwell, supra note 138, at A2.
325. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1774-1774h (Supp. V 1993).
326. Equitable title to the land, whether based on aboriginal or formal title,
includes the rights to use and occupy the land. See COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note
18, at 491 (discussing occupancy rights secured by aboriginal title and recognized
title). Even where title is not contested, leasing tribal land without the federal
government's consent violates the Nonintercourse Act. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988).
327. See generally HAUPrMAN, supra note 142, at 15-43, 85-122; S.REP. No. 511,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-11 (1990) (explaining historical background leading to
Seneca Nation Settlement Act of 1990); Laurence M. Hauptman, The Historical
Background to the Present-Day Seneca Nation-SalamancaLease Controversy, in IRoQuoIs
LAND CLAIMS 101-22 (Christopher Vecsey & William A. Starna eds., 1988)
(describing "long and complex history" of leases between Seneca Nation and
inhabitants of Salamanca, New York).
328. The Iroquois Confederacy consists of the Seneca, Cayuga, Oneida, Onondaga, Mohawk and Tuscarora Nations. HAUPTMAN, supra note 142, at x. Today,
they are located in New York, Oklahoma, Wisconsin and Canada. Id.
329. Only the Oneidas and Tuscaroras sided with the United States. The
other Iroquois nations allied with Great Britain.
330. 7 Star 15 (Oct. 22, 1784).
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Iroquois Confederacy and the United States, the United States took
33
large land cessions from the hostile tribes as war reparations.

1

However, the Fort Stanwix Treaty also guaranteed to the tribes, including the hostile tribes, their lands within what is now New York
State. 33 2 The Senecas vehemently protested the loss of almost all of
their land. 333 As a result, in the 1794 Treaty at Canandaigua, the

United States gave the Senecas some additional land and again
guaranteed their possessory rights. 33 4 Today, the Senecas live pri-

marily on the Cattaraugus and Allegany Reservations in southwest33 5
ern New York State.
In the mid-nineteenth century, New York opened the western
part of the state to the railroads. Under apparent state authority,
but without federal consent, the railroad companies leased rightsof-way and other land from the Seneca Nation and individual Tribe
members.33 6 Non-Indian railroad workers and farmers followed the
331. Id. The hostile tribes ceded their lands west of what is now New York
State. The United States wanted the Ohio territory to help repay its war debt,
particularly to its soldiers. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 649 F. Supp. 420,
429, 443 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that these lands were necessary to pay war debts,
establish national domain and enforce peace on frontiers), aff'd, 860 F.2d 1145
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989). For a'discussion of the United
States' interaction with the Iroquois Confederacy following the Revolutionary War,
see Campisi, supra note 30, at 49-65.
332. 7 Stat. 15 ("[T]he Six Nations shall and do yield to the United States, all
claims west of the said boundary [the western border of New York State], and then
they shall be secured in the peaceful possession of the lands they inhabit east and
north of the same.").
333. Campisi, supra note 30, at 61-62.
334. 7 Stat. 44 (Nov. 11, 1794). The Treaty stated, in pertinent part:
"Now, the United States acknowledge all the land within the aforementioned boundaries, to be the property of the Seneka [sic] nation; and the
United States will never claim the same, nor disturb the Seneka [sic) nation ... in the free use and enjoyment thereof: but it shall remain theirs,
until they choose to sell the same to the people of the United States, who
have the right to purchase.
Id.
335. From the mid-1700s through the mid-1800s, the nations of the Iroquois
Confederacy lost large tracts of land to New York State, land speculating companies and private individuals. HAUprMAN, supra note 142, at 18. The Treaty of Buffalo Creek in 1838 essentially eliminated the Seneca's land. Id. However, in 1842
the Seneca Nation regained the Cattaraugus, Allegany and Oil Springs Reservations at the Second Treaty of Buffalo Creek. Id. Today, the Oil Springs Reservation is uninhabited. S. REP. No. 511, supra note 327, at 4. The Iroquois Nations
lost additional territory in the twentieth century, much of it to reclamation
projects. HAurrMAN, supra note 136, at 17. In 1964, the federal government took
approximately 10,000 acres by eminent domain for the Kinzua Dam. See HAuPTMAN supra note 142, at 85-122. The dam was part of a flood control project
designed to protect Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. See id. at 92-93.
336. 25 U.S.C. § 1774(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993); H.R. REp. No. 832, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990).
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railroads. They established settlements on land leased from the Indians including the City of Salamanca.3 3 7 The New York courts declared these leases void because the federal government had not
approved them. 33 8 The State subsequently pressured the federal

government to give the Salamanca residents title to the land or ratify the leases.3 3 9 Over the Senecas' strong objections, the United
States Congress approved the leases in 1875340 and again in 1890.341

The 1890 Act granted Salamanca residents and businesses ninetynine-year leases at "favorable rates."3 42 Many rents were set so low
that some lessees only paid a dollar a year.3 43 The average annual

rent in 1990 was ten dollars.3 44 The Act contained no acceleration
clause and no provision for renegotiating or increasing the annual
337. 25 U.S.C. § 1774(a) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1993). Discovery of oil and abundant timber also lured many white settlers and profiteers to southwestern New
York. By 1900, the Senecas were outnumbered five-to-one on the Allegany Reservation. HAuPrMAN, supra note 142, at 17.
338. 25 U.S.C. § 1774(a) (2) (C) (Supp. V 1993); see also Oneida 1,414 U.S. 661,
672 n.8 (1974); H.R REP' No. 832, supra note 336, at 4.
339. An 1871 resolution provided:
Resolved (if the Senate concur), that the Senators from this State in Congress be instructed and the Representatives be requested to presume the
passage of some act as the formation of a treaty with the Seneca nation of
Indians, whereby title may be obtained to the whole or a portion of the
Allegany Reservation, or such relief secured for white settlers as the circumstances demand.
Joint Resolution of the New York State Assembly and Senate, Jan. 18, 1871, quoted
in HAurrMAN, supra note 136, at 4; see also H.R. REP. No. 832, supranote 336, at 4
(1990); S.REP. No. 511, supra note 327, at 32 ("It is equally clear that the State of
New York bears significant responsibility. It was the State that originally authorized the leasing within the Allegany Reservation and then sought Federal legislation to either extinguish Indian title to the land or confirm long term leases.").
i 340. Act of February 19, 1875, ch. 90, 18 Stat. 330 (authorizing further leasing
and making confirmed leases renewable for 12-year term).
341. Act of September 30, 1890, ch. 1132, 26 Stat. 558. In the 1875 Act, Congress officially confirmed the leases for a five-year term, renewable for another 12year term. The 1890 Act amended the 1875 Act by substituting a 99-year renewal
term. SeeFluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Authority, 928 F.2d 542, 544, 546 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 74 (1991).
342. 25 U.S.C. § 1774(a)(2)(D) (Supp. V 1993); Act of September 30, 1890,
ch. 1132. The 1890 Act also provided that the Seneca Nation retained ownership
of the land in perpetuity. Act of September 30, 1890, ch. 1132.
343. The rental fees were substantially less than the actual lease value of the
land. 25 U.S.C. § 1774(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993). See United States v. Forness, 125
F.2d 928, 941 (2d Cir.) ("The consideration - $4.00 a year - comes close to being
unconscionably small."), cert. denied sub nom. City of Salamanca v. United States,
316 U.S. 694 (1942); Treadwell, supra note 138, at Al (quoting Calvin John, Seneca Nation President: "In 1890, we didn't have any legal assistance and, as witnesses testified in a congressional investigation in 1920 or '30, the Indians were
lied with liquor to coerce them into signing. The old agreement was unfair to
oth sides, really.").
344. ,H.R.REp. No. 832, supra note 336, at 4.
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rents during the lease term.M5
Despite the low rates, the Tribe had difficulty collecting the
annual rents. By 1939, over twenty-five percent of the non-Indian
leaseholders were in default3 46 On March 4, 1939, the Senecas finally issued a resolution canceling all delinquent leases.3 47 The
United States brought a test case on the Tribe's behalf to determine
the Tribe's right to cancel leases for nonpayment.3 8 In United
States v. Forness, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the Seneca Nation could cancel delinquent leases
and negotiate new leases for higher rents. 3 49 The Second Circuit

also indicated that federal law, not stte law, governed.3 50 Forness
generated considerable anti-Indian backlash and renewed efforts by
New York State, powerful politicians, business concerns and private
parties to extinguish the Seneca's title to the land.3 5 1 Although

successful, their efforts left a legthese powerful interests were not
3 52
acy of distrust and antagonism.
The ninety-nine-year leases terminated on February 19,
1991.353 Approximately 3,300 leases were affected.3 54 Prior to termination, the Senecas announced that they would offer new leases
but at higher rates and for a shorter term. The annual rents would
be based on the fair market value of the land. Leases that were
not renegotiated would be canceled, and the land, including improvements, would be confiscated. The Tribe's announcement
generated considerable alarm and hostility among Salamanca
345. Act of September 30, 1890, ch. 1132; see also H.R. RElP. No. 832, supra
note 336, at 4.
346. H ummAN, supra note 142, at 21.
347. Forness, 125 F.2d at 931.
348. United States v. Fornes, 37 F. Supp. 337 (w..N.Y. 1941), rev'd, 125 F.2d
928 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. City of Salamanca v. United States, 316 U.S. 694
(1942). The United States sued Frank and Jesse Forness. The City of Salamanca
and a number of large mortgage holders intervened as defendants. Id. at 340.
The Fornesses operated a garage in the center of the City. Under their lease, their
annual rent for the land was four dollars. By March 1939, they owed eight-years'
rent plus interest. Forness, 125 F.2d at 931. Over 800 other leaseholders were also
in default. HAUPrMAN, supra note 142, at 15. For a discussion of Forness and its
aftermath see HAuPmMAN,supra note 142, at 15-43 and Hauptman, supra note 327,
at 108-19.
349. Forness, 125 F.2d at 940-41.
350. Id. at 932.
351. See HAUPrMAN, supra note 142, at 31-43 (discussing ramifications of
Forness).
352. See HAUtrmAN, supra note 136, at 25-26 (discussing effect of bigotry and
racial tensions on negotiations between Seneca Nation and Salamanca).
353. See 25 U.S.C. § 1774(a)(4) (1988).
354. S.REP. No. 511, supra note 327, at 1.
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residents.
New York authorized the Salamanca Indian Lease Authority
(SILA) to negotiate a new lease agreement with the Seneca Nation
in 1969.356 In July 1990, after 20 years of difficult, often bitter negotiations, 57 the City of Salamanca and the Seneca Nation finally
reached an agreement. 358 The federal government subsequently
approved the agreement by enacting the Seneca Nation Settlement
Act of 1990.

b.

359

Settlement Terms

The Seneca-Salamanca settlement provided for new leases at
higher rates and compensated the Tribe for its losses incurred
under the prior leases.3 60 The Tribe agreed to offer new leases to
the City, individual lessees and lessees in several neighboring towns
for a forty-year term.3 6 1 Thereafter, the new leases are renewable
for an additional forty years.3 6 2 For residential property, the annual
355. H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, 4t 4-5; see also Gruson, supranote 138,
at B-1. By the 1990s, the City of Salamanca and the other small towns affected by
the leases were economically depressed. Several factors combined to make this
area particularly hard hit, including the decline of the railroads, the major interstate bypassing the City, and the recession. H.R. REP. No. 832, supranote 336, at 5.
Moreover, many of the City's inhabitants were elderly and living on fixed incomes.
Id. People who were accustomed to paying only a nominal fee for their land were
suddenly faced with substantial increases in their annual rent that many could not
afford. Id.
356. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1790-99 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1991). SILA
was supposed to negotiate a master lease; however, the Tribe wanted individual
leases. A majority of the Salamanca leaseholders authorized SILA to negotiate new
leases for them. Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Auth., 928 F.2d 542, 544 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 74 (1991).
357. See Fluent, 928 F.2d at 544 (discussing negotiation efforts and final
agreement).
358. The Agreement Between the Seneca Nation and the City of Salamanca
[hereinafter Seneca Agreement] was signed by the Mayor of Salamanca on July 12,
1990, and by the President of the Seneca Nation on July 13, 1990. Seneca Agreement, npinted in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 22. The Seneca Agreement
consists of the basic agreement plus an appendix of three technical documents.
Document 1 lists the leases that did not expire in 1991 for which the Tribe agreed
to provide new leases. Document 2 states the terms for the new leases. Document
3 provides for the Seneca Nation-City of SalamancaJoint Leasing Commission and
its functions. Document 3 also establishes a dispute resolution procedure. The
basic agreement and Document 3 are reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note
336, at 13-28 (app. I) and S. REp. No. 511, supra note 327, at 16-31.
359. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1774-1774h (Supp. 1990).
360. See Seneca Agreement § I(A), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note
336, at 13.
361. Id. §§ II(A),(B) (1), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 832, supranote 336, at 14.
The Tribe has discretion on whether to renew Tribe members' individual leases.
Id. § II(B) (8), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 16.
362. Id. § II(B) (2), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 14.
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rent is eight percent of the fair market value of the land without
improvements.3 63 For nonresidential property, the rent is ten percent of the fair market value.3 64 The City is responsible for collect-

ing the annual rents and paying the aggregate amount to the
Tribe.3 65 Salamanca also agreed to pay a minimum of $800,000 per
year until the aggregate annual rent exceeds $800,000.366 Thereaf-

ter, the annual aggregate rent will be the amount under the eight
percent/ten percent formula.3 6 7 The agreement also provides for
periodic reappraisals of the land3 68 and establishes a dispute resolution mechanism.3 69 As part of the settlement, the Seneca Nation
relinquished any claims to rents before February 20, 1991.370

In addition, the Seneca Nation received $60 million as compensation for its losses under the previous lease arrangements. The
federal government contributed $35 million, and New York State
contributed $25 million.3 71 Forty-six million dollars of these funds
363. Id. § II(B) (3), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 14-15.
364. Id.
365. Id. § II(B) (6), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 15-16. As
long as the City pays the aggregate annual rent due, the Seneca Nation may not
seek redress against an individual leaseholder for failure to pay his or her rent to
the City. The agreement gives the City the exclusive right to go after a delinquent
lessee. Id. § IV(B), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 18.
366. Id. § II(B) (5), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 15. The
agreement provides that the annual rent from the City will be reduced proportionately for any leases that are not renewed. Id. § II(B) (7), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
832, supra note 336, at 16.
367. The average annual rent for a household in 1993 was approximately
$150. See Salamanca, Senecas Agree to Form Joint Depository, BurrALo NEWS, June 24,
1993.
368. Seneca Agreement § II(B)(3)-(4), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra
note 336, at 14-15.
369. Document 3 of the Agreement establishes the Seneca Nation-City of Salamanca Joint Leasing Commission. Seneca Agreement § IV & doc. 3(A), reprinted
in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 17, 23. The Seneca Nation and the City
each appoint two members of the Commission. These four select the fifth member. Id., doc. 3(B), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 23-24. The
Joint Commission determines the annual rents and notifies the City. Id. § IV(A) &
doc. 3(D), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 17, 24-25. The agreement provides initially for good faith negotiations to resolve disputes over lease
terms and administration. The Joint Commission may mediate disputes if it provides for mediation in its procedural rules. If a dispute is not resolved, the agreement calls for binding arbitration, reviewable by the United States District Court
for the Western District of NewYork. Id. § IV(B) & doc. 3(E),(F), reprinted inH.K
REP. No. 832, supranote 336, at 17, 25-28. The agreement also gives the Council
of the Seneca Nation power to investigate whether the City and the lessees are
complying with the lease terms and leasing provisions of the agreement. Id. § III,
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 16.

370. 25 U.S.C. § 1774b(b) (Supp. V 1993).
371. 25 U.S.C. § 1774d(a)-(c) (Supp. V 1993); see also Seneca Agreement

§§ VI(C) (1),(2), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 20.
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is unrestricted.3 72 The remaining $14 million must be used for eco37 3
nomic and community development.
One of the more innovative settlement provisions establishes a
ten-year, multi-million-dollar escrow account.3 74 The City receives
two-thirds of the income annually for economic and community development within Salamanca. One-third of the annual income goes
to the Joint Venture Commission on Economic Development which
is made up of representatives from both the City and the Seneca
Nation. After ten annual payments are made, the Tribe receives
the principal. 375 None of the settlement funds or income gener3 76
ated from them is subject to tax, levy or forfeiture.
The Settlement Act also provides that the Tribe may use settlement money to buy additional land. Land purchased within the
Senecas' aboriginal territory or near a former reservation will have
restricted status.37 7 Land purchased near existing reservations may
be included in and expand the Tribe's reservations.3 78 At the time
Congress passed the Settlement Act, the Tribe planned to invest
most of the settlement funds and use the income for land acquisition, elder care, education and youth programs, economic development, job creation, environmental programs and substance abuse
programs. 3 79 The Tribe also anticipated giving each member a
small cash payment not to exceed $2000.380
The Seneca-Salamanca settlement left several important issues
unresolved. Neither the agreement nor the federal act specifies
372. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1774d(b)(1),(c); Seneca Agreement § VI(C), reprinted in
H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 20.
373. 25 U.S.C. § 1774d(b) (2),(c); Seneca Agreement § VI(C) (2) (b), reprinted
in H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 20.
374. 25 U.S.C. § 1774d(b) (2) (B) (ii); Seneca Agreement § V(D), reprinted in
H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 19. The federal government contributed five
million dollars for economic and community development. Three million dollars
was placed in the escrow account. 25 U.S.C. § 1774d(b) (2) (B) (ii). The remaining
two million dollars in restricted federal funds was paid into an interest bearing
account for the Tribe. Both the income and principal can be used for the Tribe's
economic and community development. Id. § 1774d(b) (2) (B) (i). New York
State's share of the economic and development funds is nine million dollars. 25
U.S.C. § 1774d(c).
375. 25 U.S.C. § 1774d(b) (2) (B) (ii).
376. 25 U.S.C. § 1774f(a) (Supp. V 1993). The settlement also does not affect
the Tribe's or its members' eligibility for federal programs. Id. § 1774f(b).

377. Id. § 1774f(c).
378. Id. The settlement agreement also includes provision for the City to sup-

ply certain tribal and tribal members' property with electric, water and sewer services. Seneca Agreement §§ V(A),(B), reprinted in H.R. REP.
336, at 18.
379. H.R. REP. No. 832, supra note 336, at 30-31.
380. Id. at 31.
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-who owns the improvements on leased land. Moreover, neither
deals with what will happen after the second, forty-year lease term
ends.
c.

Aftermath

The settlement did not resolve the dispute between the Seneca
Nation and the Salamanca residents. A vocal group of lessees refused to sign the new leases. They formed the Salamanca Coalition
of United Taxpayers, Inc. (SCOUT) 3 8 ' and filed suit in federal
court challenging the constitutionality of the Seneca Nation Settlement Act of 1990. They also sought a declaration that.the negotiated agreement was void and an order compelling the Seneca
Nation to renew their leases for 99 years.38 2 The suit was dismissed.
Affirming the district court's decision, the Second Circuit held that
the Seneca Nation had sovereign immunity from suit and was an
indispensable party to the claims against the non-Indian defendants.3 83 In the fall 1991 elections, the residents of Salamanca replaced the city council that had approved the agreement with
opponents of the agreement.3 8 4 The new council petitioned Congress to reopen the settlement.3 8 5 In January 1992, they unsuccessfully tried to stop payment on the City's annual rent check.3 8 6 In
April 1992, the council declared the Seneca-Salamanca Lease
Agreement void. They then unanimously voted to override the
mayor's veto of their action.38 7 At least one resident moved his
house off the reservation, and a number of homeowners threatened
381. See Heuck, supra note 207, at Al.
382. Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Auth., 928 F.2d 542, 543 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 74 (1991).
383. Id.
384. Treadwell, supra note 138, at Al; Jerry Zremski, Lease Hostilities Fail to
Subside 'Physical Harm' Feared in Salamanca-Seneca Faceoff, BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 1,
1992, at Al.
385. See Colum Lynch, Assignment: Salamanca-BitterResidents Charge Indians
Want Their Homes, CHI. TaB., Jan. 30, 1992, at 5.
386. See Andrew Maykuth, A Lease's Uncertain Legacy: A New York Town's Residents Have Found That Their Homes May Belong to the Seneca Indians,PHUA. INQUIRER,
Apr. 5, 1992, at Al. Judicial action forced the City to pay the annual rent for two
years. The City paid an additional $119,000 in late fees and $31,000 in attorney's
fees defending the council's actions. See Donna Snyder, Salamanca Agrees to Pay
Seneca Lease; $746,217 Payment Is Due on Feb. 20, BurFALo NEWS, Feb. 11, 1993 (Local Section) [hereinafter Payment Article]; Donna Snyder, Salamanca Republicans
Share Vision; COPCandidatesFocus on PositiveFuturefor City, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 10,
1993 (Local Section).
387. Treadwell, supra note 138, at Al.
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to dynamite their houses.3 88
In response, the Tribe again threatened to evict those who re38 9
fused to sign new leases and confiscate any buildings on the land.

The Senecas also refused to discuss ajoint depository for the escrow
account so the City could not receive its share of the economic and
community development funds.39 0 Banks refused to offer mort3 91
gages, and insurance companies refused to write title insurance.
The state subsequently exacerbated the situation by trying to tax
3 92
gasoline and cigarette sales on the reservation.
The residents' negative reaction to the settlement was no
doubt fueled in large part by both SCOUT's and the press' scare
tactics. Rumors spread that tribal members were riding around the
City selecting homes to confiscate, and SCOUT leaders warned that
local residents had no way to protect their property interests because the Senecas were immune from suit.3 93 Such tactics exacer3 94
bated existing mistrust, antagonism and racism. on both sides.
Although most inhabitants of Salamanca generally conceded that
the old rents were unfair, the increased annual payments, on top of
existing taxes, also caused some hardship to those living on fixed
incomes, especially during hard economic times. The primary
cause of the negative reaction, however, appears to be the parties'
failure to resolve two of the lessees' major concerns in the settlement agreement: Who owns the improvements on the land3 95 and

3 96
what will happen after the second, forty-year lease term expires.
Nevertheless, as of this writing, tensions have died down, and
the settlement finally appears to be working. Only about four per-

388. James Brady, Indians Take on Settlers in Upstate Land Skirmish, CRAIN'S N.Y.
Bus., Dec. 16, 1991, at 9; Maykuth, supra note 386, at Al.
389. Associated Press, Senecas' Neighbors Meet With Senator, TIMES UNION, Aug.

5, 1992, at B6; Lynch, supra note 385, at 5; Maykuth, supra note 386, at Al. Tensions heightened when a group of dissident Senecas formed the Seneca Coalition
Against Lease Proposal (SCALP) in reaction to SCOUT and advocated taking back
leased land. See Heuck, supra note 207, at Al.
390. Stumbling Block Seen on '93 Lease Payment, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 14, 1993
(Local Section).
391. Maykuth, supra note 386, at Al.

392. Treadwell, supra note 138, at Al.
393. See Maykuth, supra note 386, at Al.
394. See id. (quoting U.S. Rep. Amory Houghton who stated: "There's a tremendous undertow of racial animosity underlying all of this."); see also Heuck,
supra note 207, at Al.
395. See Zremski, supra note 384, at Al ("In the end, the two sides compromised by leaving the home ownership issue unresolved-and didn't stress that fact
when explaining the deal to the city residents.").
396. See Heuck, supra note 207, at Al.
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cent of those affected did not sign new leases.3 97 The real estate
market is again functioning,39 8 an escrow account has been established, and the annual income is being distributed.3 99 The City is
finally paying the annual aggregate rent to the Tribe. 40 0 New City
officials, who want to work with the Seneca Nation, have been
elected. The State has also helped subsidize the City for revenue
lost because of the increase in tax-exempt property.4 1 Moreover,
the money that the settlement generates for both the Tribe and the
40 2
City should provide much needed economic stimulus to the area.
Whether history will repeat itself when the current leases expire in eighty years remains to be seen. The settlement provides
the Seneca Nation with a substantial and steady source of income,
which should induce the Tribe to offer leases in the future. Rents
are reasonably set to vary with the fair market value of the land, and
the settlement agreement provides an impartial dispute resolution
procedure. If the current lease agreement works over time, it may
prevent similar hostilities in the future by providing a model for
40 3
future lease agreements.

397. Treadwell, supra note 138, at Al. As of September 1994, approximately
180 former leaseholders had not signed new leases. Associated Press, Seneca Tribe
Wants SalamancaResidents to Pay Up or Get Out, TIMES UNION, Sept. 12, 1994, at B2.
398. Donna Snyder, Mortgages Offered on Allegany Reservation; CattaraugusBank
Says Program Includes Residential, Commercial Loans, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 24, 1993
(Local Section); Donna Snyder, Salamanca Gets $150,000 Grant from State; Money
Will Ease Revenue Crunch Linked to Indian Tax Exemptions, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 22,
1993 (Local Section) [hereinafter State Grant Article].
399. Salamanca, Senecas Agree to Form Joint Depository, BuFFALO NEWS, June 24,
1993 (Local Section).
400. Payment Article, supra note 386.
401. State Grant Article, supra note 398.
402. Donna Snyder, Senecas Get Checks to Make Up for Rent Inequity Infusion of
$2,000 Tax Free Per Capita Gives Impetus to Salamanca'sEconomy, BUFFALO NEwS,June
14, 1992, at C5. The Seneca Nation has used some of the settlement funds to build
two health centers and a community center run by the Tribe's Department of Aging. See Donna Snyder, Senecas Readying New Health Centers Facility on Allegany Reservation; Should Open in About Two Weeks, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 1, 1993. The Tribe has
also purchased additional land. See State Grant Article, supra note 398.
403. The problem of who owns the improvements on the land remains, however. See Zremski, supra note 384, at Al. Even if the parties agree to leave this issue
unanswered, they will still have to decide whether the rents should be based on the
fair market value of the land with or without the improvements. Id. In the current
agreement the parties decided to base the rents on the value of the land without
any buildings because the City could not afford the alternative. Id. (quoting Sen.
Daniel K. Inouye, Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, who
stated: "In effect, the Seneca Nation agreed to defer its claim to ownership of the
improvements during the term of the [lease].").
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The State's Role in Settlement Negotiations

The state's participation is usually crucial in reaching a negotiated settlement in disputes over Native land claims. The federal
government tends to view tribal land claims as local matters. 40 4 Accordingly, Congress will not ratify a land claim settlement agreement without the state's approval. 40 5 Moreover, the federal
government will generally avoid direct involvement in the settlement negotiations until the parties have essentially reached an
406
agreement.
Although the federal government will usually contribute a substantial share of the settlement funds, it will do so only if the state
and local parties contribute their "fair share." 40 7 In most cases that
share is approximately fifty percent.40 8 Depending on the size and
404. See Starna, supra note 189, at 168, 173 (discussing how federal government distances itself from tribal land claims by calling them "local issues").
405. See Lavin, supra note 130, at 95. For example in the Maine settlement,
the Penobscots, Passamaquoddies, large private landholders and the federal government reached a tentative agreement; however, Maine refused to endorse it
without sovereignty concessions from the tribes. BRODEUR, supra note 130, at 11315. Accordingly, Congress would not enact settlement legislation until the tribes
and Maine had reached agreement. Id. at 115. The parties also reached an agreement in'the Cayuga land claim in 1979, See Lavin, supra note 130, at 93. However,
Congress rejected the settlement bill because a local congressman opposed it. Id.
at 95.
406. See S. REP. No. 528, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1986) (discussing negotiation of Gay Head settlement and Reagan Administration's subsequent opposition
to agreement); Indian Law Resource Ctr., supra note 203, at 90, 92, 94 (noting that
private parties arranged settlement before government enacted bills encompassing
Narragansett and Maine settlements); Starna, supra note 189, at 173 (discussing
federal government's reluctance to take active role in Iroquois land claims); Van
Gestel, supra note 125, at 137 ("And even in those few cases that have been settled,
such as Maine and Rhode Island, the federal government has played a reluctant
role, joining in only after the parties themselves have, because of the enormous
burdens of litigation, negotiated a settlement ....
). The federal government
usually has some informal involvement, however. In particular, the state's congressional delegation normally participates in the settlement efforts.
407. See Starna, supra note 189, at 168.
408. See, e.g., id.; 25 U.S.C. § 1771a(c) (Supp. V 1993) (providing that the
United States and Massachusetts will each bear half the cost of land acquisition);
H.R. REP. No. 57, supra'note 260, at 9 (stating that the state and local parties will
contribute 52% of the Puyallup settlement); Starna, supra note 189, at 168; cf. S.
REP. No. 511, supra note 327, at 32 (justifying state's $25 million and federal government's $35 million contributions to the Seneca lease settlement based on the
parties' respective responsibility for the prior leases). But see 25 U.S.C. § 1724
(1980) (Maine settlement); 25 U.S.C. § 1754 (1986) (Mashantucket Pequot settlement). In reaching a settlement of the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot land
claims, the State of Maine essentially "stonewalled" until the federal government
agreed to contribute all of the settlement funds, equalling approximately $81.5
million. See generally BRODEUR, supra note 130, at 100-31 (describing the events
leading to the Maine Indian Settlement Act); Indian Law Resource Ctr., supra note
203, at 94 (stating that the federal government was "faced with ... a take-it-or-
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location of the claim area, some recent settlements have involved
millions of dollars in both land and money. Local communities
and private residents do not normally have sufficient resources to
fund such settlements. Therefore, the state's contribution in land
and money is necessary to provide a viable offer. Unlike local communities, the state can spread the cost throughout the entire state.
Moreover, where the state's illegal acts originally caused the tribe to
lose its land, fairness dictates that the state should bear at least
some of the costs rather than leaving the local communities and
residents "holding the bag."
The state's active participation in the negotiations may be important in other ways. Large claims often include numerous towns,
cities and counties, as well as individually named private parties.
They also arouse local animosity and intransigence. Getting all the
various interested parties to agree on a settlement is extremely difficult. The state's leadership and coercive powers can help induce
the local parties to bargain in good faith and reach a compromise.
Moreover, ignorance, insensitivity and lack of respect for the Native
claimants and the seriousness of their claims can also thwart the
negotiating process. 4° 9 The state can thus serve an important role
in educating local communities about the Native communities and
4 10
insuring that the appropriate rituals and respect are observed.
Finally, the state has resources and expertise through its various
agencies that local communities lack. As in the Puyallup negotiations, these resources and expertise can be tapped for assessing the
Native and local communities' needs and fashioning effective settlement programs.

41 1

V.

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

Federal litigation has been a major impetus in pressuring the
leave-it choice"). The Reagan Administration initially rejected the Mashantucket
Pequot settlement because Connecticut's contribution was insufficient. See Hagan,
supra note 35, at 26. Threatened with a veto override, the President approved a
subsequent settlement bill. Id. at 26-27. Connecticut contributed 20 acres of land
and agreed to improve certain roads on the reservation. The federal government

provided $900,000 for land acquisition and economic development, together with
federal recognition for the Tribe. Id. Because Connecticut had provided services
to the Tribe in the past and the federal government had not, Congress deemed

Connecticut's contribution to the settlement sufficient. See 25 U.S.C. § 1751(0
(1983).
409. See Starna, supra note 189, at 176 (discussing problems and solutions in
negotiations process).
410. See id.
411. For an explanation of the state and local agencies' assistance in fashioning the Puyallup settlement, see supra notes 318-23 and accompanying text.
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states, local interests and the federal government to negotiate tribal
land claims. These suits have frequently named states and state officials as defendants. Before 1991, the lower federal courts split over
whether the states were immune from tribal suits in federal court
under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. 412 Some of
the jurisdictions that found the states amenable to suit held that
tribal suits against the states fell outside the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment. 413 Other courts reasoned that Indian tribes suing on
their own behalf enjoyed the same authority to sue the states as the
federal government would have, were it suing on the tribes' behalf.4 14 Still other jurisdictions concluded that Congress had abro-

gated the states' sovereign immunity when it enacted the Indian
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1362. 4 15 In 1991, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits by Indian
tribes against unconsenting states in federal court.416 The states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from tribal suits will likely have a
significant impact on both future Native land claim litigation and
41 7
settlement negotiations.
A.

Eleventh Amendment Protection

The Eleventh Amendment limits the federal courts' jurisdic412. See, e.g., Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157, 1164-65
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding no Eleventh Amendment bar to tribal suit challenging
state revenue sharing plan), revd sub nom. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,
501 U.S. 775 (1991); Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1080 (2d
Cir. 1982) (finding no Eleventh Amendment bar to tribal land claim against state);
Standing Rock Sioux Indian Tribe v. Dorgan, 505 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that Eleventh Amendment barred tribal suit against state tax commissioner to
recover state sales and use taxes); Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Wisconsin, 595 F.
Supp. 1077 (W.D. Wis. 1984) (finding no Eleventh amendment bar to tribal action
against state for retroactive monetary relief from state's violation of hunting and
fishing rights); Aquilar v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 433 (D. Alaska 1976) (holding that
Eleventh Amendment barred tribal land claim against state governor and commissioner of natural resources).
413. Hoffman, 896 F.2d at 1162-65 (finding that states consented in "plan of
the convention" to federal jurisdiction over Indian affairs, and Eleventh Amendment did not revoke consent).
414. See Oneida Indian Nation, 691 F.2d at 1080 (concluding that when Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1362, it intended "to provide Indian tribes with a capacity to sue that is as broad in some respects as that of the United States").
415. Id. at 1079-80 (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1362 abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from tribal suits); Lac Courte OreilesBand, 595 F. Supp.
at 1080-81 (same); Charrier v. Bell, 547 F. Supp. 580, 585 (M.D. La. 1982) (same);
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 446 F. Supp. 1339, 1350
(E.D. Wash. 1978) (same), rev'd in part on other grounds, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
416. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
417. For a discussion of the future impact of the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity on tribal land claims, see infra notes 538-90 and accompanying text.
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ion over the states.4 18 It provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
4 19
State.
Despite its seemingly simple wording, the Eleventh Amendment has
been the source of continued debate. 42 0 The discussion focuses on
the sources and extent of the states' immunity from suit and the
proper interpretation of the -Amendment, its scope and its
42 1
application.
418. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984)
(Eleventh Amendment affirms "that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III.").
419. U.S. CONST.' amend. XI. The states' sovereign immunity is based on the
premise that the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent. Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890).
420. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468,
496-521 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment only
applies to diversity actions); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 252302 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same); Martha Field, The Eleventh Amendment
and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: CongressionalImposition of Suit Upon the States,
126 U. PA. L. REv. 1203, 1261-78 (1978) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment reinstated common law immunity); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the
Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 1261 (1989) (arguing that
Eleventh Amendment limits diversity jurisdiction against the states); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE
LJ. 1, 75-84 (1988) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment reinstated common law
immunity); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fightingthe Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102
HARv. L. REv. 1342 (1989) (suggesting that Eleventh Amendment means what it
says); William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical
Evaluation, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1372 (1989) (rejecting diversity theory of Eleventh
Amendment); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Eleventh Amendment: A Comment on the Decisions During the 1988-89 Term, 39 DEPAUL L.
REv.321, 341-43 (1990) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment analysis should focus
on underlying values of Amendment instead of framers' intent); Larry G. Simon,
The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can OriginalistInterpretationBeJustified,
73 CAL. L. REv. 1482 (1985) (arguing against an originalist interpretation of the
Constitution).
Justice Scalia has also described the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence as "muddled." Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 44-45
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Perhaps the only
sure thing that can be said about the Eleventh Amendment is that hasty amendments to the Constitution make "bad law." Discussion of the controversy surrounding the Eleventh Amendment is beyond the scope of this Article except as it
may relate to whether Indian tribes can sue the states and whether the federal
government has the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
in Indian land disputes.
421. A majority of the Supreme Court has viewed the Eleventh Amendment
as a constitutionally-based limitation on the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991); Pen-
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The Eleventh Amendment was adopted in response to Chisholm
v. Georgia,422 decided in 1793. In Chisholm, the Supreme Court held
that Article III of the Constitution authorized suits in federal court
4 23
against a state, without its consent, by citizens of another state.
Fearing suits to collect unpaid war debts and to recover property
seized during the Revolutionary War, the states quickly introduced
42 4
and adopted the Eleventh Amendment.
The Supreme Court has subsequently expanded the scope of
nhurst, 465 U.S. at 98. Writing for the majority in Blatchford, Justice Scalia
explained:
Despite the narrowness of its terms, since Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890), we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so
much for what it says but for the presupposition of our constitutional
structure which it confirms: that the States entered the federal system
with their sovereignty intact; that the judicial authority in Article III is
limited by this sovereignty ...and that a state will therefore not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has consented to suit, either expressly
or in the "plan of the convention."
Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779 (citations omitted).
Recent changes in the'Supreme Court do not suggest that the Court will
change its basic view of the Eleventh Amendment in the foreseeable future. In
Welch, the justices were divided over whether to overrule Hans v. Louisiana and
adopt a narrower interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. Welch, 483 U.S. at
468. Justice Scalia declined to decide the issue in Welch because the parties had
not sufficiently briefed the issue. Id. at 495-96 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and in
judgment). The.Court has subsequently refused to overrule Hans. In Union Gas,
five justices.-Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia-reaffirmed the
validity of Hans. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 34-35 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 57 n.8 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Since then justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, three of the fourjustices who believed that the Eleventh Amendment only applies to diversity cases,
have left the Court.
422. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). In Chisholm, a South Carolina
citizen sued
the State of Georgia to recover on a debt incurred during the Revolutionary War.
Robert Farquhar had supplied materials to the State of Georgia, and Georgia subsequently refused to pay for them. Following Farquhar's death, Alexander
Chisholm, the executor of Farquhar's estate and a citizen of South Carolina, sued
Georgia to recover-the money owed to the estate. He asserted jurisdiction under
the Judiciary Act of 1789 which created original jurisdiction for suits against a state
by citizens of other states. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Article III of the Constitution authorized suits in federal court against an unconsenting state by a citizen of another state. Four of the five Supreme Court justices held
that it did. Justice Iredell was the lone dissenter. Georgia's reaction to Chisholm
was to pass a law declaring that anyone attempting to enforce the Supreme Court's
decision would be guilty of a felony and hung without benefit of clergy. Clavin R.
Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REv.
61, 98-111 (1989) (discussing factual background and justices' opinions in
Chisholm).
423. Chisholm 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 419.
424. Both houses of Congress approved the Eleventh Amendment within
three weeks of the Chisholm decision. ERWIN CHEMERINSKy, FEDERAL JURISDiCrION
374 (2d ed. 1994). The necessary number of states ratified it within a year. Id.
However, the President did not formally declare the Eleventh Amendment officially ratified until 1798, three years later. Id.
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the Eleventh Amendment far beyond its literal language. A state
may not be sued by a citizen of another state, 42 5 a citizen or subject
of a foreign country,42 6 the state's own citizens, 427 a foreign coun430
try, 42 8 a corporation chartered by Congress429 or an Indian tribe.
The bar applies to federal question, 45 1 diversity, 4 32 and admiralty
43 3
actions.

1.

B. Exceptions to Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Consent4 34

The Eleventh Amendment does not preclude all suits against a
state, however. The federal government may sue the states, 43 5 and
425. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
426. Id.
427. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1890).
428. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
429. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 449 (1900).
430. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
431. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10. But see Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 504-16 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment only applies to diversity actions, not federal question actions).
432. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
433. Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 700 (1982);
Ex parte New York No. 2, 256 U.S. 503, 511 (1921). But see Welch, 483 U.S. at 497504 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment only applies to
cases in law and equity, not admiralty).
434. In addition to the exceptions discussed in this section, the Supreme
Court recognized constructive waiver in Pardenv. Terminal Railway of Ala., 377 U.S.
184 (1964), overruled in part by Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp.,
483 U.S. 468 (1987). A majority of the Court held that Congress could condition
the state's operation of a railroad in interstate commerce on waiving its sovereign
immunity from suit in federal court. -Id. at 195-96. By later operating a railroad in
interstate commerce, the Court found that Alabama had consented to suit under
the Federal Employees Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (Supp. IV 1992) (FELA).
Parden, 377 U.S. at 190-92. The Supreme Court subsequently overruled Parden to
the extent that Parden recognized constructive consent without an unmistakably
clear expression of Congress' intent to override the states' sovereign immunity in
the statute. Welch, 483 U.S. at 478. This requirement that the statutory language
clearly state Congress' intent to overrule the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity as a condition of participating in a federal program essentially merges
constructive consent with abrogation. In other words, the state chooses to have its
sovereign immunity abrogated by engaging in the activity. Congress' power to
abrogate, coupled with the state's activity under the statute, become the main
focus, rather than the state's choice. Accordingly, constructive consent is no
longer a distinct exception to the Eleventh Amendment. See CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 424, at 410 (characterizing constructive waiver as "Virtually nonexistent");
John R. Pagan, Eleventh Amendment Analysis, 39 ARu. L. REv. 447, 494-95 (1985-86)
(describing implied-waiver doctrine as "legal fiction"); cf. Hilton v. South Carolina
Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560, 564-66 (1991) (holding that FELA created cause
of action against state-owned railroad enforceable in state court)..
435. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (suit involving
boundary dispute between United States and Texas).
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a state may sue another state in federal court. 43 6 The Supreme
Court has declared that authority for these suits is "inherent in the
Constitutional plan" because they are necessary to preserve the permanence and peace of the Union. 43 7 A state may also consent to be
sued in federal court. 438 However, the state's intention to waive its
sovereign immunity must be unmistakably clear. 43 9 Political subdivisions of the state such as counties, municipalities and local school
districts are not considered "arms of the state" for Eleventh Amend440
ment purposes, and each may be sued in federal court.
2.

The Ex Parte Young Fiction and Prospective Injunctive Relief

The Supreme Court has also created a legal fiction that allows
suits for prospective relief against state officials acting in violation
of the Constitution or federal laws. In Ex parte Young,4 4 1 the Court
reasoned that a state official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped
of his [or her] official or representative character." 4 42 Although
436. See, e.g., South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 321 (1904).
437. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 487 (citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,
328-29 (1934)).
438. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990)
(finding that statutory consent in compact establishing New York-New Jersey Port
Authority constituted waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
439. Id. at 305-06. The state's waiver of its sovereign immunity must be clearly
stated "by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from
the text' as [would] leave no room for any other reasonable construction." Id.
(quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1985)). Moreover, the state does not waive its immunity to suit in federal court by waiving its
immunity to suit in its own courts. Id at 306.
440. See Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (stating that Eleventh Amendment bar does not extend to counties, municipal corporations or other political subdivisions of state). Paradoxically, these political
subdivisions are considered sufficient state actors to evoke Fourteenth Amendment liability. Home Tel. & Tel. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 294 (1913); see also
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (characterizing this anomaly as "well-recognized irony"). In general, state agencies and departments fall within the state's Eleventh Amendment protection. See, e.g., Florida
Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S.
147 (1981) (finding no state waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity in suit
against state agency for retroactive Medicaid reimbursements).
441. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
442. Id at 159-60. In Ex parte Young, Minnesota passed a law restricting railroad rates. Id. at 127. The railroads and their shareholders challenged the rates as
confiscatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 130. The federal
district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Young, the state's attorney
general, from enforcing the new rates. Id. at 132. When Young ignored the
court's order and sought mandamus against the railroads in state court, the federal court held him in contempt. Id. at 134. Young subsequently petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 126. He argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal court from issuing an injunction against the
state. Id. at 134. The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not
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the official's action is enough to trigger Fourteenth Amendment
liability, his or her actions fall outside Eleventh Amendment protection. 443 Plaintiffs cannot recover retroactive monetary relief that
would be taken from the state treasury or retrospective equitable
relief. 44 Where such relief is sought, the state is deemed the real
party in interest even though an official is named because the relief
would operate against the state.445 However, plaintiffs can obtain
prospective injunctive relief.446 Accordingly, the federal court can
order a state official to comply with federal law. Prospective relief
also includes "ancillary expenses" that are necessary to effectuate

preclude the federal courts from ordering a state official to comply with federal
law. Id. at 159-60. The Court explained:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation
of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution,
and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character
and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.
443. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 507 (1987); see also Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (recognizing apparent fiction of Ex
parte Young as necessary to vindicate federal rights and assure supremacy of United
States).
444. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 658-71 (1974); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 280-81 (1986) (holding that Eleventh Amendment barred claim
to remedy state's breach of trust because relief sought was equivalent to money
damages); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) (holding that Eleventh Amendment barred retrospective declaratory and injunctive relief).
445. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 101-02 & n.1 ("'The general
rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign
if the decree would operate against the latter.' " (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373
U.S. 57, 58 (1963))).
446. Id. at 102-03 (distinguishing between suits for prospective and retroactive relief); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60 (allowing suits against state officers
for injunctive relief).
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injunctive relief 44 7 or to "aid in the court's jurisdiction. " 448

Although the Ex parte Young doctrine has generated criticism, 44 9 the Supreme Court has deemed it necessary to vindicate
important federal rights. 45 0 The right to sue state officials for their
unconstitutional actions strikes an "uneasy balance" between the
Eleventh Amendment goal of protecting the states from suit in federal court and the Fourteenth Amendment goal of subjecting state
officials to liability for their unconstitutional acts and assuring the
45 1
supremacy of federal law.

447. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1979) (allowing lower court
to order that notice be sent to welfare recipients about procedures for seeking
"back benefits"); Milliken v. .Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 288-90 (1977) (upholding order that state pay half of cost of remedial education programs, in-service training,
and hiring additional counsellors in school desegregation case). Explaining the
distinction between retroactive and prospective relief, the Supreme Court has
stated:
Relief that in essence serves to compensate a party injured in the past by
an action of a state official in his official capacity that was illegal under
federal law is barred even when the state official is the named defendant.... On the other hand, relief that serves directly to bring an end to a
present violation of federal law is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment
even though Accompanied by a substantial ancillary effect on the state
treasury.
Papasdn, 478 U.S. at 278.
448. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691-92 (1978) (allowing awards of attorneys fees for bad faith conduct), aff'd by Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284
(1989).
449. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretendingto Sue
an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REV.435, 437 (1961-62) (criticizing Ex parte Young); Massey, supra note 422, at 69-72 (stating that Ex parte Young and Court's subsequent
limitations of doctrine force courts and litigants to waste "vast amounts of energy
in determining whether the state is the real party in interest [and] whether the
relief sought is permissible under Edelman'). But seeJOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL
POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY

133-34 (1987) (arguing that state official is proper defendant); CHARLEs A.
312 (5th ed. 1983) ("[T]he doctrine of Ex
parte Young seems indispensable to... establishment of constitutional government
and .. .rule of law.").
450. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). Writing for the majority in
Green,Justice Rehnquist stated:
Both prospective and retrospective relief implicate Eleventh Amendment concerns, but the availability of prospective relief of the sort
awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause. Remedies
designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to
vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law ....
But compensatory or deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome
the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment.
Id.
451. See LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN
FEDERAL SysTEM 134 (1986) (emphasizing that Ex Parte Young is a necessary "accomodation" of conflicting goals of Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, protecting states from suits in federal court while ensuring supremacy of federal law);
see also Chemerinsky, supranote 420, at 342-43 (arguing that Eleventh Amendment
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss3/1

72

Nelson: Resolving Native American Land Claims and the Eleventh Amendment:
1994]

CHANGING THE BALANCE OF POWER

Ex parte Young does not extend to state officials who violate
state law, however. In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,45 2 the Supreme Court reasoned that ordering state officials to
comply with state law does not implicate the supremacy of federal
law and unduly interferes with the states' sovereignty. 453 As a result,
federal courts cannot hear supplemental state claims 454 against

state officials.
3.

45 5

Abrogation Under the Fourteenth Amendment

Congress can also override the states' immunity from suit in
Amendment to the Constitufederal court under the Fourteenth
tion. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,45 6 the Supreme Court recognized that

Congress can abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
pursuant to its enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 45 7 The Court reasoned that the Fourteenth

458
Amendment was specifically intended to limit the states' powers.
By ratifying the Amendment, the states sacrificed some of their
powers to give Congress plenary power to enforce the Fourteenth

Amendment. 459 The states thus relinquished their sovereign immu-

nity protected by the Eleventh Amendment for the limited purpose
of expanding Congress' power where necessary to effectuate the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 46° However, Congress'
intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity must
be "unmistakably clear" in the text of the statute. 46 1.
interpretation should focus on underlying policies of Amendment and not framers' intent).
452. 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars federal
courts from hearing pendent state law claims against state officers).
453. Id. at 106.
454. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 1992) (codifying pendeni and ancillary jurisdiction as "supplemental jurisdiction").
455. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 120-21.
456. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
457. Id. at 456. Section 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5.
458. Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 454-55.
459. Id.
The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the
states, and they are to a degree restrictions of state power. It is these
which Congress is empowered to enforce .... Such enforcement is no
invasion of state sovereignty. No law can be, which the people of the
states have, by the Constitution of the United States empowered Congress
to enact ....
Id. at 454 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)).
460. Id. at 456.
461. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State
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Abrogation Under Article I

Whether Congress can similarly abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity under its Article I powers remained unanswered for many
years. 4 2 The Supreme Court finally addressed abrogation under
the Commerce Clause 4 63 in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 464 The

Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate commerce
among the states, with Indian tribes and with foreign nations. 465
Although Union Gas Co. can be read expansively to allow abrogation
of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the entire
Commerce Clause, some federal courts have limited the Supreme
Court's decision to the Interstate Commerce Clause. 46 6 The lower
courts are currently divided over whether Congress has similar abHosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)) ("Congress may abrogate the States'
constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."). Justice Scaliajoined
the plurality's opinion with the understanding that the statutory text could clearly
subject the states to suit without expressly referring to the Eleventh Amendment or
the state's sovereign immunity. Id. at 233. Professors Eskridge and Frickey have
accused the Court of adopting a "super strong" clear statement rule. William N.
Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement Rules As
ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAD. L. REv. 593, 597-98 (1992) (criticizing Supreme
Court's adoption of "super strong" clear statement rules); see also Chemerinsky,
supra note 420, at 334-35 (arguing that neither constitutional limit on federal jurisdiction nor diversity theories of Eleventh Amendment supports clear statement
rule); William P. Marshall, The Eleventh Amendment, Process Federalism and the Clear
Statement Rule, 39 DEPAUL L. Rv. 345, 353-55 (1989-90) (arguing that clear statement rule allows Court to frustrate congressional intent).
462. In Parden, the Supreme Court held that the state had consented to suit
under FELA when it decided to operate a railroad in interstate commerce. Parden
v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama, 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled in part by Welsh v. Texas
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987). The Court assumed that
Congress had the authority under its commerce powers to condition the right to
operate a railroad in interstate commerce upon the state's consent to suit in federal court. Id. at 192; see also Welsh, 483 U.S. at 475-76 & n.5 (assuming Congress
had power to abrogate state's Eleventh Amendment immunity under Article I without deciding issue); Oneida /, 470 U.S. 226, 252 (1985) (assuming hypothetically
that Congress might be able to abrogate states' immunity from suits by Indian
tribes but not deciding issue).
463. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
464. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that states can be held liable for damages in
federal court under CERCLA as amended by SARA).
465. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that "[t]he Congress shall have
Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes").
466. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1026-28 (11th Cir. 1994)
(holding that Congress had no power under Indian Commerce Clause to authorize suits against unconsenting states in IGRA); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa
Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484, 1489-90 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (holding that
Congress had no power under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity in IGRA), appeal dismissed, 5 F.3d 147 (6th Cir.
1993).
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rogation powers under the Indian Commerce Clause.4 7
a. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.
In Union Gas Co., the Supreme Court was asked whether the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),468 as amended by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 469 made
the states liable for monetary damages in federal court.4 70 The case
presented two issues: (1) whether Congress had clearly expressed
its intent to abrogate the states' immunity in the statutory text and
(2) whether Congress had the authority to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 4 71 A majority of the Court concluded
that CERCLA, as amended by SARA, clearly expressed Congress'
intent to hold the states liable for damages in federal court.4 72 A
different set of five justices also concluded that Congress had the
power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the states' Eleventh
473
Amendment immunity from suit.
Justice Brennan believed that the Eleventh Amendment only
applied to diversity cases and was not implicated in federal question
suits like Union Gas C0.4 74 However, he could not put together a
majority for overruling Hans v. Louisiana.475 In an interesting illus467. For further discussion of Congress' abrogation powers under the Indian
Commerce Clause, see infra notes 523-37 and accompanying text.

468. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988).
469. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601
(1986)).
470. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989). The United States
sued Union Gas Company to recover the cost of cleaning up a coal tar deposit site.
Id. at 6. Union Gas filed a third-party complaint against Pennsylvania. Id. It
claimed that the state was responsible for part of the clean-up costs because the
state had exposed the coal tar deposit while excavating a creek as part of a flood
control project. Id. Pennsylvania asserted that the Eleventh Amendment barred
the third-party action. Id
471. Id. at 5.
472. Id. at 13. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens and Scalia on the first issue. Id. at 7-13, 29-30 (Scalia,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
473. Id. at 23, 57. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, joined on the
power issue by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Id. at 13-23; id. at 23-29
(Stevens, J., concurring). In a separate opinion, Justice White concurred with Justice Brennan's conclusion on the power issue. Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
474. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 496521 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment applies
only to diversity suits).
475. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). For further discussion of the Court's interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment under Hans and support for overruling this case, see
supra note 421.
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tration of consensus building-or perhaps more accurately, lack of
consensus building-Justice Brennan essentially turned the traditional arguments against abrogation under Article I upside down to
conclude that Congress did, in fact, have the authority under the
Interstate Commerce Clause to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. Opponents had argued that unlike the Fourteenth
Amendment, Article I could not authorize Congress to override the
states' sovereign immunity because the Eleventh Amendment superseded Article 1.476 In other words, the states could not give up
power that they did not yet have. Moreover, the Fourteenth
Amendment was specifically intended to limit the states' power, and
section 5 of the Amendment expressly gave Congress authority to
effectuate the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 77 In contrast, the Eleventh Amendment lacked an explicit enforcement clause.
Justice Brennan, however, reasoned that if the Eleventh
Amendment embodied the principle of sovereign immunity that
the states brought to the Constitutional Convention, that power
predated Article 1.478 When the states approved Article I, they gave
up power to enlarge Congress' power. 4 79 Justice Brennan also read
the Eleventh Amendment narrowly to conclude that it limited only
federal judicial power, not congressional power. 48 0 He reasoned
that even if the Eleventh Amendment created new sovereign immunity, it could not limit the plenary power expressly granted to Congress under Article I without a much clearer expression of that
81
intent than the language of the Eleventh Amendment provides. 4
Finally, Justice Brennan concluded that the states consented to be
held liable for monetary damages in federal court, where Congress
deemed necessary, when they adopted Article I and gave Congress
482
plenary power to regulate interstate commerce.
476. See Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 41-42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
477. See id. at 42.
478. Id. at 17-18.
479. Id. at 19-20.
480. Id. at 18. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan focused on the
language of the Eleventh Amendment. He emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment refers to "judicial power" not being "constru[ed]" and does not mention
.congressional power." fd.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 22. Justice Brennan reasoned that Congress might have to subject
the states to money damages in some instances to fully effectuate its Commerce
Clause policies. Id. at 20.
Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion reiterating his belief that the Eleventh Amendment is a constitutional limit on the federal judiciary's diversity jurisdiction that neither Congress nor the Court may abrogate. Id. at 23-24 (Stevens,J.,
concurring). However, he concluded that the sovereign immunity that the Court
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601

In a singularly unrevealing concurring opinion, Justice White
agreed with the plurality's conclusion on the power issue. He dis48 3
agreed, however, with "much of [justice Brennan's] reasoning."
Justice White gave no explanation for either his conclusion or
48 4
disagreement.
has recognized in other types of actions is court-created based on concerns of comity and federalism. Id. at 25-29. Congress may override this judicially-created immunity. Id. at 28-29 & n.4.
483. Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Part I
of his opinion, Justice White disagreed that CERCLA or SARA expressed in "unmistakably clear language" Congress' intent to abrogate the states' immunity from
suit. Id. at 45-56. However, he acquiesced in the majority's conclusion otherwise
and agreed that Congress had the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 56-57.
484. The following is Justice White's sole discussion on the power issue in
Union Gas Co.:
My view on the statutory issue has not prevailed, however; a majority of
the Court has ruled that the statute, as amended, plainly intended to abrogate the immunity of the States from suit in the federal courts. I accept
thatjudgment. This brings me to the question whether Congress has the
constitutional power to abrogate the States' immunity. In that respect, I
agree with the conclusion reached by Justice Brennan in Part III of his
opinion, that Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, although I do not agree
with much of his reasoning.
Id. at 56-57 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). Justice White's conclusion on the power issue was not altogether unexpected. It is quite similar to his dissenting opinion in Parden, which also fails to
explain his conclusion on the power issue:
I agree that it is within the power of Congress to condition a State's permit to engage in the interstate transportation business on a waiver of the
State's sovereign immunity from suits arising out of such business. Congress might well determine that allowing regulable conduct such as the
operation of a railroad to be undertaken by a body legally immune from
liability directly resulting from these operations is so inimical to the purposes of its regulation that the State must be put to the option of either
foregoing participation in the conduct or consenting to legal responsibility for injury caused thereby.
Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala., 377 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), overruled in part on other grounds by Welch v. Texas
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987). As in Union Gas Co., Justice White found that Congress had not clearly expressed its intent to exercise its
power in FELA. Id. at 200.
Justice White's failure to explain his conclusion on the power issue in Union
Gas Co. has generated considerable frustration and criticism. See Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1026-27 (11th Cir. 1994) ("It is regrettable thatJustice White
failed to provide any reasoning of his own to support his conclusion that Congress
had abrogation power as his vague concurrence renders the continuing validity of
Union Gas in doubt."); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550,
558-59 (S.D. Ala. 1991) (declining to read Union Gas Co. expansively and stating
that "Justice White's mysterious, laconic concurrence on the abrogation issue
makes the plurality opinion something of a 'four-and-a half' vote majority"), aff'd
sub nom. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994); HART & WECHSLER, supranote 38, at 129 (Supp. 1992) ("Doesn't aJustice who casts the deciding
vote have some obligation to provide an explanation that is intelligible to the legal
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Dissenting on the power issue, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist andJustices O'Connor and Kennedy, argued that
Congress did not have authority under Article I to subject unconsenting states to suits in federal court.4 85 For these Justices, the
Eleventh Amendment limits both Congress' powers under Article I
and the federal courts' powers under Article 111.486 Rejecting the
plurality's analysis, 48 7 Justice Scalia emphasized that Hans and its
progeny had recognized that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a
broad constitutional policy protecting the states' sovereign immunity. 488 He concluded that the only way to uphold abrogation
under the Commerce Clause was to overrule Hans,which he,joined
by the other dissenting Justices and Justice White, rejected. 489 Finally, Justice Scalia warned that the Court's decision finding Article
I power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity rested on
"shaky grounds" and would not endure for long.490
The key to Justice Brennan's analysis on the power issue is his
conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment limits the federal judiciary's jurisdiction and not Congress' power. 49 1 If he is correct, the
focus should turn to the type of constitutional grant that the states
community?"); Chemerinsky, supra note 420, at 335-36 ("As the deciding vote on
an important and deeply contested constitutional question, Justice White had the
responsibility to provide some inkling as to his reasoning and views.").
485. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 35-42. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy also agreed with Justice White that CERCLA, as amended
by SARA, did not clearly express Congress' intent to hold the states liable for
money damages in federal court. Id. at 45 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
486. Id. at 39-40; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 420, at 340.
487. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 35-42.
488. Id. at 37-38 ("Hans was not expressing some narrow objection to the particular federal power by which Louisiana had been haled into court, but was rather
enunciating a fundamental principle of federalism, evidenced by the Eleventh
Amendment, that the States retained their sovereign prerogative of immunity.").
489. Id. at 30-35 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 57
n.8 (White,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I reiterate my view that
... Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1980), should not be overruled.").
490. Justice Scalia stated:
It is a particularly unhappy victory, since instead of cleaning up the allegedly muddled Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence produced by Hans,
the Court leaves that in place, and adds to the clutter the astounding
principle that Article III limitations can be overcome by simply exercising
Article I powers. It is an unstable victory as well, since that principle is
too much at war with itself to endure. We shall either overrule Hans in
form as well as in fact, or return to its genuine meaning.

Id. at 44-45.
491. Id at 18; see also Lawrence H. Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separationof Powers Issues in ControversiesAbout Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REv. 682, 693-95 (1975-76) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment
limits federal courts and not congressional authority).
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gave to Congress in the "plan of convention." 492 The states' overall
intent is what matters, not whether they actually considered and
agreed to subject themselves to suit in the federal courts. By ratifying Article I, the states gave Congress plenary power to regulate
commerce. They, thus, intended to give up all of their powers to
Congress for use when Congress deemed necessary. Accordingly,
the states retain no powers in this area. To reclaim some of that
power would require a clear constitutional amendment. As Justice
Brennan emphasized, the limited language of the Eleventh Amendment does not clearly express this intent with respect to Congress'
plenary commerce powers.
The current Supreme Court almost certainly has the votes to
overrule Union Gas Co. All of the Justices who decided Union Gas
Co. apparently disagreed with the plurality's rationale on the power
issue, 493 and Justices Brennan, Marshall, White and Blackmun, four
of the five votes for Article I abrogation authority, have left the
Court. Nevertheless, the current Court may let Union Gas Co. stand,
relying instead on the "clear statement rule" to insulate the states
from suits in federal court. In fact, the Supreme Court has had
ample opportunity to overturn Union Gas Co. or to limit its scope,
49 4
but the Court has not yet done so.
Moreover, there is good reason to let Union Gas Co. stand if the
Court is unwilling to overrule Hans or interpret the Eleventh
Amendment as conveying "subconstitutional protections." 49 5 Congress' right to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
under Article I is limited by the "clear statement rule." The two
492. Of course, if the Eleventh Amendment is in fact a broad limit on congressional authority as well as federal judicial authority, Congress cannot legislatively overrule that constitutional limitation.
493. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens and Blackmun believed that the Eleventh Amendment does not limit federal question suits. Welch v. Texas Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 496-521 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy believed that the Eleventh
Amendment limits Congress as well as the federal judiciary. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. at 29-45 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and. dissenting in part). Justice White
disagreed with Justice Brennan's rationale on the power issue. Id. at 57 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
494. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782-88 (1991)
(failing to consider whether Congress could abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity under Indian Commerce Clause and deciding that 28 U.S.C. § 1362
(1988) lacked sufficiently clear language of Congress' intent to abrogate).
495. See George D. Brown, Has the Supreme Court Confessed Error on the Eleventh
Amendment? Revisionist Scholarship and State Immunity, 68 N.C. L. REv. 867, 891
(1989-90) (arguing that Supreme Court's abrogation theory constitutes compromise solution which protects state treasuries while permitting federal enforcement
of federal substantive norms).
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together provide a compromise between the harsh results from the
Court's expansive interpretation of Hans and the needs of federalism. 496 Federalism envisions the proper balance and respect between the federal and state governments. Writing for the majority
in Younger v. Harris, 49 7 Justice Black explained federalism as follows:
What the concept does represent is a system in which
there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State
and National Governments, and in which the National
Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and to
protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States. 498
Nevertheless, he cautioned that federalism "does not mean blind
deference to 'States Rights' any more than it means centralization
of control over every important issue in our National Government
and its courts." 499 WhatJustice Black described is a "two-way street"
where the states' sovereignty interests are balanced against state
compliance with federal law and protection of federal rights.
Congress' power to abrogate the state's sovereign immunity
under Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes that the
states must adhere to federal law under the Supremacy Clause. The
power to abrogate prevents the states from violating the Constitution and other federal law with impunity. Federalism is not served
when the federal government abdicates its constitutional authority
to the states.
The "clear statement rule," however, serves as a check on both
Congress' and the federal judiciary's powers. 50 0 The rule ensures
that Congress actually thinks about whether it wants to subject the
496. Id.; see also Blatchford, 501 U.S. ' at 786 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491
U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989) ("To temper Congress' acknowledged powers of abroga-

tion with due concern for the Eleventh Amendment's role as an essential compo-

nent of our constitutional structure, we have applied a simple but stringent test:
'Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in
federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of

the statute.' "(citation omitted))). But see Blatchford,501 U.S. at 790 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 254 (1985)
(Brennan,J., dissenting) ("[Sluch 'special rules of statutory drafting are not justified (nor are they justifiable) as efforts to. determine the genuine intent of Congress.... [T]he special rules are designed as hurdles to keep the disfavored suits
out of the federal courts.' "(citation omitted))).
497. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (applying abstention doctrine).
498. Id. at 44.
499. Id.
500. Brown, supra note 495, at 888-90.
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states to liability and requires that Congress express its intent
clearly in the text of the statute. Therefore, only Congress, not the
courts, makes the decision, after careful consideration, to curtail
the states' sovereign immunity for the limited purpose of effectuating important constitutional or other federal policies where necessary.50 1 As long as Congress does not abuse its power to abrogate
under Article I, a majority of the Supreme Court may continue to
recognize Congress' Article I abrogation authority as limited by the
"clear statement rule." 50 2 Unfortunately, the' federal judiciary can

also upset the federalism balance if courts use the "clear statement
°
rule" to subvert congressional intent rather than to enforce it.50
b.

Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak

Two years after Union Gas Co., the Supreme Court decided
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak.50 4 A six-to-three majority held
that the Eleventh Amendment also bars suits by Indian tribes
against the states.5 0 5 Several Native villages sued Alaska, challenging the State's revenue sharing statute on equal protection
501. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 790-91 (1991)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Because federal intrusion into state authority is the
unusual case, and because courts are to use caution in determining when their
own jurisdiction has been expanded, this Court has erected the clear-statement
rule in order to be certain, that abrogation is Congress' plan." (citation omitted));
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 461, at 597 (explaining that "super strong clearstatement rules.., are a practical way for the court to focus legislative attention on
[constitutional] values"); Tribe, supra note 491, at 695-96 ("[A]lthough it may
seem novel to inject separation of powers considerations into the core of a problem involving federal-state division of power, recognition of the peculiar institutional competence of Congress in adjusting federal power relationships makes [the
'clear statement rule'] an appropriate and useful approach to reconciling national
power with state litigational immunity.").
502. The recent emphasis on the importance of stare decisis by an emerging
core of Supreme CourtJustices may also help insulate Union Gas Co. from reversal.
See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808-09 (1992) (discussing necessity of respect for precedent); Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n,
502 U.S. 197 (1991) (stating that departure from doctrine of stare decisis requires
compelling justification).
503. See Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96
(1989) (holding that § 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1988),
was not unmistakably clear abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
against suits in federal court for money damages); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S., 223
(1989) (holding that Education of the Handicapped Act was not unmistakably
clear abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity); Chemerinsky, supra
note 420, at 336 (stating that even when statute contains explicit language of congressional intent, "the Court often interprets it as inadequate to authorize suits
against state governments"); Marshall, supra note 461, at 354-55 (arguing that clear
statement rule allows Supreme Court to frustrate congressional intent).
504. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
505. Id.
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grounds.506 They sought damages equalling the amount of funds
that they would have received under the previous revenue sharing
plan. 507 The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Elev-

enth Amendment was applicable to suits by Indian tribes. If so, the
Court then had to decide whether the Indian jurisdictional statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1362, abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity or the federal government had delegated to the tribes its
power to sue the states. The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment applies to tribal suits against the states and Congress
did not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from
506. Id. at 777-78. In 1980, Alaska passed a revenue sharing statute which
gave unincorporated Native village governments $25,000 per year. Id. The state
attorney general concluded that the statute violated the equal protection clause of
the State's constitution. Id. at 778. The Commissioner of Alaska's Department of
Community and Regional Affairs subsequently expanded the revenue sharing program to include all unincorporated communities. Id. As a result, the Native villages received less money than they would have under the original program. Id.
In September 1985, the Native Village of Noatak, the Native Village of Akiachak
and the Circle Village sued the Commissioner of the Department of Community
and Regional Affairs in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska.
Id. They claimed that diluting the funds for the Native villages violated federal and
state law. Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.
1990), rev'd sub nom. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
The Villages sought declaratory and injunctive relief and an order compelling the
Commissioner to pay them the money that they would have received under the
original program. Id.
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1159-60. The district court's order was filed on December 1, 1987, and
is not published. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit initially reversed, concluding that the Indian jurisdictional statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1362, abrogated the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity; the plaintiffs
were federally recognized Indian tribes within the meaning of § 1362; and their
claims arose under federal law. Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 872 F.2d
1384, 1387-90 (9th Cir. 1989), withdrawn by 896 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub
nom Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991). Following the
Supreme Court's decision in Deilmuth, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its decision.
Hoffman, 896 F.2d at 1159. In its second opinion, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the states had consented to suit by Indian tribes in the "plan of convention" so the
Eleventh Amendment was not applicable. Id. at 1161-65. The Ninth Circuit stated:
The answer is that Indian affairs are sui generis and that in this unique
area concerning relations with non-foreign governmental units, the surrender of state sovereignty carried with it a surrender of immunity from
suit.
To recapitulate, there is no need for an explicit overriding of state
immunity if the state in consenting to the Constitution has consented to
being sued. The states did give consent to federal jurisdiction of Indian
affairs. The Eleventh Amendment has not revoked the consent of the
states, because neither in terms nor purpose does the amendment apply
to Indian tribes. No other general immunity protects the state from suit
by tribes.
Id. at 1164-65. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Ninth Circuit.
Blatchford, 501 U.S. 775.
507. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 778.
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tribal suits in § 1362.508
Writing for the majority this time, Justice Scalia rejected the
Native villages' argument that the Eleventh Amendment was only
applicable to suits by individuals. Relying on Monaco v. Mississippi,50 9 the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment extends to
both individuals and sovereigns. 5 10 Justice Scalia also found that
the states had not waived their sovereign immunity from tribal suits
511
in the "plan of convention" when they adopted the Constitution.
Conceding that Indian tribes are somewhat like the states because
they both are domestic sovereigns, 512 Justice Scalia, nevertheless,
concluded that no mutual surrender of immunity in the "plan of
convention" had occurred. He reasoned that the tribes had not
been parties to the Constitutional Convention and had retained
their sovereign immunity from suit by the states. Accordingly, he
refused to conclude that the states had surrendered their immunity
513
to benefit the tribes.
Justice Scalia also rejected the Native Villages' argument that
the federal government had delegated to the tribes its authority to
sue on their behalf when Congress enacted § 1362. 5 14 Expressing
skepticism that the federal government could in fact delegate such
power,51 5 the Court found no indication of any intent to allow the
tribes to sue the states in either the text of § 1362 or its purpose. 516
508. Id. at 779-88.
509. 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars suits by
foreign sovereigns against non-consenting states).
510. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779-81.
511. Id. at 781-82.
512. Id. at 782.
513. Id.
514. Id. at 783-86.
515. Id. at 785.
516. Id. at 784-86. The Court also limited Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 784-85 (holding that Tax
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988), did not bar tribes' access to federal court
to obtain injunctive relief from state taxation). In Moe, the Supreme Court stated
that by enacting § 1362, Congress intended that "[a] tribe's access to federal court
to litigate a matter arising 'under the Constitution, laws, or treaties' would be at
least in some respects as broad as that of the United States suing as the tribe's
trustee." Moe, 425 U.S. at 473. In Blatchford, however, Justice Scalia concluded that
Moe had decided only that § 1362 eliminated the application of the Tax Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, to tribal suits. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 784-85. He distinguished reading § 1362 as withdrawing a congressionally-created jurisdictional
limit based on principles of comity from reading § 1362 as eliminating a constitutionally-created bar to the federal courts' jurisdiction. Id. at 785.
The legislative history of § 1362 reveals that the Indian jurisdictional statute
was enacted in response to Yoder v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes, 339 F.2d 360 (9th
Cir. 1964). See H.R. REP. No. 2040, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1966), reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3145, 3146-47 (stating that purpose was to permit Indian tribes to
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Finally, Justice Scalia found no abrogation of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity because § 1362 did not satisfy the unmistakably clear language requirement for abrogation. 51 7 He
rejected the Villages' assertion that the Court should apply a minimal clarity standard because § 1362 was enacted when Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama5 18 was in effect.5 19 Because Parden was a
conditional consent case rather than an abrogation case, it was not
applicable. 52 0 Justice Scalia ignored the statutory construction rule,
raised by the dissent, that requires courts to construe ambiguous
statutes that are intended to benefit Indian tribes in favor of the
tribes. 52 1 In concluding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the
Native Villages' claims for damages, the Court also refused to address whether the Villages could have recovered injunctive relief
against the state. 5 22 Finally, the Court never considered whether
bring civil actions arising under Federal Constitution, laws or treaties without regard to jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement of § 1331); S. REP. No.
1507, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966) (same). In Yoder, tribal claims were dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the tribes failed to demonstrate the
necessary amount in controversy that was then required under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1988). Yoder, 339 F.2d 360. Congress enacted § 1362 primarily to eliminate the
amount in controversy requirement in federal question suits brought by Indian
tribes. See H.R. REP. No. 2040, supra; S. REP. No. 1507, supra. There is no indication in the legislative history of § 1362 that Congress considered the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. Similarly, the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity was not raised in Moe or considered by the Supreme Court. See Moe, 425
U.S. at 463. Nevertheless, tension now exists between'the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1362 in Blatchford and its interpretation of § 1362 in Moe.
517. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 786-88.
518..377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled in part by Welch v..Texas Dep't. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
519. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 787-88; see also supra note 434.

520. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 787-88.
521. See id. at 795-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

522. Id, at 788 (refusing to address possibility of injunctive relief because
Ninth Circuit had not addressed that issue).
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, dissented. Id. at
788-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun reiterated the dissent's belief
that the Eleventh Amendment was not implicated in federal question suits. Id. at
789. He then attacked the majority's application of the clear statement rule to
§ 1362. Id. at 790-96. Justice Blackmun argued that the policies for the clear statement rule as a tool of statutory construction were not applicable to suits by Indian
tribes. Id. at 792. He reasoned that the clear statement rule is designed to preserve the proper balance of power between the federal government and the state
by allowing the federal government to intrude into the state's authority only when
Congress declares such intent in the clearest language. Id. at 790-91. However,
the balance of power is weighed against the states and heavily in favor of the federal government when Indian affairs are concerned because Congress has plenary
power over Indian matters. Id. at 791-92. Justice Blackmun, thus, concluded that
the dear statement rule was not applicable to tribal suits against the states. Id. at
792.
Justice Blackmun further observed that the Court should use traditional rules
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Congress would actually have power to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause as opposed to the Interstate Commerce Clause, which was at issue in
Union Gas Co.
c.

523
Abrogation Under the Indian Commerce Clause

A number of lower federal courts have held that Congress does
not have authority to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause of Article 1.524 Refusing to read Union Gas Co. expansively, in part because of Justice
Brennan's "weak plurality opinion" and subsequent changes in the
Court, they have limited the application of Union Gas Co. to abrogation under the Interstate Commerce Clause. 52 5 Although the reasoning is not entirely clear, these courts distinguish between
Congress' powers under the Interstate Commerce Clause and the
Indian Commerce Clause based on the different functions of the
two clauses.526 They also rely on the Supreme Court's holding in
of statutory interpretation, noting that Congress' use of "all suits" in § 1362 was
sufficient to include suits by Indian tribes against the state. Id. at 792-96. Justice
Blackmun also noted that Congress enacted § 1362 to foster tribal self-determination because Congress recognized that, at times, it lacked the resources or will to
properly vindicate the tribes' rights under the government's trust duty. Id. at 794.
Citing Moe, Justice Blackmun stated that § 1362 was intended to give the tribes the
same rights to sue for full vindication of their rights as the federal government
would have, and this would necessarily include suits for money damages. Id. at
793-94. Finally, Justice Blackmun argued that the Court should interpret § 1362 in
the Native Villages' favor under traditional principles for interpreting ambiguous
statutes that are intended to benefit Indian tribes. Id. at 795-96.
523. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o
regulate Commerce ...

with the Indian Tribes.").

524. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1026-28
(11th Cir. 1994) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars suits by Indian. tribes
against states to enforce IGRA); Pueblo of Sandia v. New Mexico, 1992 WL 540817,
at *1 (D.N.M. 1992) (same), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Ponca Tribe of
Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994); Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma
v. Oklahoma, 834 F. Supp. 1341, 1345-46 (W.D. Okla. 1992) (same), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa
Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484, 1489-90 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (same), appeal
dismissed, 5 F.3d 147 (6th Cir. 1993); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama,
776 F. Supp. 550, 559-62 (S.D. Ala. 1991) (same), aff'd sub nom. Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994). But see Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma
v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that Congress had authority
under Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in IGRA); Spokane Tribe v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991, 994-97 (9th Cir. 1994)
(same); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 280-81 (8th Cir.
1993) (same).
525. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe 11 F.3d at 1026-27; Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 800 F. Supp. at 1489; PoarchBand of Creek Indians, 776 F. Supp. at 55859.
526. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1027; Ponca Tribe, 834 F. Supp. at 1345;
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Blatchford that there was no mutual surrender of sovereign immunity between the states and Indian tribes "in the plan of the
527
convention. "
Distinguishing between the Interstate Commerce Clause and
the Indian Commerce Clause, however, makes little sense. Both are
plenary grants of power to Congress which are located in the same
clause of Article 1.528 More importantly, the Indian Commerce
Clause presents a stronger case for abrogation than the Interstate
Commerce Clause. The Articles of Confederation contained an Indian affairs clause similar to the Indian Commerce Clause in the

Constitution, except that it contained two exceptions.5 29 The Articles of Confederation gave the confederal government exclusive
power over Indians. However, it reserved to the states the right of
preemption and limited Congress' authority to nonassimilated Indians. 530 Despite this provision, the states continued to engage in InSpokane Tribe, 790 F. Supp. at 1060-61. In Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Circuit states
that Congress' plenary powers under the Interstate Commerce Clause allow Congress to "place limits on the states in order to 'maintain [ ] free trade among the
States.'" Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989)). The primary function of the Indian Commerce Clause, however, is "to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in
the field of Indian affairs." Id. The Eleventh Circuit then concludes that the two
clauses should be treated differently because they have different underlying purposes. Id. The court, however, never explains why. Id. The Eleventh Circuit even
concedes that Congress has power under the Indian Commerce Clause to limit the
states but, nevertheless, finds no abrogation power in the Indian Commerce
Clause. Id. Like Congress' powers under the Interstate Commerce Clause, however, Congress' authority over Indian affairs would be incomplete without the authority to subject the states to suit where necessary to effectuate its Indian
commerce powers. SeeUnion Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania, 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989). In
both clauses, the states surrendered their authority to allow Congress to regulate in
the area. Just because the primary purposes of the two clauses are different does
not mean that Congress' abrogation powers are different. See Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe, 3 F.d at 280-81; Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma, 37 F.3d at 1431-32; Spokane Tribe of
Indians, 28 F.3d at 996-97.
527. See Seminole Tribe oflorida, 11 F.3d at 1022 ("[T] he states cannot be said
to have surrendered their sovereign immunity under the 'plan of the convention.' "); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 800 F. Supp. at 1489 ("Blatchford
holds that states did not waive immunity to suit by Indian tribes.").
528. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes.").
529. The Indian Affairs Clause of the Articles of Confederation provided:
The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and
exclusive right and power of ... regulating the trade and managing all
affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that
the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or
violated....
ARTicLES OF CONFED., art. IX, cl. 4.

530. Oneida Indian Nation V.New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1154 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989).
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dian affairs and to take Indian land. This resulted in hostilities,
essentially plunging the fledgling nation into a widespread Indian
war which it could little afford following the Revolutionary War with
Great Britain. The confederal government's inability to control the
states' interaction with the Indian tribes, particularly the states' cessions of Indian lands, was a major reason for the need to "form a
more perfect union."5 3 ' The Indian Commerce Clause was incorporated in the Constitution specifically to exclude the states from
532
Indian affairs and to give Congress plenary power over the tribes.
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that Congress
has exclusive power over Indian affairs and that the states have no
jurisdiction without an express grant from Congress.5 33 In contrast, the states may regulate, and even burden, interstate commerce as long as they do not "unduly burden" it.53 4 Accordingly,
one cannot reasonably argue that the states gave Congress less authority when they adopted the Indian Commerce Clause than the
Interstate Commerce Clause; the states relinquished all of their
power "in the plan of the convention" to give Congress both ple533
nary and exclusive power under the Indian Commerce Clause.
531. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 649 F. Supp. 420, 437 (N.D.N.Y.
1986) (stating that this lack of control "was one of the 'evils' that the Constitution
'entirely altered' "), aff'd, 860 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871
(1989); id. at 441 ("[T]he central government's inability to deal effectively with
Indian problems in the South lead to Congress' plenary control over Indian affairs
under the Constitution and the Nonintercourse Act."); Newton, supra note 1, at
200.
532. See, e.g., Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985) ("With the adoption of the
Constitution, Indian relations became the exclusive province of federal law.");
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) ("The plenary power of Congress
to deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and implicitly
from the Constitution itself."); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561
(1832) ("The whole intercourse between the United States and the [Indian] nations, is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United
States.").
533. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973)
(quoting Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945)) ("The policy of leaving Indians
free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history.").
534. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981) ("Commerce Clause does not ...invalidate all state restrictions on commerce .... [I] n
the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in
the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which ... in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it." (quoting
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945))); Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) ("The crucial inquiry... must be directed to
determining whether [the challenged statute] is basically a protectionist measure,
or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns,
with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental.")
535. It is difficult to see how the Supreme Court can ultimately decide that
Congress has no abrogation power under the Indian Commerce Clause without at
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The Supreme Court had the opportunity to overrule Union Gas
Co., or to limit its holding to the Interstate Commerce Clause, in
Blatchford.536 However, the Court never discussed whether Congress had authority to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause. It only considered
whether the Eleventh Amendment applied to suits against the states
by Indian tribes and whether Congress had, in fact, abrogated the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in 28 U.S.C. § 1362.537 The
fact that the 'Supreme Court did not even raise the power issue suggests that Union Gas Co., or at least its reasoning, was controlling.
VI.

THE IMPACT OF THE STATES' ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

ON RESOLVING INDIAN LAND CLAIMS

A. Land Claim Actions Against the State
The immediate consequence of Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak is that Indian tribes may not sue a state unless the state has
consented. or Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 53 8 Consent will not be implied; it must be "unmistakably clear."53 9 For obvious reasons, states will not likely consent
to most suits by Native Americans, particularly suits involving tribal
land claims. 540 Congress may also abrogate the states' sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment 541 or the Indian Coinleast rejecting Justice Brennan's rationale in Union Gas Co. that favors Congress'
abrogation powers under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
536. 501 U.S. 775 (1991) (addressing whether 28 U.S.C. § 1362 abrogated
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits by Indian tribes).
537. I&
538. Id.
539. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1990)
(quoting Atascedero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).' For
further discussion of the requirements for consent, see supra note 439 and accompanying text.
540. However, the state may choose to intervene in a suit which has substantial impact on the state's interests. For example, the State of Washington intervened in the Puyidlups' suit asserting title to land surrounding the State's most
important deep water port. Order of Judge John C. Coughenour Granting the
State of Washington Intervention, Mar. 24, 1990, Puyallup Tribe v. Union Pac.
R.R., No. C84-359TC (W.D. Wash.). The federal government may also choose to
intervene on behalf of the tribe to assert a claim against the state. See Order of
Judge Neal P. McCurn Granting the United States Intervention, Nov. 30, 1992,
Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, Nos. 80-CV-930, 80-CV-960 (N.D.N.Y.)
541. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454-56 (1976). For a discussion of
Congress' authority to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra notes 456-61 and accompanying text. For example,
Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the states from discriminating
against Indians in employment because of their race except as permitted under
§ 703(i). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (i) (1988) (prohibiting race discrimination in
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mence Clause in Article 1.542 However, Congress' intent to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity must be unmistakably clear on the face of the federal statute or treaty. 543
544
Neither 28 U.S.C. § 1331 nor § 1362 constitutes an abrogation.
The tribes might try to argue that Congress intended to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the
Nonintercourse Act. Both the language and history of the Act indicate that Congress meant the prohibition against alienating Indian
land to apply to the states. 545 However, it is not clear that the tribes
even have a cause of action under the Act, let alone the right to sue
the states. In Oneida II, the Supreme Court refused to decide
employment except permitting "preferential treatment... given to any individual
because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation"). The Supreme Court has
held that Title VII abrogates the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.
Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 445, 447-48.
542. For a discussion of Congress' authority to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause, see supra notes 523-37 and accompanying text.
543. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786 (1991).
544. Id.; see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985)
("A general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal
statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.").
545. See Oneida 11, 470 U.S. 226, 253 (1985) (affirming lower court's finding
that state treaty made in violation of Noniritercourse Act was void); Oneida , 414
U.S. 661, 670 (1974) (discussing federal government's exclusiveright to extinguish
Indian title codified in Nonintercourse Act and stating that "[t]he rudimentary
propositions that Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be extinguished
only with federal consent apply in all of the States, including the original 13").
The first version of the Nonintercourse Act expressly prohibited the 'states from
alienating Indian land without the federal government's approval. Act of July 22,
1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 138. Section 4 of the 1790 Act provided:
[N]o sale of land made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians
within the United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to any
state, whether having the right of prememption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held
under the authority of the United States.
Id. The current version of the Noninteicourse Act provides:
No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands,, or of any
title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be
of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or
convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution. Every person who,
not being employed under the authority of the United States, attempts to
negotiate such treaty or convention, directly or indirectly, or to treat with
any such nation or tribe of Indians for the title or purchase of any lands
by them held or claimed, is liable to a penalty of $1,000. The agent of any
State who may be present at any treaty held with Indians under :the authority of the United States, in the presence and with the approbation of
the commissioner of the United States appointed to hold the same, may,
however, propose to, and adjust with, the Indians the compensation to be
made for their claim to lands within such State, which shall be extinguished by treaty.

25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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whether the Nonintercourse Act creates an implied right of action
for Indian tribes. 5 46 Instead, the Court held that the Oneida's right
54 7
to sue arose under a federal common law right of ejectment.
The Supreme Court's reluctance to address the issue is not surprising. When the Nonintercourse Act was first enacted, Congress
probably never considered the Indians' right to sue. The tribes
were expected to rely on the federal government to enforce their
rights. 548

In any event, neither the current version of the

Nonintercourse Act nor any of its previous versions contains "unmistakably clear language" showing Congress' intent to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 549 Similarly, the courts
are not likely to find clear language abrogating the states' sovereign
55 0
immunity in the specific treaties that protect tribal lands.
Although some statutes allow tribes to sue states to enforce certain
55 2
specific rights, 55 1 they do not generally apply to land claims.

546. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 233 ("We need not reach the . . .question [of
implied right of action) as we think the Indians' common-law right to sue is firmly
established.").

547. Id.
548. See, e.g., Treaty at Canandaigua, Nov. 11, 1794, art. VII, 7 Stat. 44, 46
(stating that Six Nations should complain to President of the United States or his
appointed superintendent to redress wrongs against them until legislature enacted
other means for asserting their rights). For a discussion of the reasons why Indian
tribes were expected to rely on the federal government to enforce their rights, see
supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
549. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (current version); Act ofJune 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 12,
4 Stat. 729, 730-31; Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, § 12, 2 Stat. 139, 143; Act of Mar.
3, 1799, ch. 46, § 12, 1 Stat. 743, 746; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, § 12, 1 Stat. 469,
472; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, § 8, 1 Stat. 329, 330-31; Act ofJuly 22, 1790, ch. 33,
§ 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138.
550. Congress stopped making treaties with Indian tribes in 1871. 25 U.S.C.
§ 71 (1988) ("No Indian nation or tribe ...shall be acknowledged or recognized
as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty .. ").Like the Nonintercourse Act, land treaties were written when
Indian capacity to sue was at least uncertain and they were expected to petition the
federal government to enforce their property rights. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
551. See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 474-75
(1976) (holding that Tax Anti-Injunction Act does not preclude tribes from bringing suit in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 for tax relief); Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 280-81 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act abrogates states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
552. Some of the recent land claim settlements include limited waivers of the
parties' sovereign immunity. See Seminole Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of
1987, 25 U.S.C. § 1772f (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (codifying limited waiver/abrogation of immunity from suits over disputes arising under settlement agreement);
Puyallup Agreement § XI(B), supra note 278, at 33, reprinted in H.R. ReP. No. 57,
supra note 260, at 59 (providing limited waiver of immunity from suits over disputes arising under settlement agreement); Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement
Act of 1989, 25 U.S.C. § 1773g (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (incorporating jurisdictional provisions of Puyallup Agreement).
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B.

Actions Against State Officials to Enforce Property Rights

Whether tribes can sue state officials under Ex parte Young to
enforce property rights presents an interesting question. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for retroactive relief against state officers acting in their official capacities. 55 s Accordingly, suits to
recover the fair market value of lost tribal lands, trespass damages
or other monetary damages are prohibited. This type of relief constitutes retroactive monetary relief that would come from the state's
treasury, making the state the real party in interest. 554 The Eleventh Amendment would also bar suits to recover lost land or substitute lands. 55 5 The court would have to adjudicate the state's title to
the land in dispute. Again, the state would be the real party in interest. Although awarding land to the claimants would not constitute payment from the state treasury, it would deplete the public
domain and constitute both a declaration of, and restitution for,
55 6
the state's past wrongs.
However, the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit suits for
prospective injunctive relief against state officials. 55 7 As discussed
553. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 65-66 (1985) (holding that Eleventh
Amendment barred retrospective declaratory and injunctive relief); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-68 (1974) (holding that Eleventh Amendment barred
retroactive payment of wrongfully withheld Aid to Aged, Blind, and Disabled benefits). For a discussion of why plaintiffs cannot recover retroactive monetary relief,
see supra notes 444-45 and accompanying text.
554. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668 ("[A retroactive award of monetary relief] is
in practical effect indistinguishable in many aspects from an award of damages
against the State. It will to a virtual certainty be paid from state funds, and not
from the pockets of the individual state officials who were the defendants in the
action.").
555. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 279-81 (1986) (holding that Eleventh
Amendment barred plaintiffs' breach of trust claim against state officials where
plaintiffs sought declaration that sale of Chickasaw Cession school lands was void,
and also sought establishment of perpetual trust or substitution lands); Florida
Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 689 F.2d 1254, 1255-56 (5th Cir.), on remandfrom 458 U.S. 670 (1982) (holding that state could not be forced to litigate
title to property in federal court); see also Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors,
458 U.S. 670, 702 (1982) (White, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part) (stating that Ex pane Young was not applicable where state claimed ownership
of sunken treasure and action was to determine state's title); cf. Treasure Salvors,
458 U.S. at 699-700 (plurality opinion) (indicating in dicta that state cannot be
named as defendant in action to determine property title).
556. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 n.11
(1983) (quoting Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) ("The general rule is
that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment sought would expend itself on
the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration' .....
(emphasis added) (citations omitted))).
557. Id at 102-03. Although the Supreme Court refused to address whether
the tribal plaintiffs in Blatchford could recover prospective injunctive relief against
state officials, no reason exists to treat tribes differently from other plaintiffs. Ac-
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in Part V, a federal court can order an official to comply with federal law in the future. 5 58 The court can also award monetary relief
that is ancillary to prospective injunctive relief, even though the
funds will be paid from the state treasury. 5 9 The question is
whether Indian tribes can characterize their land claims to fit
within this narrow exception. The Supreme Court has noted that
distinguishing between suits for retroactive relief and suits for prospective relief is often difficult. 560 To determine whether an action
fits within the Ex parte Young fiction, the court will examine the substance, rather than the form, of the relief sought and the underly561
ing policies of Ex parte Young.
Tribes might try to characterize their land claim actions as suits
for prospective relief by seeking to enjoin state officials to enforce
federal law prospectively. If a state's cessions of Indian land were
void ab initio under the Nonintercourse Act,5 62 the tribe would still
hold valid title. Prospective injunctive relief would prohibit the official from interfering with the tribe's future occupancy. Alternatively, the tribe might seek future rental payments as ancillary to the
injunctive relief. In either case, however, the federal court would
have to adjudicate the state's title to the land based on the state's
past actions. Although careful wording of the complaint and the
relief sought might characterize the relief as prospective, a court
would likely find that the complaint is really against the state and,
therefore, barred by the Eleventh Amendment.563 Native Americans may have a better chance enforcing future hunting and fishing
rights on state lands. Such relief looks more like traditional procordingly, the Ex parte Young doctrine should be available to Indian tribes in the
appropriate case. See, e.g., Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944
F.2d 548, 552 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that Eleventh Amendment did not bar injunctive and declaratory relief against Commissioner of Health and Social Services
in suit to compel state recognition of native villages and tribal court adoption decrees under Indian Child Welfare Act).
558. For a discussion of the circumstances under which a federal court may
order a state official to comply with federal law in the future, see supranotes 441-55
and accompanying text.
559. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 346-49 (1979).
560. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986).
561. Id at 279.
562. See Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 245-46 (1985) (stating that under
Nonintercourse Act, "a conveyance without the sovereign's consent was void ab
initio").
563. See Papasan, 478 U.S. at 279-81 (holding that Eleventh Amendment
barred petitioners' trust claims against state officials and rejecting distinction between characterization of claims as "continuing obligation of a trustee" and "on
going liability" for past breaches of trust).
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spective relief and less like punishment for past wrongs. 564
C.

Land Claim Actions Against Non-State Landholders

Blatchford does not signal the end of Native land claims, however. Tribes can still sue political subdivisions of the state, including local cities, towns and counties, 6 5 as well as private
landowners. 566 The cost of defending land claim actions is normally extremely high. For example, by 1986, local defendants in
Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo had already incurred approximately
$1 million in legal expenses, and the case is still pending as of this
writing. 56 7 Most land claim litigation takes many years and involves
numerous court proceedings. 568 When the state is a named defend564. See generally Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564, 569-70 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974) (holding that Native American plaintiffs retained
hunting and fishing rights on former reservation lands free from state regulation).
565. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280
(1977).
566. Before Blatchford, tribal plaintiffs commonly named as defendants local
subdivisions of the state and certain large private landowners in addition to the
state. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. New York, 649 F. Supp. 420, 422
(N.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 860 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871
(1989) (suing New York State, various New York counties and defendant class of
private landowners); Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp.
1297, 1303 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (suing "the Governor of New York, numerous administrative agencies, authorities and officials, the Counties of Cayuga and Seneca, various local governmental entities and officials, . . . various commercial and
individual landowners," and a proposed class of "all other persons who assert an
interest in any portion of the Original Reservation lands," estimated to exceed
7,000 individuals and entities); Narragansett Tribe v. Southern R.I. Land Dev.
Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798, 806 (D.R.I. 1976) (suing Director of Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, private individuals and businesses).
567. Lavin, supra note 130, at 95; Kathy M. Bachman, Oneidas to PursueClaims,
SYRACUSE HERALD-JouRNAL, Oct. 3, 1989, at B2 (stating that attorneys fees for defending state and local defendants in Oneida Indian Nation v. New York were approximately $1.2 million).
568. The protracted land claims litigation in New York State presents a particularly egregious illustration. At the time of this writing, the Oneida test case has
been pending for 24 years and has been twice before the Supreme Court. For a
discussion of the background and procedural history of the Oneida test case, see
supra notes 89-125, 180-89 and accompanying text. Similarly, the Cayuga land
claim has been pending before the Northern District of New York since November
1980. The Cayugas initially filed suit after the House of Representatives rejected a
negotiated settlement because of a local congressman's opposition. See generally
Lavin, supra note 130, at 87-100. So far, the Northern District of New York has
issued at least six major decisions in the Cayuga action. See Cayuga Indian Nation
of New York v. Cuomo, 771 F. Supp. 19, 24 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) [hereinafter Cayuga
V!] (rejecting defendants' laches defense and granting plaintiffs' partial summary
judgment, except against state, on defendants' liability); Cayuga Indian Nation of
New York v. Cuomo, 762 F. Supp. 30, 35-36 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) [hereinafter Cayuga
11 (dismissing plaintiffs' claim against Conrail); Cayuga Indian Nation of New
York v. Cuomo, 758 F. Supp. 107, 118 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) [hereinafter Cayuga IV]
(rejecting defendants' defense of abandonment); Cayuga Indian Nation of New
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ant, local defendants can "ride on the state's coattails" to a large
extent if they choose. Without the state, they must absorb all of the
defense costs.
More importantly, local municipalities, businesses and private
landowners may be held liable for illegal actions that the state committed long before they had access to the land in question or
before they even existed. 5 69 Court awards to successful claimants in

the form of damages, land or both may be prohibitively large. In
the Oneida test case, Judge Port initially awarded $16,694 in damages plus interest against the two defendant counties. 570 The award
only constituted the fair market rental value of approximately 872
acres of land over a two-year period. 5 7 1 However, many land claims
involve much larger tracts of land and potential damages that have
been accruing for decades and even centuries. 5 72 Unlike the states
and federal government, which have greater resources and can
spread costs throughout the state or nation, local governments and
private landowners, especially small business and landowners, generally lack the necessary resources to adequately cope with such
claims. Moreover, Eleventh Amendment and common law sovereign immunity preclude losing defendants from seeking indemnification from the state in either the federal or state courts.5 7 Unless
York v. Cuomo, 730 F. Supp. 485, 493 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) [hereinafter Cayuga III]
(granting plaintiffs' partial summary judgment and holding that conveyances of
Cayuga land to New York State in 1795 and 1807 were invalid); Cayuga Indian
Nation of New York v. Cuomo, 667 F. Supp. 938, 949 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) [hereinafter
Cayuga II] (denying motions for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims); Cayuga
Indian Nation of New York v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297, 1330 (N.D.N.Y. 1983)
[hereinafter Cayuga 1] (denying defendants' motion to dismiss).
569. See Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 253 (1985) (affirming defendant counties'
liability where state had illegally purchased land in 1795).
570. Oneida , 719 F.2d 525, 540 (2d Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and reversed in
part, 470 U.S. 226 (1985). The Second Circuit affirmed the counties' liability but
remanded for recalculation of the damages. Id. at 544. As of this writing, Oneida II
is still pending in the district court; however, proceedings are stayed pending setdement negotiations. For a discussion of why proceedings have been stayed, see
supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
571. Oneida II, 719 F.2d at 540.
572. See, e.g., Cayuga 1, 565 F. Supp. at 1301 (seeking possession of approximately 64,000 acres, award of fair market rental value for over 200 years and other
monetary and protective relief); see also supra notes 213, 270-76 and accompanying
text (discussing Narragansett and Puyallup land claims).
573. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 252-53 (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars
suits for indemnification against nonconsenting states in federal court). The
states' common law sovereign immunity prohibits suits against a nonconsenting
state in state court. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67
(1989) ("It is an 'established principle ofjurisprudence' that the sovereign cannot
be sued in its own courts without its consent." (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 527, 529 (1857))).
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619

the federal government decides to intervene against the state or the
state chooses to intervene as a party-defendant, local governments
and private landowners must now face land claim litigation on their
own.
D.

Impact On Land Claim Settlements

Less obvious but potentially more serious, the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from tribal suits may deter settlements in
land claim disputes. As discussed in Part IV, voluntary settlements
are preferable to court imposed remedies. 574 Unlike formal adjudication, the negotiating process provides the parties with greater
flexibility to fashion creative, constructive solutions for difficult
problems. Working through each side's needs and concerns can
also establish a basis for better future relations. The Puyallup
Agreement illustrates the type of comprehensive agreement that is
possible and that benefits everyone.5 75 In addition, the federal
courts do not have to confront the complex and controversial social
and political issues that these claims inevitably raise if the parties
can resolve their disputes through negotiations. Voluntary settlements also relieve judges of trying to fashion relief that is both equi5 76
table and enforceable for meritorious tribal claims.
Since the Supreme Court decided Oneida II, Native Americans
have successfully used land claim litigation to induce otherwise recalcitrant states and local landowners to come to the bargaining
table. 5 77 Even though the voluntary settlements that have resulted
may not fully, or even adequately, compensate the tribes for their
lost lands or the wrongs they have suffered, the tribes have benefitted. They have gained additional land, and some tribes, like the
Puyallups and Senecas, have also acquired substantial economic
578
resources.
The danger of Blatchford is that it weakens the tribes' negotiat574. For a discussion of why negotiated settlements are preferable to judicial
remedies, see supra notes 176-208 and accompanying text.
575. For a discussion of the settlement terms and the benefits resulting from
the Puyallup Agreement, see supra notes 280-323 and accompanying text.
576. For a discussion of the difficulties associated with trying to fashion relief
that is both equitable and enforceable, see supra notes 176-202 and accompanying
text.
577. See Hagan, supranote 35, at 28 ("The tactic of filing suit against landowners as well as states has proved highly successful in generating pressure for settlement"); Starna, supranote 189, at 165 (stating that Iroquois' "primary strategy" was
to achieve "out-of-court resolutions of claims brought").
578. For a discussion of the economic resources acquired by the Puyallups
and Senecas through a voluntary settlement, see supra notes 280-301, 360-80 and
accompanying text.
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ing position in relation to the states. Depending on the specific
circumstances, the state may be more reluctant to join settlement
negotiations and to contribute state resources knowing that it cannot be held liable to either the Native claimants or the non-Native
occupants. Local landowners and communities may be left with insufficient resources to offer viable settlements and to trigger federal
contributions.
Of course, states will still have an interest in resolving land
claims within their borders. Without the threat of state liability,
however, states may well find themselves in a "catch-22" position.
Normally, the state and the affected communities strongly oppose
any compromise immediately after the claimants file suit. However,
as both the hardship in the claim area and the likelihood of losing
increase, those affected will pressure the state to take an active role
in resolving the dispute. 5 79 The more economically and politically
influential the claim area, the greater that pressure will be. The
rest of the state, and usually a vocal minority from the claim area,
will exert pressure against expending state resources to resolve the
land claim. The pressure against committing significant state resources to the dispute will be substantial, especially in times of financial difficulties. Accordingly, Eleventh Amendment immunity
will tend to tip the balance against the state's willingness to contribute to the "settlement pot" and may well reduce the state's incentive
to take an active role in the -negotiations process. Even where the
state chooses to take an active role in facilitating an agreement, it
will have less influence over local participants without the promise
and coercive influence of a substantial state contribution.
The state's immunity from suit will also force Native claimants
to sue the most economically and politically important localities
that can exert the greatest pressure on the state. This strategy was
quite effective in the Puyallup land claim. Because the Puyallups'
claim impacted Washington State's most important deep-water
port, the state and a number of local governments sought intervention in Puyallup Tribe v. Union Pacific Railroadand ultimately negoti579. See Lavin, supra note 130, at 100. Lavin states that:
Recent history has shown that acheiving unanimity among the residents
of whatever area is chosen for a new reservation site is unlikely, but as
litigation costs mount and the court case draws closer to a trial date, state,
local, and federal leaders will face increasing pressures to risk offending
some constituents if the title threat and the drain of the defense costs are
to be lifted from the community at large.
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ated an agreement. 58 0 More recently, Governor Lowell Weicker's
refusal to negotiate with the Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe in Connecticut 58 1 prompted the Tribe to threaten to extend its land claim
actions against politically and economically influential Fairfield
5 82

County.

In contrast to the states that have negotiated settlements, New
York has had a dismal record for resolving land disputes with the
Iroquois Nations. 583 The reasons for this failure are complex and
5 84
rooted in historical, social and political problems on both sides.
585
Despite judicial findings of liability in both the Oneida test case
5 86
and Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo,
as well as "on-again-off-again"

settlement negotiations interrupted by periodic litigation, the
Oneida, Cayuga and St. Regis land claims are still pending in federal court after many years. New York's reluctance to settle these
cases may be partially due to the fact that these claims involve relatively rural, economically poor areas of the State with less influence
in the State's capital than more affluent downstate areas.
If the parties cannot reach satisfactory settlements, the federal
courts will be forced to adjudicate Native land claims and fashion
relief where the tribes prevail. So far, the courts have avoided making major awards in land claim actions because the defendants have
resorted to negotiations when they realized that the Native claimants could well prevail. If the federal courts are forced to fashion
remedies in these disputes, they will also be forced to consider the
Supreme Court's suggestion in Oneida II that "equitable considerations should limit the relief available" 58 7 or impose substantial bur580. For a discussion of land claims asserted by the Puyallups and the consequences of those claims, see supra notes 270-76 and accompanying text.
581. See Pazniokas, supra note 129, at Al (reporting state's refusal to negotiate
settlement with Paugussetts); see also Judson, supra note 129, at B1 (stating that
state's attorney general "has vowed to fight 'tooth and nail' rather than
negotiate").
582. SeeJudson, supranote 129, at BI.
583. See generally HAUPrMAN, supra note 136 (discussing relations between New
York State and Iroquois Confederacy between 1970 and 1986); HAUPTMAN, supra
note 142 (discussing history of Iroquois Confederacy from 1940 to 1974).
584. See Starna, supra note 189, at 168-74.
585. Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 253 (1985).
586. Cayuga IV,771 F. Supp. 19, 24 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting Cayugas' motion for partial summary judgment on defendants' liability, except against state);
Cayuga I1, 730 F. Supp. 485, 493 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that 1795 and 1807
conveyances of Cayuga land were invalid).
587. See Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 253 n.27. After rejecting the counties' defenses,
affirming their liability, and lamenting Congress' failure to extinguish the
Oneidas' title to the land claim area, the Supreme Court stated in a footnote:
The question whether equitable considerations should limit the re-
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dens on local communities and private landowners. Judgments that
overly tax local inhabitants or insufficiently compensate Native
claimants will create greater dissatisfaction with the judicial process
and bitterness among all concerned.
To the extent that Eleventh Amendment immunity deters state
participation in resolving tribal land claims, Native Americans, long
frustrated in trying to protect their sovereignty interests, will become further frustrated by protracted and unsuccessful settlement
negotiations or inadequate judicial remedies. If accepted means of
dispute resolution are perceived as inadequate, Native claimants
will be more inclined to resort to self-help measures. Although one
thinks of "Indian hostilities" as history, incidents of civil unrest by
Native Americans protesting their treatment by society are common
in modem times. Recent examples include the Mohawks' 1974
seizure of an abandoned Girl Scout camp at Moss Lake, New
York; 588 the Canadian Mohawks' 1990 blockade of the Mercier
Bridge into Montreal, Canada, when local authorities threatened to
convert their ancestral lands into a golf course;5 89 and the Senecas'
1992 road barricades when New York State attempted to tax on5 90
reservation sales of cigarettes and gasoline.
lief available to the present day Oneida Indians was not addressed by the
Court of Appeals or presented to this Court by petitioners. Accordingly,
we express no opinion as to whether other considerations may be relevant to the final disposition of this case should Congress not exercise its
authority to resolve these far-reaching Indian claims.
Id.
588. In May 1974, 60 Mohawk warriors took over an abandoned Girl Scout
camp at Moss Lake in the New York Adirondacks. They occupied the 612-acre site
for three years. In 1977, then New York Secretary of State Mario Cuomo and the
Mohawk faction reached a settlement. New York gave the Indians occupancy
rights, but not title, to two parcels of state land in Clinton County in exchange for
relinquishing the camp. See HAUpTMAN, supra note 136, at 29-30.
589. Associated Press, Mohawks, CanadianArmy Demolish Barriers Together,PHIL.
INQUIRER, Aug. 30, 1990, at A4. In the summer of 1990, Mohawk Indians near
Montreal, Canada, fought a gun battle with provincial police in an attempt to stop
the resort town of Oka from building a golf course on their ancestral land. Id. A
police officer was killed. Id. The Mohawks also blocked a number of roads, shut
down the Mercier Bridge into Montreal and threatened to blow up the bridge. P-I
News Services, Angry Crowd Assails Indians Near Montreal, SEATIrL POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 17, 1990, at A2. The bridge blockade infuriated commuters and local
residents, resulting in a number of racial incidents. Id. The Canadian government
called out the army, and a standoff over the bridge ensued. Associated Press,
supra,at A4. Leaders of the Mohawk community, the army and the Canadian government finally negotiated a settlement. Id. The barricades were dismantled without major bloodshed, and Oka agreed not to expand their golf course on the
disputed land. Id.
590. Treadwell, supra note 138, at Al. New York State attempted to tax cigarettes and gasoline sales to non-Indians on reservations. Id. Following a state court
ruling in 1992 upholding the State's authority to impose the tax, a number of
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States and local communities were generally able to ignore Native land claims until Congress and the Supreme Court finally
opened the federal courts to these claims. Through litigation, Native Americans have forced state, local and federal bureaucracies to
take their land claims seriously. The states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit, however, alters the balance of power by weakening both the Native claimants' and the local landowners' ability
to pressure states into settling. Without the threat of defense costs
or liability, states may be more susceptible to political and economic pressures against committing state resources to facilitating
voluntary settlements. Unless the local defendants can exert sufficient pressure on the states, or the federal government decides to
intervene against the states, local communities, businesses and
other private land owners will have to face tribal land claims with
little or no assistance. Negotiations are likely to become even more
protracted and agreements harder to reach. If Native land claims
are not resolved voluntarily, either the federal courts will have to
resolve them or the federal government will feel compelled to impose a solution.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Experience has shown that there are no simple solutions to the
continuing problem of Native American land claims. Everyone
"gets caught in the middle."
Congress could, of course, extinguish the tribes' title to the
land. 59 ' If title is based on ancestral tide, the federal government
does not even have to pay compensation. 5 92 However, involuntary
extinguishment merely perpetuates the inequitable treatment of
Native Americans throughout this country's history, exacerbates
their bitterness toward "white society," and does nothing to assuage
the country's collective guilt.59 3 Moreover, the Fifth Amendment
Senecas blocked roads and threw burning tires from a highway bridge in protest.
Id. The incident exacerbated tensions following the Seneca-Salamanca lease settlement. Id.
591. See Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 253 ("We agree that this litigation makes abundantly clear the necessity for congressional action."); Van Gestel, supra note 125, at
137-38 (calling on Congress to "live up to its representative responsibility and enact legislation that will resolve these issues in a way that is fair to all parties and will
clear away once and for all the clouds on title by these kinds of Indian land
claims"). Numerous bills have been introduced in Congress to unilaterally extinguish Indian land claims over the years.
592. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 288-89 (1955).
593. Discussing why Indian cases are typically omitted from the study of federal courts jurisprudence, Professor Judith Resnik explains:
The history of United States' dealings with the peoples who inhabited the
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requires the federal government to compensate the tribes for extinguishing formally recognized title.5 94 Given the current concern
for the budget deficit, extensive extinguishment of formally recognized Indian title is not only undesirable but also unlikely.
Some proponents of Native rights have suggested that the
tribes should forego litigation and concentrate on attaining economic growth and self-sufficiency. 595 Litigation and economic development strategies are often linked, however. Litigation is seen as
the catalyst for obtaining the resources necessary for economic and
social development, at least if it leads to a settlement. 596 Indeed,
filing suit may be the only way to get the non-Native bureaucracies'
attention in many instances.5 97 Pursuing economic growth will
continent before Western Europeans arrived is one of conquest, exploitation, and eradication. Phrases like "allotment," "discovery" and "relocation" capture events that are deeply embarrassing to those committed to
a vision of a United States founded upon consent and dedicated to nondiscriminatory treatment. Unlike the disturbing history of slavery, no arguably comfortable mileposts are available.
Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the FederalCourts, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 671, 696 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
594. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980).
595. See Tureen, supranote 141, at 147. Thomas Tureen, plaintiffs' counsel in
a number of the Eastern land claims, stated in his afterword to Paul Brodeur's
book on the Mashpee and Maine Indian land claims:
The future for Indian tribes, in this writer's view, does not lie in further land claims ....
[S]ituations in which the Nonintercourse Act, or
other federal laws or decisions involving Indians, offers meaningful opportunities for Indians to regain lost territory and rights are extremely
limited. And while the United States judicial system has displayed .remarkable restraint and tolerance during the Nonintercourse Act claims,
the Supreme Court has made clear in the Oneida decision that Indians
are dealing with the magnanimity of a rich and powerful nation, one that
is not about to divest itself or its non-Indian citizens of large acreage in
the name of its own laws. In short, ... it ultimately makes the rules and
arbitrates the game.
A far greater opportunity for Indian expansion and growth exists
within normal commercial channels.
Id.
596. See Hagan, supra note 35, at 28 ("The tactic of filing suit against landowners as well as states has proved highly successful in generating pressure for settlement."); Starna, supra note 189, at 165 ("Negotiated settlements, or more directly,
out-of-court resolutions of claims brought, were, from the outset, the [Iroquois']
primary strategy .... ").
597. For example, the success of the Pequot's casino in Ledyard, Connecticut,
has made gambling a desirable way of raising substantial funds. Some tribes may
be using land claims to pressure the states into negotiating agreements under
IGRA to allow casino gambling on Native land. SeeJudson, supra note 129, at BI
(discussing Paugussetts' claim in Connecticut); Denise Lavoie, Indians, Whites at
War-In Court; PaugussettsSeek to Reclaim Hundreds of Acres of Land Within Bridgeport,
Conn., FRESNo BEE,July 8, 1993, at 2 (South Valley) ("Bernard Wishnia, an attorney
... who is representing the tribe, concedes that the lawsuits are an attention-grabbing [strategy] ... aimed at pressuring officials to push for a settlement and gain-
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probably not end land claims, at least not in the near future, and
may actually increase the number of claims filed.
Forcing the federal courts to resolve tribal land claims also
raises problems. As discussed, the federal courts are not well-suited
to dealing with the complex social and political issues that Indian
land claims raise or to fashioning appropriate relief where the
claimants prevail. Moreover, court battles exacerbate tensions
among the tribe, state and local residents, often leaving bitter resentments that impair future relations.
Negotiated settlements are still the most viable, means for
resolving these disputes. The negotiations process can provide the
flexibility necessary for the parties to address each other's major
concerns. It can also establish a basis for better future relations.
The state generally plays an important role in reaching a negotiated
settlement. In most land claims, the federal government will contribute substantially to the settlement, but it will not approve an
agreement without the state's endorsement or a "fair-share" contribution from the local parties. Local communities normally lack the
necessary resources to make viable settlement offers without the
state's resources. Moreover, leaving local communities to shoulder
the burden of the settlement, especially in those cases where the
state was primarily at fault, is inequitable.
The states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from tribal suits
may impair voluntary settlements by weakening the Native claimants' bargaining power and by leaving local landowners and municipalities with insufficient resources and direction .tonegotiate viable
settlements. Although Congress can abrogate the states' immunity
from tribal suit in federal court, it is not likely to do so. The members of Congress represent their states, and it is highly.unlikely that
the states will willingly subject themselves to suits over Native land
claims. Moreover, abrogation is ultimately -not the ariswer. While
abrogation might restore the tribes' bargaining power, the adversarial nature of these disputes would remain. Furthermore, states
can always "stonewall," thereby protracting settlement talks and
forcing the federal courts to adjudicate Native land claims.
Ultimately, the states, federal government, local residents and
tribes must work together in good faith to resolve these disputes.
ing recognition for the tribe, which would help clear the way for the Paugussetts to
build a casino."); Agnes Palazzetti, Title Policies Assured for Grand Island, BuffALO
NEWS, Aug. 28, 1993, at Al (quoting Representative John J. LaFalce accusing Seneca Nation of filing its Grand Island, New York, land claim to make money via
coercive settlement or gambling casino).
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Although recently negotiated settlements are not flawless, they provide a basis for addressing pending and future land claims. The
invitation of Irving Powless, Jr., a chief of the Iroquois, remains the
best alternative:
The Creator has given us a mind. He has given us the
ability to sit and think. And we hope that we are intelligent enough to sit down and negotiate a solution to the
problem that faces us today. I think that, sitting under the
Tree of Peace with the Houdenosaunee, we can come to a
solution to the problem.5 98
598. Powless, supra note 2, at 161.
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